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Like all human beings,judges are influenced by personal routines and
behaviors that have become second nature to them or have somehow
dropped below the radar of their conscious control. Professor Ellen
Langer and others have labeled this general state "mindlessness." They
have distinguished "mindful" thinking as a process that all people can
employ to gain awareness of subconscious influences, and thus increase
the validity of their decisions. In this Article, I establish a theory of
"judicial mindfulness" that would guard against two types of "cold" bias
when interpreting legal materials. The first harmful bias involves
traumatic past events that might unknowingly influence judges when
they decide cases that are reminiscent of the trauma. The second
harmful bias involves the elimination of valid legal theories or the
interpretation of ambiguous phrases to mean only one thing, thus
motivating premature decision-making. Judicial mindfulness is attain-
able whenjudges implement two psychological techniques that fit within
psychologists Wilson and Brekke's general framework for correcting
instances of mental contamination: (1) negative practice and (2)
transitional or dialectical thought. These systems alert judges to their
biases by allowing them to understand how they arrive at decisions, and
then offer a framework that analyzes the processes they employ to
achieve legitimate legal conclusions.
I. INTRODUCTION
"There are Three things extreamly hard, Steel, a Diamond and to
know one's self."'
-B~ininFrwkfi
Only once have I witnessed a law student behave in a manner
disrespectful of a judge. The student recounted the tale of a federal
1. POOR RICHARD: THEAL\1ANACKS FORTHEYEARS 1733-1758, at 175 (Richard Saunders ed.,
1964) Jhereinafter AL\IANACI (citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALIANACK (1750)). As a
caveat, this Article rests on the assumption that judges should exercise self-awareness--they should know
whether biases have impaired the legal justifications they provide-whenever they have measurable
discretion. Just as America's judicial circuits have concerned themselves with the threat of gender and
acial biases influencing the courts, a majority of Americans are concerned with these types of influences
as well. Seegenerally Article, The Efficts If Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report f the.\Vnth Circuit Gender
Bias TaskForce: The Quali v ofJustice, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1994) (discussing concerns); John M. Scheb
& William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Court in High Regard, 77JUDICA-rURE 273,274 (1994) (noting that
sixty-nine percent of the national public believed justices should recognize and eliminate political biases
from decisions). When a decision is biased, even ifjudges provide legal bases for their decisions, they are
inherently less accurate. See injfa Part III (describing harmful judicial biases). In the pages that follow, I
provide a practical approach forjudges to achieve greater self-awareness.
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judge who read a self-help book in her chambers as she decided a case. '
Because the student acted as if the judge were neglecting her official
duties, his tale inspired an important question: should it be the case that
judges refrain from self-help? Seemingly, the vast majority of the
Americanjudiciary are no different than book dealers: they see self-help
as "the Rodney Dangerfield of publishing"-it just doesn't get any
respect.3 Like the movers-and-shakers of the business world, judges are
supposed to be self-reliant in the face of personal conflict.4 Yet,
notwithstanding doubts regarding self-help, many of which are
2. A student at a conference on judicial clerkships described a particularly odd experience while
interviewing with a federaljudge. When he met the judge, she was completing the review of a dispute that
required a promptjudgment. Thejudge held two items in her hands. While, in one hand, she grasped the
case file, in the other, the judge clenched a worn copy of a generic self-help book on improving decision-
making. The book had been opened to a dog-eared and thoroughly highlighted page featuring a shaded
box containing instructions on stress-reducing breathing techniques. Supposedly, while in the student's
presence, the judge followed these exercises by the number, and then commented that such exercises
enabled her to withstand the toils of her role. Professors, and students alike, were startled upon hearing the
story. In fact, the student referenced the meeting to convey the downside of interviewing with judges. He
echoed the popular criticism that it is not a judge's place to search for help from anything but case law or
treatises in resolving a given dilemma.
3. Daniel McGinn, Sel JHdp US.A., NEWSWEEK,Jan. 10, 2000, at 44.
4. Judges must achieve a final decision,just as the working world requires unquestioned obedience
while performing work routines. The duty to apply the law to cases may consequently raise conflicts for
judges. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (observing that "it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right"). CompareJudith V. Royster;
Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L REV. 241,255 (1998) (noting
"traditional rules of finality ofjudgments" in all legal proceedings), with MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAUSM (Talcott Paisons trans., 1958) (stressing the importance of working
within an occupational calling without concern for life's pressures).
A factor that complicates matters forjudges is a relatively widely held belief amongjudges that
they should avoid referring to any personal influences in their decision-making. This situation existed in
the 1920s when judges would have been "stoned in the street" for acknowledging such influences. Joseph
C. HutchesonJr., The udgment Intuitie: The Function of the "Hunch" in judicial Decision, 14 CORNELLL.Q. 274,
275, 278 (1929). A decade later, the stigma continued, requiringjudges to deal with behavioral matters in
"a sneaking, hole-in-corner manner." JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MINI) 152 (1930). And,
even today, little has changed. While judges recognize the need to reduce racial and gender bias in the
courts, the only way they have been willing to address such issues has been in an anonymous forum where
they can deny claiming responsibility for their beliefs. See Article, supra note 1, at 969 (describing a program
that "used a series of real-life vignettes gathered from the news media [and] elicited audience participation
by providingeach participant with computercapacity to give theiropinion, anonymouslyand immediately,
about whether a given scenario constituted gender-biased conduct"). The following risk thus presents itself:
pressure to limit disclosure of personal conflicts, which do not rise to a level requiring recusal from a case,
may very well condition judges to ignore such factors.
Under these models, reliance on self-help resources becomes a sign of personal weakness. See
Julia M. Klein, Book Review, A Nodler's Chicken Soup, THE NATION, Mar. 12, 2001, at 31 (noting Tom
Tiede's popular sentiment that readers who buy self-help books "may be congenitally programmed to fail");
Ira J. Hadnot, Editorial, Therapy By the Book Increasing Populaiy of"Self-Help" Works Sparks Debate About Their
Phises, Ainuses, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 23, 2000, at J (doubting individuals' choices when they
rely on advice from unsupported research).
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reasonably based,5 executives in all fields increasingly purchase self-help
tides and government agencies increasingly send top-level officials to
self-mastery workshops at taxpayers' expense.6
While the general public might be wise to continue seeking personal
guidance in its faithful trips to the bookshelves, it is less evident that
judges' unique problems are best addressed in the same generic self-help
racks. Although judges are well respected, judging is one of the most
stressful professions known (i.e., judges are often torn between the
mandate of the law as opposed to their own conscience).8 From a
3. See Hadnot, supra note 4, at J (observing estimates that over ninety-five percent of these books
are "published without any [supporting] research").
6. Consider that the number ofAmericans buying self-help titles rose 15% in only three years, from
33% in 1988 to 48% in 1991. Compare Leonard Wood, Sef-Help Buying Trends, PUB. WKLY., Oct. 14, 1988,
at 33 (reviewing Gallup Poll from 1988); Leah Garchik, S. F. CHRON.,July 27, 1991 (providing statistics
for 1991), with Robert D. Putnam, Are IWeJoiners or Loners?, ATIA.vrAJ. & COxST., Dec. 27, 1995, at 7A
(noting that 40% ofAmericans belonged to some type ofsupport group in 1994). These purchasers, in fact,
occupied many ofthe higher stations of American professional life. See Wood, supra, at 33 (noting that the
majority of self-help book buyers are college educated, aged 35-49, and earn an annual income over
$30,000); MargaretJones, 'Convergence'at the Bookstore, PUB. WKLY., Nov. 3, 1989, at 32 (noting a "typical
clientele [that is] 30-55 years old [and] college-educated or better").
In the realm of public service, self-help has touched the lives of our nation's most powerful
leaders. On December 30, 1994, President Clinton invited a number of self-help specialists to a retreat at
Camp David for counsel. His guests included Anthony Robbins and Stephen R. Covey, both ofNw hom are
known for self-help publications and seminars. See Ann Devroy, Clinton Turns to Two lVizards of Self-Help,
MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL,Jan. 4, 1995, at 4A (describing how former Minority Speaker Newt Gingrich had
also summoned Covey for advice). Yet, in light ofthis novel visit, a "prominent" official within the Clinton
Administration reported: "I was appalled .... My information is that the chief of staff (Leon Panetta)
didn't even know about [the meeting]." Robert Nova, Editorial, Ickes' Unseen Hand Running Democratic Pary,
BUFFALO NEWS,Jan. 14, 1995, at 3. Seemingly, this episode received more public outcry than rumors of
President Reagan's multiple meetings with psychics, which incidentally evidenced similar reliance on
metaphysical solutions to public officials' problems. Compare Wayne R. Anderson, Why Would People Not
Believe Weird Things?, 22 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, 42, 43 (1998) ("We smiled when we learned that Nancy
Reagan arranged her schedule (and that of the president?) on the advice of an astrologer..."), with
McGinn, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that agencies are spending taxpayers' money to send an increasing
number of military officials and public administrators to self-help workshops like the Covey symposium
regarding habits of effective people).
7. Seemingly, self-help book readers strive for keys to unlock the doors to their subconscious minds.
They want to know what restrains them from attaining personal goals. When we consider that Americans
have relied on such documents since the inception of this nation, such desires hardly seem immature or
childish. See, e.g., Introduction to ALMANACK, supra note I, at vii (observing how most Americans found the
Poor Richard's series "virtually indispensable"). However, it is not so clear that judges will prosper from
applying methods that are not specifically intended fbr the complex legal decision-making that they face
on a daily basis. See WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Foreword, in RUGGEROJ. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS:
A GUIDE TO CIEAR LEGAL THINKING, at xxi (3d ed. 1997) (noting that even college graduates are not
prepared to handle the legal analyses performed by first-year law students, let alone judges).
8. See C. Robert Showater & Tracy D. EelIs, Psychological Stress in the Judiciay, 33 CT. REV. 6, 6
(1996) (noting the NationalJudges Health-Stress Project's findings that "judges are over-represented in ...
'high stress' categor[ies] compared to other professionals"); James L. Gibson, Personaliy and Elite Political
Behavior' The Influence of Self Esteem on Judicial Decision Making, 43J. POL. 104, 114 (1981) ("Although
Americanjudges ... are subject to the expectation that they 'follow' precedents in making decisions, they
arejust as obviously expected, by others and by themselves, to 'dojustice."'); Karl Georg Wurzel, lethods
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psychological perspective, the major difficulty that results from such
stress is increased difficulty recognizing the presence of unwanted
thoughts. Studies indicate that "when individuals participate in complex
tasks, they are much less aware of themselves," which is only
compounded by the stress, which makes them "less self-conscious [and]
undermine[s] self-regulatory processes."9  Not only does this stress
impair the judge's ability to understand limitations on his conscious
control, it results in a diminished ability to "carefully weigh and
elaborate upon the various sources of information impinging on
them.""° In light of such impositions, judges may very well be obligated
to better understand their own limitations to successfully discharge their
duties.
While generic self-help may not be the appropriate way to build
necessary linkages between judges' own personalities and the judicial
role," this prohibition should not outweigh every imaginable self-help
method. The challenge is creating a resource for resolving a judge's
inner conflicts that is acceptable to peers who hold him to extremely
high standards. 2 This Article creates such an alternative resource. It
probes judicial mindsets with the hopes of revealing the human factors
that will enable judges to achieve greater reliability in their
interpretations of the most difficult cases and controversies. While we
could call this method judicial self-help, we should call it judicial
mindfulness because of how it is applied.
ofJudicial Thinking, in SCIENCE OFLEGAL METHOD 286,298 (192 1) (noting that "the judge is exposed more
than any other thinker to emotional influences," which can lead to errors injudgment).
9. James W. Pennebaker, Stream of Consciousness and Strs: Levls of Thinking in UNINTENDED
THOUGHT 327,330 (James S. Uleman &John A. Bargh eds., 1989) (hereinafter UNINTENDED THOUGHT).
10. Id. at.341. See also Chris Guthie et al., Inside the judicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 783
(2001) ("ffJudges make decisions under uncertain, time-pressured conditions that encourage reliance on
cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions ofjudgment.").
11. For more on this connection, see Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69
S. CAL. L. RE'. 1989, 2028-29 (1996): "[P]erceived judicial] constraint comes from a text, or more
precisely, [judges'] agreed-upon perception ofa text.... Thejudges' own personal ideologies are not law,
as judges themselves well know. They become part of law through a process of integration and
coordination whose contours are established by existing legal categories.".
12. See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential llemy ofjudicial Candor, 73 TEN. L REV. 1307, 1327 (1995)
(noting how judges often write opinions to impress one another). To highlight the demands ofpeer pressure
on the Supreme Court, seeJilda M. Aliotta, Social Backgrounds, Social Motives and Participation on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 267,279 (1988) (pointing out that "justices who graduated from less prestigious law
schools [may] feel that they are at a disadvantage in attempting to persuade their colleagues").
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II. PSYCHOLOGY AS TABOO IN LEGAL ADJUDICATION
The fact that scholars propound numerous conflicting theories of
constitutional interpretation, 3 for example, suggests the possibility that
these theories do not provide judges with enough guidance about how
to achieve the best outcomes-how to weigh and balance the competing
claims in a case. It follows that greater self-awareness of "blind spots',
or internal biases will aid this balancing process. Yet, self-help hardly
seems a leading contender for the appropriate solution to the problem
of constitutional interpretation.14
The major difficulty with theories of constitutional interpretation is
this: even if judges accepted them, none offer the kinds of practical
guidance that judges need to improve their decisions. 13 For example,
while Originalist methods of constitutional interpretation have been
celebrated for eliminating instances of bias with a rigid analytical
framework, 6 the theory has its drawbacks. It fails to identify howjudges
should prioritize conflicting historical sources or explain which approach
for resolving such dilemmas is optimal in a particular instance. 7
Because the legal profession demands clarity and thorough evaluation
in logical analyses, it seems hard to imagine that theories of
constitutional interpretation are just too difficult for scholars to grasp or
explain.' 8 There has to be some other explanation that eludes us for
determining whether a judge has achieved a sufficiently unbiased and
13. Without listing the multiple variations of constitutional theories, scholars have noted the
fundamental difficulty with most of these views. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentaty
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1998) (observing the "irreconcilable tension" between variations
of Originalism and living constitutionalism that "only increase as we move forward in time").
14. Presumably, some might argue that, at the most basic level, all theories of constitutional
interpretation are essentially methods ofjudicial self-help. On this view, the only difference between the
constitutional theories adopted by judges and self-help in general is the absence of psychological analysis.
Yet, given the fact that constitutional scholars directly refute psychological models, this notion hardly seems
compelling. See Robert A. Carter, Self-Help: It All Stirted 117th Ben Franklin ... And the Genre Continues Its
Impressive Growth in A any Felds, Including Accounting Law and A'Iedicine, PUB. WKLY., Oct. 14, 1988, at 28
(referring to West's Law in a .Nitshell series as a form of legal self-help); infra Part II.A (describing legal
scholar's direct attacks on psychologists).
15. See Kent Greenawah, The Enduring SignificanceofA:utralPndpks, 78 COLLM. L REV. 982, 1014
(1978) ("[Elach [theory.] is theoretically defective, and ... insofaras any of them are cast in ways that make
them plausible, they would not, even if accepted, be of much assistance for actual Justices.").
16. See David M. Zolmick, justice Scalia and His Critics: An Evploration of Salia's Futliy to His
Constitutional Maethodologj, 48 E.NIORY LJ. 1377, 1379 (1999) (expressing Justice Scalia's view that an
Originalist perspective defies the "mainstream constitutional theory, which he believes allows judges to
inject their own personal values into constitutional law").
17. See infra notes Part IV.B.III and accompanying text (describing potential inaccuracies injustices'
attempts to consult historical and other authoritative sources).
18. See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1014. (claiming that these theories may be too complex "to
yield to capsulization"-that they are beyond the comprehension of mere mortals).
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thus more accurate decision. In this Article, I propose one respect in
which constitutional theories are deficient in practice. They fail to
address an essential element of reality: judges are human beings, 19 and
as a result, are motivated by influences originating beyond the scope of
their immediate comprehension."0  This is not to say that alljudges
experience subconscious conflicts and psychoses to a level where they
are mentally disabled without aid of a special process.2' Instead, the
proposition states that theories of constitutional interpretation and
popular methods of legal analysis will work optimally ifjudges are aware
of how their own personalities and experiences might influence their
legal reasoning.
22
While many might label this the psychology of judicial decision-
making, 23 we must be careful not to adopt an overly broad reading of
the term pchologv here. Psychology, in general, involves a number of
analytical frameworks,24 whereas the science to which I am referring
involves the much narrower field of self-awareness. The centerpiece of
this Article is the concept of mindfulness, a relatively new theory that
focuses on transcending self-imposed limitations on one's decision-
making and determining the alternatives that exist absent such
impositions. 23 Whereas the self-awareness theory offers practical tools
to modify behavior, traditional psychological methods can do more
harm than good to interpreters of the Constitution for two reasons.
19. See BERNARD L. SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 3 (1944) ("It has been
intermittently discovered that judges are human beings, subject to the same fundamental laws of biology
and of psychology as are human beings generally."); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN,JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT? 12 (1999) ("Each justice is only human, and being human means
sometimes making decisions that are self-serving or in other ways biased.").
20. See Hat-old D. Lasswell, S&f-Analysis andJudicial Thinking, 40 INT'LJ. ETHICS 334, 336 (1930)
(recognizing that judges are influenced by "unseen compulsions" when analyzing and deciding cases);
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS H 112 (1921) (noting that judges are
influenced by forces "so far beneath the surface that they cannot reasonably be classified as other than
subconscious").
21. See EijT.NJ. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 26-27 (1989) (observing that [o] ne need not work through
deep-seated personal conflict to make conscious those thoughts that are mindlessly processed"). In fact,
scholars have doubted psychological models for this very same reason. SeeJames R. Elkins, 77e Legal
Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA. L. RE\,. 733, 738-59 (1978) ("The essential unresolved
question is whether insight for effective self-scrutiny is possible without the encouragement and guidance
ofan experienced psychoanalyst or psychotherapist.").
22. SeeinfraPartIV.
23. See generally Dan Simon,A PAchologicalIlodel o)JudicialDeision Making, 30 RUTGERS LJ. 1(1998)
(reviewing various theories in this category).
24. See generaly James L. Gibson, From Simpliciy to Compleity: 77Te Development of Theoy in the Study of
JudicialBehavior, 3 POL. BEHA\. 7 (1983) (describing the applicability of multiple psychological components
in the judging process, including role assumption, attitude, fact patterns, organizational behavior,
environmental concepts, and self-esteem).
23. See infra Part III (explaining Langer's theory).
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First, most psychological models are merely descriptive in nature and do
not offer solutions to the problems they explore.26 Second, and even
worse, the great majority of these models are so obtuse and complex that
many psychological theories exist, for all practical purposes, only within
the confines of the ivory towers of the academics who originated them.
Although the analytical methods that I propose would not force
intensive therapy on judges before hearing cases, even my less
demanding objective seems to be taboo in the field of American
jurisprudence. Legal scholars dismiss the notion that judicial decisions
should be evaluated on the basis of how a judge reached a particular
decision. Most do not care if a judge was influenced by psychological
factors, as long as the decision is justified by legally accepted methods.28
The remainder of this Article responds to the notion that psychology
is useless in aiding judges in their decision-making by distinguishing
several key points. Part II.B explains that the origin of a legal decision
particularly matters tojudges when facts give rise to legal indeterminacy,
the condition in which "the correct theory of legal reasoning fails to
yield a right answer or permits multiple answers to legal questions." 29
Next, Part III depicts the stages of the process by which judges exhibit
any number of particular biases falling under five overarching
categories. It then presents a model ofjudicial debiasing that envisions
mindful judging as its objective. This Part attempts to preserve "good"
biases and those instances where it is more optimal to keep a mental
process operating within the judge's subconscious.30 Part IV explains
26. Seegeneral Simon, supra note 23 (explaining the solely descriptive nature ofcurrent psychological
models).
27. For example, consider the following "operationalized model" ofjudicial decision-making in the
Supreme Court:
Voting behavior on civil rights and liberties or economics =justice's party identification +
appointing president's intentions index - southern regional origins - agricultural origins -
family social status (for economics only) + non-Protestant religion - first born - father as
government officer (for civil ights and liberties only) + judicial experience -
prosecutorial/judicial experience index.
C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Thme Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attibute Models of Supreme Court
Voting Behazior: 1916-88, 35 AM.J. POL. SCI. 460, 471.-72 (1991). The researchers who developed this
model confirmed that it accounts for up to fifty-one percent of the variance in decisions by forty-six
Supreme CourtJustices during the course of nearly six decades. Id. at 477. While this predictive model
may be impressive to statisticians, it does little to improve the quality ofjudicial opinions. Just as ajustice
cannot change the fact that she was born to a family ofgovemment officials, she probably would be unable
to determine whether the characteristics of her fellow Justices fit neatly enough within the categories
described to know how they would vote on a given issue.
28. See infra Part II.A (describing attacks on psychological theorists).
29. Ken Kress, Legal Indeteminazy, 77 CAL. L. REX. 283, 320 (1989). See also infia Part I1.A
(discussing indeterminacy).
30. See infra Part III.C (distinguishing "good" from "bad" biases).
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how and why the theory of judicial mindfulness successfully resolves
some crucial problems of legal analysis. Part V addresses practical
considerations regarding implementation of the theory. Part VI
concludes that the proposed psychological model increases judges'
decisional accuracy. We should note however, that the criticisms
pointed out by philosophers and other legal practitioners, which are
discussed immediately below, are often valid in cases where the law is
determinate. Consequently, judicial mindfulness is not always required
of the bench. We might say that this tactic should be reserved for the
"tougher cases."
3 1
A. The Demise of Social Science Approaches to Jurisprudnce
Sociological jurisprudence-the implementation of psychological
methodologies in legal analysis-emerged in the 1930s." JudgeJerome
Frank and Dean Roscoe Pound fostered this movement by echoing the
sentiments ofJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes33 and challenging the legal
profession to implement psychological methods in its analytical
processes. 4 The movement grew so strong that lawyers and judges alike
believed the Pound/Frank camp would soon transform the face of legal
education. But this raging inferno soon dwindled to no more than a
candle's light.36 And, while psychologists continue to float an occasional
theory in the direction of our nation's law reviews, none have compelled
31. See Caminetti '. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 483 (1917) ("Where the language is plain and
admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does. not arise and the rules which are to
aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."); infra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining
indeterminate and haid cases). Note, however, that cases can be "tough" for reasons other than legal
indeterminacy.
32. See Roscoe Pound, AMechanicaljurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L REV. 603,609-10 (1908) (calling for
a legal system "adjusted to human conditions").
33. See generalo OLIVER WENDELL HOLIES,JR., THE COMMON LAW I (1881) (noting that "[t]he
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience"); Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. RE\!. 457, 437 (1897) ("Law is merely a prediction ofwhatjudges will do.").
34. See FRANK, supra note 4, at 29 (demanding a psychological method because:
Most ofus are unwilling--and for the most part unable-to concede to what extent we are
controlled by ... biases. We cherish the notion that we are grown-up and rational, that we
know why we think and act as we do, that our thoughts and deeds have an objective
reference, that our beliefs are not biases but are of the other kind-the result of direct
observation ofobjective data.).
33. James A. Elkins, A Humanistic Perspective in Legal Education, 62 NEB. L REV. 494, 503, 303 n.45
(1983) (discussing the psychological movement in legal education).
36. See Jan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Etolution, 72 CAL. L REv. 343, 348 (1984)
(noting that "the checks [legal realists] drew on [social science] %vent unpaid for insufficient funds"); see also
Elkins, supra note 33, at 508 ("After the appearance of the psychoanalytic critiques in the 1960's and the
ear'ly 1970's, the concern for psychology began to wane as legal educators followed new intellectual
currents.").
10312002]
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law schools or legal practitioners to adopt uniform systems of
psychological training.
Although a myriad of theories have been advanced casting doubt on
the need for psychological methods of self-awareness in the law, they
essentially reduce to three primary explanations: (1) the notion of the
justification process, as advocated by Richard A. Wasserstrom;3 7 (2) the
theory of legitimate legal reasoning, as advanced in Steven Burton's
good faith thesis;38 and (3) the notion of moderate, or what I call healthy
indeterminacy, as illustrated by Ken Kress. 9  Together, the
37. Wasscrstrom observed that the outcome ofajudicial decision does not necessarily depend on
a judge's motivations when determining the law regarding that outcome. He distinguished the process of
discovery from the process ofjustification, where justification involves applying "logic[al] analysis" and
discovery involves the imagination and creative impulses a person experiences before directing her attention
to the task at hand. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THEJUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF
LEGALJUSTIFICATION 26-27 (1961) (noting that the process of justification describes thought, rather than
one's reaction to a text or situation). See also Scot W. Anderson, Note, Suneying the Realm: Descnption and
Adjudication in Law's Empire, 73 IOWA L. RExV. 131, 144 n.91 (1987) ("For example, Kekule discovered the
structure of the benzene ring while dozing before his fireplace. This discovery came to him fiom the
inspiration of his dream. That dream, however, does not justify that discovery. Justification rests, in this
case, on the rigors of scientific investigation."); STEVENJ. BURTONJUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 45 n. 17
(1992) ("Some causal reasons bear no relationship tojustification. We may be caused to act in some way
by misfiring neurons, by operant conditioning, by emotional impulses, or by external threats of harm.").
Accordingly, these reasons are not legal reasons because they fail to "establish that an act was right or
wrong." Id.
38. The good faith thesis holds that judges can reach legally justified decisions even in the face of
incompatible or indeterminate rationales because they follow legally acceptable guidelines. See BURTON,
supra note 37, at 12 ("[T]he rules of interpretation might be indeterminate, but all relevant policies and
principles supported by all relevant political moralities may converge on one resolution. Convergence is
possible at any level of analysis and might produce determinate results in a case."). Burton observed the
importance of serving the judicial role, from which judges would not intentionally depart. See id. at 33
(noting how "judges do not fulfill their legal duty if they act only on parts of the law with which they
agree").
Burton's notion ofjudicial honesty represents the view thatjudges do not intentionally deceive.
Compare Simon, supra note 23, at 93-94 (suggesting that judges are genuine because most cannot become
aware of their own influences without the right tools), ith Martin ShapiroJudg as Liars, 17 HARV.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y, 155, 156 (1994) (noting that becausejudges "must always deny their authority to make law,
even when they air making law.... [cjourts andjudges always lie"). There ale yet other explanations that
mediate between these extremes. See Simon, supra, at 17 (noting that if judges aie "deceptive," the
deception exists when they believe "even though the law seems coherent and I am not constrained by a
singularly correct decision, I will nonetheless report closure because that is what I am expected to do and
that serves the judicial function best"). Others might simply cite cases like United States v. Hater, 519 U.S.
801 (1996) (holding that it would be unconstitutional to make judges pay Social Security and Medicare
taxes, as these taxes would diminish the judges' salaries while they are in office), for the proposition that
judges are self-interested and have incentives to "regularly forego candor" when arriving at decisions. See
Idleman, supra note 12, at 1310.
39. Professor Kress defined indeterminacy as a situation where "legal questions lack single right
answers." Kress, supra note 29, at 283. See also id. at 320 ("[L]egal indeterminacy may properly be defined
in terms oflegal reasoning, as follows: low is indeterminate where the correct theory of legal reasoning fails
to yield a right answer or permits multiple answers to legal questions."). A number of scholars provide
similar analyses. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 273 (2d ed. 1994) (defining indeterminate law
as "incompletely regulated"); Gary Uawson, Legal Indetenninacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV.J.L & PUB.
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Wasserstrom-Burton-Kress model of legal decision-making (hereinafter
WBI) rests on three principles. First, judges must use legitimate legal
reasons to support their decisions. Second, judges are compelled by
official duty and legal training to reject purely emotional views as the
byproducts of the discovery process. Third, some level of indeterminacy
is healthful for the judicial process, because it provides new avenues of
exploration, as long as judges employ the prior two principles in their
analyses of less determinate legal bases.
B. Indeterminacy and the Rebirth of Psychological Analysis
Seemingly, the three WBKprinciples reject the notion that psychology
matters in the judicial process. However, a detailed analysis of the
principles reveals that each respective theorist, at the least, recognizes
the potential for unreliable legal analyses when judges use traditional
methods of interpretation. In Wasserstrom's model, "[t] he value of the
justification process is lost... if the judge does not pay attention in good
faith to the value of the justification he comes up with."4 Burton
acknowledges not only that "indeterminacy can be stubborn" but that
decisions made in ambiguous situations deserve extra attention because
they become the very "reasons ... that justify [a] particular law in the
first place."'" Furthermore, Professor Kress acknowledges the ever-
present threat of conclusions that are so rigid and formalistic that they
can actually limit the level of justice delivered to the public. Perhaps
these limitations might even include a judge's own decision to refrain
from realizing her own participation in a system characterized by
radical indeterminacy. 2
POL'Y 411,411 (1996) (defining indeterminacy as "the extent to which any particular legal theory cannot
provide knowable answers to concrete problems"). Some even compare indeterminacy with the notion of
the hard case. See HART, supra, at 272-73 (noting that in hard cases, when there is no law to be found, a
judge may "follow standards or ieasons for decision which are not dictated by the law").
Professor Kress affirmed that some level ofindeterminacy or indecisiveness is actually beneficial
and necessary for the proper functioning of the judiciary. See Kress, supra, at 293 ("11]t is arguable that
justice not only permits, but indeed requires moderate indeterminacy. Although justice demands that most
things be settled in advance, there must be room for flexibility in marginal and exceptional cases in order
that equity be done.") (emphasis added).
40. WILAIM L. REYNOLDS,JUDICIAL PROCF S IN A NUISHELL 60(1980).
41. BURTON, supra note 37, at 48 (describing the "privileged status" that judicial decision-making
should occupy in ambiguous situations because of its inhe rent risk). Cf. also Guthrie et ai., supra note 10,
at 781 ("Asjerome Frank put it, ifjudicial decisions are 'based on judge's hunches, then the way in which
the judge gets his hunches is the key to the judicial process. Whatever produces thejudge's hunches makes
the law."' (citing FRANK, supra note 4, at 104)).
42. See Kress, supra note 29, at 336 (surveying those who recommend the "instrumental use of the
indeterminacy thesis to unfreeze the legal mind and encourage creative legal solutions[,]" which
simulLneously cautions against the danger ofinflexible analyses). But cf. Lawson, supra note 39, at 421 ("All
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To a large extent, the reliability of each WBK theory rests on the
proposition that ajudge knows he is being influenced during the process
by which he discovers some principle of law when deciding a case. After
all, were a judge to say that it does not matter how he initially came
upon an idea because he substantiated it later at some point with
legitimate methods, for this assertion to be true, he would have to know:
(1) the source and extent of the motivation for her idea; (2) the weight of
the motivation in determining how he used legitimate methods of
analysis; and (3) that he would have selected the same methods of
interpretation if the motivation had differed.
The problem with theories like WBK is that, in their rejection of
psychology, they leave the judicial decision-making process virtually
unchecked. Professor Charles Lawrence has observed the exclusion and
ostracism of "students of the unconscious" in legal forums whenever
they address matters extending beyond expert testimony." Lawrence
further explains that this result is "hardly surprising" and that the
reluctance may even be "appropriate":
The law is our effort to rationalize our relationships with one another.
It is a system through which we attempt to define obligations and
responsibilities. Denial of the irrational is part of that system, as is our
notion that one should not be held responsible for any thoughts or
motives of which one is unaware.'
So, the legal community accepts the WBK, perhaps in an effort to let
sleeping dogs lie.
In the scientific community, similar arguments prevail, limiting
interest in locating and eliminating bias because of the unsettling
implications of detecting such contamination: "As a colleague once
remarked, 'If someone asks for constructive criticism, tell them
something good, because they don't really want to hear anything bad.'
In a way, [all] 'news' about human cognitive capacity is bad."4 3 Just as
the WBK theories represent the "good news" in the legal system, the
"good news" that the scientific community conjures up in defense of its
disinterest in debiasing is a set of similar and "[t]ypical arguments-
'The group overcomes the limitations of individual scientists,' or
else being equal, the more certain we can be about our conclusions, the less indeterminacy we will find.").
Also note Kress's rationale that "[t]he perasiveness of easy cases undercuts . . . claim[s] of radical
indeterminacy" does not preclude the possibility of unhealthy indeterminacy occurring. Kress, supra, at
296.
43. Charles R. Lwrence, III, 7he Id, th E go, and Equal Proction: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L REv. 317, 329 (1987).
44. Id.
45. DAVID FAUST, RJface to THE LI I'll, OF SCI E.FiFic REA.SONING, atxxvi (1984).
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'Scientific method ensures protection from cognitive limitations'-
[which] are put forth as self-evident, with little critical attempt to
consider the substantive issues raised by the judgment literature."46
In judicial decision-making, the "good news" ignores these facts:
"[M]aking true and making false are not things that facts do to judges.
The facts don't reach out and grab the decision-maker, preventing her
from deciding capriciously, or dictating themselves to her in any
unavoidable way."47 Because "[d]ifferent judges will reach different
results even when they all take themselves to be pursuing the right
answer," it logically follows that some level of self regulation is
necessary.48 Seeing that most of the small amount of whatjudges know
about self-regulation has come from psychological research, the
propositions for which the WBK theories stand exist more as a
psychological defense mechanism than a true response to the issue of
debiasing judges.
We are faced with the dilemma of whether judges can ever know
whether or not the motivation for a decision masquerades as its
justification-a justification that may happen to be false. If, indeed,
judges deny recognizing their own behavioral influences, they run the
risk of inaccurate49 decisions.5 0
46. Id. at xxv.
47. Jeremy Waldron, 7Te Irrleiarnce of Moral Objectizity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CO.NTE.IPORARY ESSAYS 158, 183 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
48. Id.
49. When I refer to inaccuracy, this does not mean judges are wrong. Instead it means they are less
accurate. See Wurzel, supra note 8, at 300 (noting that "[e] nrrs produced by emotion air felt most often and
easiest in the field of legal thinking." (emphasis added)). Consider Robert Cover's model of the judging
process. In it, he observes thatjudges use a process ofelimination to achieve a desired result. See Franklin
G. Snyder,.Aimos, .Varnative, andAdjudicationc Towardajurisgenic 7Teoy of Law, 40 WM. & MARN' L. REV. 1623,
1624 (1999) (citing Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Tenn -Forasrd. "omos and. arratite, 97 HARV.
L. RE\'. 4, 53 (1983) (defining term)):
When a judge faces a question in which legal meaning is contested ... the problem is not
•.. that there is a "gap" in the law or that the law is "unclear." Rather, there is simply too
much law-a host of meanings competing for recognition.... The role of thejudge therefore
is purely negative. It is "jurispathic" or law-killing ....
When judges unknowingly eliminate theories for the wrong reasons, while they are "not dishonest;" the
writing ofajudge's opinion will "not reflect the completeness and clarity essential to [the] thoroughgoing
integrity" required of his office. Robert A. Leflar, Honestjudicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721, 723
(1979). As a result, decisions lack accuracy because judges, in not stating the "real reasons" for their
decisions "can be misled by th[e] pretense [of the opinion and a] hidden fact may not emerge, or may
emerge incompletely." Id.
50. See Lawson, supra note 39, at 421-22 (" [Blccause of the lack ofconsciousness about the need for
standards of proof for legal claims, the standard employed in any context may shift without warning. It is
difficult to apply a standard consistently if one is not aware of the standa d or is not even aware that a
standard is being applied.").
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Th concerns regarding whether a judge knows the real reasons for
his decisions come into focus when we consider the risks posed by judges
who do not show the "correctness of their action" when they adopt a
particular theory or analyze a case in a particular way.5' In such cases,
justification may only "show that one or another way of going on should
be advantaged over others without support for the reasons why." 2
Suppose that an analytical method justified under these circumstances
leads to a correct decision only half of the time. Given that the decision
could have gone another way, if psychological methods, such as the one
proposed in this Article, help judges achieve a more well thought
conclusion, it stands that the psychological method should count as a
legitimate part of the justification process. In this instance,
psychological methods would be relevant to the process ofjudging by
helping judges determine and justify why they are using some
approaches at the exclusion of others.53 The next part of this Article will
explore areas of legal analysis in which the lack of a psychological
approach to limit bias threatens the accuracy ofjudicial determinations.
III. JUDICIAL BIAS AND ITS HARMFUL EFFECTS
A. Defining Judicial Bias
Critics of psychological methods of self-help in the law have treated
the term "bias" in only the most general sense. The generic view of bias
is so broad that it includes many aspects of the judge's own experience,
which can be seen as a benefit rather than a drawback. 54 Often, the
51. BURTON, supra note 37, at 19.
32. Id. (exploring the claims of"newjurisprudences").
53. Implementing psychological processes that reduce bias among judges makes sense for two
reasons. First, scholars following the lead of Herbert Wechsler have argued that neutrality is an essential
part of the judicial decision-making process. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward .Nutral Ainciples of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) (arguing for judges to provide "reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result"). See also William E. Nelson, Histony and
Neutralily in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REX'. 1237, 1263 (1986) (addressing concerns related to
applying neutral principles in a modern context). Second, the Supreme Court publicly affirms these
principles. See infra note 220 and accompanying text (explaining the position of the Supreme Court
regarding the quest for neutrality).
54. ProfessorJohn Leubsdorf explains that lawmakers, by failing to define the criteria of bias or an
unbiased "decision according to law," "cannot tell us what motives Will subvert decision according to law
and what motives will promote it." John Lcubsdorf, Theories q/judging and judge Disqualizfication, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 237, 241 (1987). In the most basic sense, "proof that a judge's mind is a complete tabula rasa
demonstrates lack of qualification, not lack of bias," suggesting the value of certain personal experiences
in judicial decision-making. LESIE W. ABRAMSON,JUDICIAL DISQUALIHCATION UNDER CANON 3 OF
THE CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT 24 (2d ed. 1992). Cf E. Tory Higgins &John A. Bargh, Unconscious
Sources ofSubjectivity and Suffering Is Consciousness the Solution?, in THE CONSTRUCTION OFSOCIAi JUDGA IENTS
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definition of bias changes, 3 as'legal scholars have understood that they
"may omit important types of bias not yet envisioned." 6  Recognizing
that certain biases are, in fact, healthy for the legal system, 37 the crucial
determination becomes developing a method of debiasing that will
simultaneously preserve the healthy aspects ofjudicial experience and
eliminate the unhealthy aspects of partiality. 8 Regulations guiding
judges in the area of judicial disqualification have attempted to strike
this delicate balance.59 The result has been law that is less than optimal
and rife with "cloudy distinctions that disqualify an occasional judge
while allowing many others to sit."6O Even here, the Supreme Court
expects sitting judges to detect and eliminate their own biases.6
67,81 (Leonarvd L Martin & Abraham Tesser eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONSTRUCTION] ("[I]f relatively
slow, serial, limited conscious thought had to take over everything typically handled by unconscious
processes, we would not be able even to get out of bed in the morning.").
55. The manner in which the definition of "bias" has transformed over the years in Black's Law
Dicionary offers an intriguing petspective. Asin the early years of Bouiiers Lao Dictionary, Black's explanation
of the term was similarly complex, attempting to offer a perspective on how the bias operated. Compare
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 238 (15th ed. 1883) (even recognizing exceptions that would permit courts
to be biased against groups rather than individuals), with BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (2d ed. 1910)
[hereinafter BLACK'S SECONDj (containing a similarly lengthy definition). But, in more recent years,
Black's has rescinded much of the former commentary. The most drastic omission occurred with the
release of the Seventh Edition in 1999. No longer did the definition of bias require a judge's mind to be
"perfectly open to conviction." Compare BLACK'S SECOND, supra, at 130 (alluding to a judge's
"predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open
to conviction"), and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (4th ed. 1968) (same), and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
147 (Sth ed. 1979) (same), andBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (6th ed. 1990) (same), with BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 133 (7th ed. 1999) (limiting the definition to a pithy reference to "[i]nclination" oi
"prejudice," and noting that the state originates "during a trial"). Either the editors have recognized the
impossibility of the mandate, or they have lost their grasp on the method by which a judge can attain such
levels of impartiality. See infra note 72 (revealing that this is true even among the most learned judges).
56. ABRAMSON,supra note 34, at 24.
57. In Likky v. United States, 310 U.S. 540 (1994), the Supreme Court recognized twosuch instances.
First, it may be necessary for ajudge to develop a certain animus towards a defendant to carry out his role:
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill
disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible
person. But thejudge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and
the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the pro-
ceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of thejudge's task.
Id. at 530-51 (1994) (emphasis added). Second, the Court permits those types ofjudicial biases that arise
firomjudges' exposure to legal scholarship and their resulting interpretations of the law. ld. at 554 ("hT]he
judge's view of the law acquired in scholarly reading... will not suffice" as grounds for "'bias or prejudice'
recusal").
58. See infra Part III.C.1 and accompanying text (explaining beneficial biases and unconscious
processes of which judges lack awareness).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994) (regulating the disqualification ofbiasedjudges); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)
(1994) (same); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT § 3C (1990) (same).
60. Leubsdorf, supra note 54, at 238.
61. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Likky sheds light on the responsibilities ofjudges to detect and
eliminate biases. In that case, he explains that the Court is not concerned with psychological types of biases
that may be influencing the judge: "One of the %'ery objects of law is the impartiality of its judges in fact
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Vagueness is ultimately the greatest obstacle to debiasing judicial
and in appearance. So in one sense it could be said that any disqualifying state of mind must originate from
a source outside law itself. That mewa-physical inquiry, however, is beside the point." Liteky, 510 U.S. at
558 (Kcnnedy,J., concurring). The reason why this rejection may at first seem undeniable is the role of
thejudge. The Court sees it as a duty ofjudges to become aware of their own biases and exercise control
over them. Justice Kennedy conveyed that the Court has "acceptled] the notion that the 'conscientious
judge will, as far as possible, make himselfaware of his biases... and, by that wcry self-knowledge, nullify
their effect."' Id. at 562 (citing In reJ.P. inahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1943) (Kennedy,J.,
concurring)). He further noted as a "requisite[ I ofjudicial office," the "skill and capacity to disregard
extraneous matters," so that judges can remain "faithful" to their oaths and "approach evety aspect of each
case with a neutral and objective disposition." Id. at 561-62 (KennedyJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
Kennedy alluded to the fact that this skill had been "acquired" by the judge but failed to explain where.
Id. at 562 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
If Justice Kennedy is mandating that judges should somehow know how to debias themselves
with knowledge gained prior to their assumption of office, he appears to be overly optimistic. Simply
consider the difficulty of theJustices and the counselors in oal arguments to definitively explain bias that
would rise to a "really bad" level. First was the exchange between ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Petitioner's
Counsel PcterJ. Thompson:
MR. THOMPSON: I think-you know, Congress, by passing this statute, a broad statute like
this, basically indicated that it may be very difficult to make these determinations. I don't
QUESTION: Whether it's difficult in a particular case for a judge to make it, I certainly
agree with you, but don't we have to have some uniform definition of bias before we can get
at the reasonableness and so forth, which may be very difficult?
MR. THOMPSON: ... [A] definition of bias as I think it would fit into the standards that
were applicable in 455(a), and what I came up with was this: cir umstances that would lead
a reasonable person to question whether thejudge's inclination or state of mind toward a
party belies favor or aversion to a degree or kind that might affect thejudge's impartiality
in the case.
I think a more exacting definition of bias or of the standard, or to anticipate all the different
ways in which it could come up ... would be almost impossible, and it needs to, ofcourse,
be handled on a case-by-case basis.
QUESIION: The problem-your response to the Chief Justice disclosed this. The
problem-what you're proposing is, it doesn'tjust open up every prior trial that a particular
defendant has had before thisjudge. It opens up any prior trial that involved the same kind
of issues....
... Isn't there any way to avoid subjecting the judiciary to that enormous burden?
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, LiteAy (No. 92-6921), available at 1993 U.S. TRANS
LEXIS 129, at* 10-12.
Anotherattempt similarly failed, this time initiated byJustice Scalia with Respondent's Counsel
Thomas G. Hungar.
QUESTION: Can you give me a definition of pervasive bias, because I really-I agree with
Justice Kennedy, I don't see what's gained by adopting this rule with this exception.
MR. HUNGAR: I'm not sure. It has to be-It has been fleshed out by the courts of appeals
on a case-by-case basis, and obviously it would-
QUESTION: Does it mean anything different than really bad bias? Is that what it means?
(Laughter)
MR. HUNGAR: That might be as good a way of putting it as any,Justice Scalia.
Id. at *29-30.
In both instances, counsel quickly entered into territory so murky that their best response was
allusion to the difficulty of the hypotheticals offered and the suggestion that the definition of bias is so
elusive, it is best interpreted on a case-by-case basis. LiteAy never addressed the precise stepsjudges should
take to improve theiranalyses if impeded by unconscious biases ofsome sort. Yet, in dictaJustice Kennedy
seemed adamant that judges have a duty to do so.
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decisions. Without pointing to particular instances of unhealthy bias, it
becomes relatively easy to oversimplify matters by explaining that no
methods would be sufficient to solve the problem: "If. . . 'bias' and
'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the
mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever
will."'62 This Article acknowledges the difficulties of determining when
judges should disqualify themselves for being biased.63 In part, it
borrows from the literature in this field to identify the goal of
impartiality and explain the basic premises behind bias that undercuts
such impartiality. Yet, it focuses on the types of bias that may be
eliminated upon their recognition, preventing the need for judicial
disqualification.64 To this end, the disqualification literature disfavors
those instances in which the judge relies on "an extrajudical source,
resulting in an opinion on the merits based on something other than
what the judge learned from participating in the case, 6 5 and favors
circumstances when the judge is impartial (viz, "lacks motives and
62. In reJ.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650,651 (2d Cir. 1943). Cf Leubsdorf, supra note 54, at 250
(challenging vague definitions of biases as mere "unconscious motives:" "If unconscious motives sway
everyone, how can one find a judge who is free of them? If only Hercules can find the correct result--or
if there is no correct resuh-how can we say that onejudge is better suited to decide a case than another?").
A more popular method ofoversimplifying matters is attributing anomalies injudicial decisions
to thejudges' politics. If "law is politics all the way down," short ofchanging political parties during a case,
thejudge has few options to remedy the problem. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies:A Political Histoo,, 100
YALE L.J. 1515, 1526 (1991) (reviewing this popular view); see also C.K. ROWLA.D & ROBERT A. CARP,
POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 47 (1996) (noting not only that judicial
decisions are strongly based uponjudges' political orientations, but also that theirdecisions shows allegiance
to the political party of the president who elected them). The problem with this theory is that it relieves
judges of the responsibility to understand other nonpolitical influences on their decision-making. Critics
of the political explanation demand that judges be provided the tools that are necessary to explore their
decisions in greater depth. See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 19, at 55 ("Though [political] labels fit, we need
to move beyond them in order to understand the determinants of opinion formationI [to the] . .. theory
[that] emphasizes the differences in processing information.").
63. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN &JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OFJUDICIAL PRACTICE.S AND AITITUDEs 4 (1995) ("Within th [e] firmework of rules
that too often fail to give adequate guidance, disqualification issues are becoming increasingly complex.");
Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminay Inquiy into the Ej/ict of Potentially Biasing Information on
Judgesandjrurors in CivilLtigation, 12 BEHAV. SCl. & L. 113, 117 (1994) (observing"the generally accepted
rule that virtually nothing the trial judge sees or hears during the proceeding in a case can spark a bias
sufliciently serious to \%arrant her removal").
64. C." infra text accompanying note 115 (dispelling the notion that a stigma must accompany the
treatment of all unconscious or preconscious processes occurring in one's decision-making).
65. ABRAMSON, supra note 54, at 24. See also RICHARD E. FA.I.MI,JUDICIALDISQUALIFCATION:
RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OFJUDGES § 4.6.5, at 138-39 (1996) (explaining same notion).
Extrajudicial sources create impairments in legal decision-makingand reasoning when they make "finding
the correct answer-or the class ofanswes that ar e not wrong... difficult forjudges." Icubsdorf, supra
note 54, at 261.
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assumptions that would tend to warp her perception of the correct
results"66 ).
Some legal scholars have attempted to categorize judicial bias
broadly. For example, one commentator suggests that "[j]udges are
biased when they adopt and give power to myths or stereotypes about
a group. 67  Such attempts, however, do not provide methods for
overcoming such biases. As a representative example, consider the
reflections ofJustice Lewis F. Powell on his deciding vote in Bowers v.
Hardwick" in 1990: "I think I probably made a mistake in that one."'6 9
Powell's admitted "mistake" was basing his decision on his own
experience, or lack thereof, with an entire segment of American society
-gays and lesbians.70 Some may read the quotation and determine that
Justice Powell's lack of experience rose to the level of bias observed at
the outset of this paragraph, 'or at least, perhaps, some degree of
homophobia.7 If this is so, we must ask the harder question: does the
definition provided explain how the bias operates-when a "myth or
stereotype" rises to a level that can contaminate a decision? Seemingly
not.72  Further, acknowledging those biases that are the most obvious
does little to help categorize others that operate more discreetly.73 The
problem is simply that "[h]uman judgments-even very bad ones-do
66. Leubsdorf, supra note 34 at 261; cf. also SHAMAN & GOLDSCH.1IDT, supra note 63, at 70
(stressing that "the areas of personal relationships and potential bias are in serious need of clarification").
67. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Relinm frnm Small Rules? Anti-Bias Canons as a Substitute for
Heightened Scrutiny, 83 MINN. L. REV. 363, 371 (2000).
68. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
69. Arnold Agneshwar, E'-Justice Stys He AIy Have Been I.[ung: Powell on Sodomy, NAT'L LJ., Nov.
3, 1990, at 3.
70. See, e.g., Ma rk Tanney, Note, The Deinse of Mariage Act: A "Bare Desire to Hann" an Unpopular
Alinorlyb Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 T.JEFFERSON L. REv'. 99,142 (1997) (suggesting
that Powell was homophobic in his Bowers opinion based on his comments of 1990 and the fact that Powell
"had never known a gay person").
71. See Brown, supra note 67 at 369-70 ("[I]n a legal system fraught with dejure discrimination
against gay men and lesbians, what does it mean to say that a judge manifests bias on the basis of sexual
orientation? To put the issue more provocatively, what does Canon 3 mean in a world where Bowers .
Hardwick is good law?"); Debra Lyn Bassett, judicialDisqualfication in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV.
1213, 1218 (2002) (suggesting that the Bowers decision and Powell's quote represent "underlying,
unconscious bias against gay men").
72. See Diane Kobrynowicz & Monica Biernat, Consideing Correctness, Contra4 and Categorization in
Stereotyping Phenomena, in STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION AND INHIBI-1ON 109, 111 (Robert S. WyerJr., ed.,
I th ed. 1998) (discussing the inherent difficulty of "determining the accuracy of a stereotype," let alone
when one is, in fact, "bad"); Guthrie et al., supra note 10, at 782 (noting that "even the most learned judges
have acknowledged that they do not understand /owjudges make decisions" because ofthe lack of probing
research on the topic and the failure to connect the task with an advanced body of psychological research)
(emphasis added). But see Brown, supra note 67, at 370 (explaining three instances that she believes would
qualify as actionable biases under Canon 3).
73. See ABRAMSON, supra note 54 (explaining that there are many biases that have yet been
discovered).
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not smell. '74 The law, therefore, fails to distinguish where the line exists
distinguishing good biases from bad.
Psychology can be useful in assisting judges in their analyses because
a number of psychologists investigating bias and debiasing processes
have begun to explain biases in terms of how they operate, rather than
by their results in individual instances. Norbert Kerr and his colleagues
have identified three such categories of bias, in which individuals act
under "self-enhancing or self-protective motives," use "cognitive short-
cuts or heuristics," or exhibit "inappropriate sensitivity or insensitivity
to certain types of information."7 5 Such biases lead to inevitable and
detectable results. Most notably, and relevant to the process ofjudging,
biased individuals commit "sins of omission," in which they "miss...
good cue[s]" 76 or "sins of commission," in which they "use a bad cue"
in decision-making." The legal community has only recently begun to
grasp these concepts," and has of late focused more on sins of
commission, which are easier to detect among samples ofjudges. 79
In an exhaustive study of 167 federal magistrates, Professor Chris
Guthrie and his colleagues investigated the effects on judges of several
heuristics noted in the psychology literature during the decision-making
process.8" The study concluded that "even highly qualified judges
inevitably rely on cognitive decision-making processes that can produce
systematic errors injudgment."' While observations on how to debias
judges were minimal in comparison to the authors' efforts to identify the
presence of the heuristics, the researchers doubted that the simple
74. Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and M'Iental Correction Unwanted
Influences onJudgments and Fwaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 121 (1994),
75. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias inJdgment. Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSN'CHOL REV. 687,
687 (1996).
76. Id. at 689. Particularly, these sins are committed when "the judge fails to use information held
to be diagnostic by the idealized model ofjudgment." Id.
77. ld. An example of this sin occurs when judges use a litigant's race to reach a decision that is
different from what it would have without such consideration. Id.
78. Guthrie et al., supra note 10, at 782 ("Few [studies] have dealt with the sources ofjudicial
error.").
79. The focus of Guthrie and his colleagues' research was admittedly directed towards sins of
commission. 'Just as certain patterns ofvisual stimuli can fool people's eyesight, leading them to see things
that are not really there, certain fact patterns can fool people's judgment, leading them to believe things
that are not really true." Id. at 780. Consequently, it is mainly errors in prediction of phenomena that
occupied the attention of the researchers. See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, inJUDGMEN-I AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPIJNARY READER
38, 53-54 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986) (explaining that their focus on many of the
same heuristics considered by Guthrie and Rachlinski was mainly concerned with errors in applying
"fundamental statistical rules" or considering "the effect of sample size on sampling variability").
80. See Guthrie et al., supra note 10, at 784 (providing descriptions of the "five common cognitive
illusions" tested on the judge-respondents); id. at 787-816 (applying the theories to their research results).
81. Id. at 779.
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methods accepted by most legal commentators supporting prevailing
WBK theories-they doubted that "increased attention and greater
deliberation [would] enable judges to abandon the heuristics that they
are otherwise inclined to rely upon [and] avoid the illusions ofjudgment
that these heuristics produce." 2 Instead, the study recommended that
"judges... learn to educate themselves about cognitive illusions so that
they can try to avoid the errors that these illusions tend to produce." 3
Exactly how judges should do this was an uncertain question in the
literature.
The Guthrie et al. study rejected the WBK approach to judicial
decision-making, concluding that
[e]ven with greater [legal] resources,judges will still resort to cognitive
shortcuts. Ifjudges are unaware of the cognitive illusions that reliance
on heuristics produces, then extra time and resources will be of no
help. Judges will believe that their decisions are sound and choose not
to spend the extra time and effort needed to make ajudgment that is
not influenced by cognitive illusions.8"
These findings are equally applicable to sins of omission because the
biasing processes work nearly identically. In both cases, the judge's
actions raise to the level of sins because he "cannot easily distinguish
between what 'the law says' and what [he] believes. ... 3 He therefore
''may not know how much he is (or should be) investigating what legal
sources say, and how much he is applying his own ideals."8 6
Consequently, biased judicial decision-making becomes detrimental to
thejustice system when the "investigation is so difficult that judges must
use intuitions and short-cuts, or when there is an unclear boundary
between questions having correct answers and those left to the values of
judges."87
This Article is more interested in "sins of omission" because they are
more difficult to detect and have been equally, if not more, neglected
than the dialogue on heuristics. While there is likewise "no single,
simple answer to" the question of "[w] hat... the legal system [can] do
to avoid or minimize" such biases,88 there have been significant
advances in the exploration of sins of omission that are worthy of
mention and experimentation in judicial self-awareness. At its heart,
82. Id. at 819. In fact, increased scrutiny ofdificuh legal sources that initially brought on biases can
"feed [directly] into some cognitive illusions." Id. at 820.
83. Id. at 821.
84. Id. at 820.
85. Leubsdorf, supra note 54, at 262.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 266.
88. Guthrie et al., supra note 10, at 821.
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this Article aims to develop a more comprehensive view of what bias is
and how it operates. To this end, the section below depicts a more
complete picture of how a judge progresses through the levels of
developing a biased judicial opinion.
B. The Elements of the Judicial Biasing Process
Figure 1, on the next page, charts five aspects of the biasing process
that can lead to judicial inaccuracy under Professor Leubsdorf's theory
of cognitive judging.89
1. Influences Present During Issue Framing
At the most basic level, the judge can potentially trigger certain
networks of thought that lead to biases when determining the essential
issues to be decided in a case. According to psychologist Donal E.
Carlston, all decision-makers work their way to the conclusion of a
determination by accessing nodes of senses and experiences that are
connected to neural networks.' Essentially, distinctions are blurred
between sight, sound, memory, and the other senses as these nodes are
activated.9 An individual can be led anywhere along the continuum of
the past events he has experienced without intending that destination. 2
In the judging process, the determination of issues can relate to matters
as varied as the existing precedent, rules of interpretation," thejudge's
experience with the issue in both legal and nonlegal terms,95 and the
audience for which the judge is writing.96 Each of these sources for issue
identification can raise unwanted though associated thoughts that
increase a judge's propensity toward multiple varieties of bias.
89. See supra notes Part II.A (explaining criteria).
90. Donal E. Carlston, Impression Fomation and the lodularAind. TheAssociated Systems Theory, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALJUDGME.NTS 301,318-22 & fig. 11.4 (Ionard L. Martin & Abraham Tesser
eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONSTRUCTION].
91. Id.
92. This also means that "retrieval of [specific] infornation... will vary depending on the nature
of other currently accessible material." L at 320. Cf Timothy D. Wilson & Sata D. Hodges, Attitudes as
Temporary Constructions, in CONSTRUCTION, supra note 90, at 37, 38 (suggesting that "people often have a
large, conflicting'data base' relevant to their attitudes on any given topic, and the attitude they have at any
given time depends on the subset of these data to which they attend").
93. See supra Part II.A and accompanying text (discussing the presumed reliability of accepted
conventions of legal reasoning).
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 54 and 57 (explaining the necessity ofjudges to rely on such experiences, which
they do often).
96. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing audiencesjudges may contemplate when
authoring opinions).
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FIGURE 1:
PROCESS THROUGH WHICHJUDGES' BIASES INFLUENCE THEIR
LEGAL DETERMINATIONS
Illustration by Jamie Boling
2. Triggers in the Process of Legal Analysis
-Following the specification of issues to be decided by the judge,
certain conventions of legal reasoning can trigger biases related to the
issues." These trigger points emerge when the judge further limits an
issue for the purpose of clarity,98 selects and eliminates theories of
97. See infra notes 148 and 228 (addressing practically infinite tools to aid the judge in legal
reasoning).
98. The power ofinitially framing issues in resolving any dispute is best illuminated in the mediation
literature. ProfessorJames Stark observes the following: "For their part, lawyers-who, like physicians,
ai taught to think in diagnostic categories-often prematurely 'classify the flow of reality' into the wrong
categories, because of insufficient training or insufficient sensitivity to the unique aspects of each client's
situation." James H. Stark, Preliminay Reflections on the Fstablishment ofa 'lediation Clinic, 2 CGUN. L. REX. 457,
480-81 (1996). Often, practitioners of the law will have to retrace their steps to alert themselves to issues
missed on the first go around. Id. at 481.
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interpretation,99 attempts to test a theory's utility by applying particular
unique facts to the theory,'00 or relies on certain aesthetic measures to
package the final determination for a particular audience or the general
audience who will be reading the opinion.' 0'
3. Factors Increasing Susceptibility to Bias
In a third element of the biasing process, the judge's own personal
characteristics will determine his susceptibility to a particular variation
of bias. These characteristics include the judge's level of "intention-
ality," in which a "judge is aware of a bias yet chooses to express it when
[he] could do otherwise";0 2 his "motivation," which relates to
conditions where "the bias has its origins in the judge's preferences,
goals, or values,"'0 3 or the "normative justification" in which he
engages.'0 4 In this final instance, judges use "some normative system"
to "distinguish[] appropriate or defensible biases from inappropriate or
indefensible biases."'05 Based on the invocation of these three factors
that increase susceptibility to biases, the judge may display any of
countless biases falling under five overarching categories.
4. The Types of Bias InfluencingJudges
The first type of bias is "advocacy," which roughly equates to the
"selective use and emphasis of evidence to promote a hypothesis,
99. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussingjurispathic decision-making and law killing).
100. See Simon, supra note 23, at 27 (explaining a prevailing model ofjudicial decision-making that
includes, as key elements "test[ing] conceptions" and using the results of such tests to "decide[ ] which
conception is the most satisfactory"). Some have asserted the possibility and recommendation thatjudges
attempt to test the validity of their hunches. On this view,judges similarly "follow the consequences of
their decisions [and evaluate] whether their subjective feeling of rightness has consequences that verify it."
Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic iustification of the Judicial Hunch, 33 U. RICH. L REV. 55, 81 (2001)
(responding to WilliamJames's pragmatic epistemology). Because each judge is an individual who views
life and the law in different and unique ways, there are few specifications on exactly hows analyses based on
precedent or hunches air to be tested in any definitive way. For the judge presiding in DeAngelis v. El Paso
MAun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591,593 (5th Cir. 1995), as explored in context infra note 191, the Archie
Bunker/Homer Simpson test for determining whether a defendant's behavior rose to a sufficient level of
egregiousness may have been totally warranted.
101. See infra Part IV.A (describing use ofomamental quotations and science fiction in legal opinions);
Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1047, 1051-32 (2002) (describing four
distinctive systems of legal analysis that he labels "aesthetics").
102. RobertJ. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 A.\N, REV. PSYCHOL.
239, 267-68 (1998).
103. Id. Note the way MacCoun differentiates between motivation and intentionality: "intentional
bias is motivated, but not all motivated biases are intentional." Id. at 268.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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without outright concealment or fabrication.' ' °6 The second is "fraud,"
or "intentional, conscious efforts to fabricate, conceal, or distort
evidence, for whatever reason-material gain, enhancing one's
professional reputation, protecting one's theories, or influencing a
political debate." ' The third is "cold bias," which operates at a largely
"unconscious" level "even when the judge is earnestly striving for
accuracy."' 8 The fourth is "hot bias," which is likewise unintended but
"directionally motivated," where "the judge wants a certain outcome to
prevail."° 9 The final variation is "skeptical processing," where a "judge
interprets the evidence in an unbiased manner, but [his] conclusions
may differ from those of other judges because of [his] prior probability
estimate, his asymmetric standard of proof, or both."" While these
biases may operate in different ways and their definitions may overlap
to a degree, it is possible to understand practically all instances that
commentators usually call biases as falling into one of these five groups.
5. Consequences of the Presence of Bias
Biases are bad when they either lead the decision-maker to use a bad
cue or miss a good one. In anticipation of the following section, which
identifies ways to become aware of biases, it is assumed that the more
the judge increases the missing of good cues or the use of bad ones, the
more mindless his decision is in the legal sense.
In the context of Figure 1, this Article is concerned with those judges
whose biases are triggered by the elimination of theories or packaging
of results, which evokes instances of cold biases that cause the judge to
miss good cues. To address the debiasing process in this respect, this
Article draws from a number of sources. The section below identifies
the framework for the process of debiasing in the most general sense,
which should be equally applicable to sins of omission and commission.
At each stage of the process, it highlights those actions that judges
should take to gain awareness of and correct instances of mental
contamination.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 269. This is the category in which most heuristics probably fall. See supra notes 79-83 and
accompanying text (describing the operation of most heuristics).
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C. The Stages ofthe Judicial Debiasing Process
1. The Necessity of Adopting a Pragmatic Approach
Before explaining the framework for debiasing mentally contaminated
judgments, further comment is necessary on distinguishing good from
bad biases. The disallowance of extrajudicial reasons for an opinion,
which underlies legal definitions of bias, is too vague for use as a
uniformly applicable standard to determine inappropriate biases."'
"[S]ome forms of bias are more forgivable than others" and others
"seem normatively defensible"' 2 because certain mental processes are
better left to the unconscious." 3 A body of literature addressing the
values of unconsciously dictated thoughts and actions sheds much
needed light on the issue.
Two pioneers in this field are psychologists E. Tory Higgins andJohn
A. Bargh. 4 They have advocated that preconscious and unconscious
thought processes are too often inappropriately stigmatized because
unwanted and uncontrollable "psychoanalytic variables such as
repression and perceptual defenses" have similar origins.' 13  They
suggest that people naively ignore the flipside of the equation indicating
that "consciousness is good when unconsciousness is bad."" 6 Namely,
consciousness "may be less helpful when unconsciousness itself is
good."" 7 While, on their face, "neither [level of mental processing] is
inherently good or bad,"'"' consciousness is good in instances when
"unconsciously generated influences on decisions and responses are
undesirable or inappropriate to current goals, or lacking altogether (as
111. The Supreme Court so stated when it rejected extrajudiciality as the singular meaningful factor
when determining whether judges should disqualify themselves:
As we have described [the "extrajudicial source" doctrine] ... th re is not much doctrine
to the doctrine. The fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside
judicial proceedings is not a necessary condition for "bias or prejudice" recusal, since
predispositions developed during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice.
Nor is it a sufficient condition for "bias or prejudice" recusal, since some opinions acquired
outside the context ofjudicial proceedings (for example, thejudge's view of the law acquired
in scholarly reading) will not suffice.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994).
112. MacCoun, supra note 102, at 263.
113. Infra Part III.C.I.
114. See generally E. Tory Higgins &John A. Bargh, Unconscious Sources ofSubjectiyiy and Suffering: Is Con-
sciousness the Solution?, in CONSTRUCTION, supra note 90, at 67 (making several key distinctions).
115. Id.at67n.1
116. Id.at81.
117. Id.
118. Id. at97.
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in completely novel circumstances)." ' 9 Consciousness is bad, however,
when it "inhibits the use of relevant stored knowledge.' 20  As the
researchers have stated:
When considering the advantages and disadvantages ofconsciousness,
it might be useful to distinguish consciousness of the problem and conscious
problem solving. When people are functioning maladaptively, it may be
necessary for them to become conscious that there is a problem before
the problem can be addressed. In this sense, consciousness may be
critical to problem solving. This does not imply, however, that
conscious processing is the best way to solve the identified problem.
... Once one has identified the problem, perhaps the best next step
is to "sleep on it." To attempt control at this stage may restrain rather
than facilitate discovering a solution.'2'
The authors likewise suggest "distinguish [ing between] the generation
of solutions and the assessment of solutions." 22 While "[u]nconscious
processing may be most effective and efficient when attempting to
generate the broadest range of possible solutions. . . . [c]onscious
processing... may be best when assessing the comparative utility of
alternative solutions."'' 23
Essentially, judges can learn two lessons from the research situating
unconscious biases. "[C]onsciousness implies awareness but not
understanding. If understanding is lacking, conscious processing per se
is not going to solve the problem."' 124  Furthermore, "the relative
advantages and disadvantages of conscious versus unconscious may vary
for different stages and aspects of problem-solving." 2 3 Observing the
various dimensions of the biasing process illustrated above in Figure 1,
it is clear that judges may not need to scrutinize their decision-making
until they are alerted to the fact that they have increased their own
119. Id. at 80.
120. Id. at 97. Such inhibition occurs when reference to the "here and now" only has a "less
informative" orientation than reflection on the past. Id. at 96. Furthermore, the researchers note how it
is often optimal to "Ilet sleeping dogs lie" and not waste time on an issue when "there is no solution to the
problem." Id. at 88. They present the following hypothetical to illustrate this point. "Telling a male
fijend, 'Women don't find you attractive because you're so short,' may increase his consciousness of the
problem, but it is unlikely to improve matters." Id. Yet another related difficulty is the natural tendency
ofdecision-makers to attempt to prove their theories correct even when new information indicates that they
have erved: "[W]hen one becomes aware of information disconfirming one's belief, one does not change
the belief. Instead, one mentally reworks the disconfirming evidence (e.g., by discrediting its validity, or
through a situational attribution) in order to preserve the prior belief." Id. at 95.
121. Id. at 96.
122. Id. (emphasis omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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susceptibility to bias or they have definitively identified one. Judges also
need to know when their debiasing efforts are likely to succeed.
2. Goals forJudicial Debiasing
Just as biasing needs an overarching definition, so does debiasing. In
this context, debiasing cannot merely mean thought suppression or
exercising some modicum of conscious control. While it is possible to
gain control over unwanted thoughts, many recognize the exhausting
nature of the practice if it is exercised on a regular basis. 26  Others
highlight the pitfalls of a premium on vague notions of suppressing
unwanted thoughts. 27 To be of use to judges, debiasing should be
defined according to a feasible objective. The definition must account
for the difficulty of eliminating negative thought processes that have yet
to be recognized by decision-makers, 2 let alone psychologists. 2 9 The
proposed model for judicial debiasing envisions judges who can better
understand how their particular personal experiences might trigger
certain biases; who can appreciate the limitations that such biases
impose; who can detect these biases once triggered; and finally, who can
determine the strength of such biases. Such an objective provides the
judge flexibility in responding to biases. If the judge is capable of
suppressing the thought sufficiently, he can allocate his energy
accordingly. If thejudge experiences difficulty, he might seek other help
or disqualify himself, if necessary.
The value of this pragmatic approach of limiting the scope ofjudicialdebiasing's objectives is evident upon comparison to decision-making
enhancers in other professional fields. Most notable is the Recognition-
Primed Decision (RPD) Model, 3 ' which has been applied to decision-
making settings as diverse as "firefighting, command and control,
126. See id. at 79-80 ("Through constant, repeated suppression of the habitual impulse, and the
substitution of a different, more acceptable or appropriate response, an undesirable unconscious response
may be supplanted with a new, desired one-but only through deliberate, conscious effort.").
127. Daniel M. Wegner & DavidJ. Schneider, Menta Cont1hL" The War of the Ghost in the Afachine, in
UNINTENDED THOUGHT, supra note 9, at 287,303 (explaining that people who want to eliminate thoughts
often can, yet "thought suppression [can] hale] ironic and troubling effects... in that the suppressed
thought can return, sometimes to be more absorbing than it was at the start").
128. See supra note 84 and infra note 210 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of dealing
with problems of which someone is unaware).
129. See Abramson, sufrn ote 54 (explaining that definitions of bias are growing in the advent of new
research).
130. See Gary Klein, How Can We Train Pilots to AMake Better Derisions, in AIRCREW TRAINING AND
ASSESS.NlEx-r 165, 171 fig.9.1 (Harold F. O'Neil, Jr. & Dee H. Andrews eds., 2000) (depicting and
describing how the RPD model is used to assist professionals in making more accurate decisions under
uncertain conditions).
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process control, [and] medicine."' 3' Experts who have implemented this
measure have recognized that attempting to remove all harmful biases
with any type of decision-making aid is an impossible undertaking.
32
Instead, these implementers recognize that certain heuristics can create
error and adopt the more realistic objective of "build[ing] the
experience base for [recognizing and] using heuristics more skillfully." 133
The method ofjudicial debiasing proposed in this Article will similarly
assist the judge in becoming more knowledgeable of himself. The
specific methods highlighted provide the judge vital tools sufficient to
gain such awareness.
3. Debiasing in General
In a practical context, judicial debiasing involves three categories of
action by the judge to eliminate instances of mindlessness, which will be
developed more fully in Part IV. The framework for the process was
developed by psychologists Timothy D. Wilson and Nancy Brekke.
134
After exploring aspects of several cold biases that extended far beyond
the realm of heuristics to several sins of omission, 11 the authors pointed
out the four criteria necessary to correct contaminated thought
processes:" 'l First, people "must be aware of the unwanted mental
process," which they can detect "directly" or "suspect" with awareness
of an appropriate "theory."' 37 Second, "[p]eople must be motivated to
correct the error."'" Although, "[e]ven if motivated to correct the
error, people must be aware of the magnitude of the bias."'39 Finally,
the individual must exhibit "[c]ontrol over [personal] responses to be
able to correct the unwanted mental processing."' 40 One example of the
exercise of such control is turning offthe counterargument autopilot that
131. Id. at 165.
132. Id. at 190.
133. I
134. &egenerdml Wilson & Brckke, supra note 74, at 119 fig.'.
135. &eid. at 142 app. B (describing"Unwanted ConsequencesofAutomatic Processing" and mental
contamination relating to "Source Confusion" as distinct from "Failurc[s] of [Applying a] Rule of
Knowledge and Application" and associating each type of bias with existing theories and specific studies).
136. "Mental contamination" is defined as "the process whereby a person has an unwanted
judgment, emotion, or behavior because of mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable," with
the term "unwanted" signifying that "the person making the judgment would preli:r not to be influenced
in the way he or she was." Wilson & Brekke, supra note 74, at 117.
137. Id. at 119. SeeasoiLd. at 130. . ,
138. Id. Elsewhere, the researchers explain that "people's motivation to correct for bias and, more
generally, their motivation to form an accurntejudgment are important determinants of the extent to which
they will avoid mental contamination." Id. at 131.
139. Id. at 120.
140. Id.
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Higgins and Bargh explained was likely to persist after realization of an
error injudgment. 4 ' The Wilson and Brekke model for debiasing is no
simple one.'42 Those legal scholars who have attempted to apply it in
the absence of specific practices that build on the framework have found
it to be of some value, but also that it poses a number of confusing and
unanswered questions."'
4. Judicial Debiasing
In developing ajudicial debiasing approach, it must be accepted that
the task is extremely complex, if for no reason other than the fact that
"people [often] do not have the proper control conditions, with random
assignment, that would enable them to determine how biased their
judgments are, even in the aggregate."' 44 Stated differently,
[D]ecision biases will not go away by manipulating simple variables,
such as asking people to work harder, or informing them about the
bias, or restructuring the task, but rather will require sophisticated
theories and techniques dealing with basic cognitive processes.' 3
141. See id. at 133; Higgins & Bargh, supra note 114.
142. Elsewhere, the authors have explained the difficulty of understanding mental processes. See
Wilson & Brekke, supra note 74, at 121:
When [people] form an evaluation of someone, what they experience subjectively is usually
the final product (e.g., "This guy is pretty attractive"), not the mental processes that
produced this product, such as the operation of a halo effect (e.g., people do not consciously
think, "Well, I like this guy, so I guess I'll boost my perception of how attractive he is").
Id.
143. See, e.g., linda Hamilton Krieger, Cizil Rights Perestroika: Inteigioup Relations Afkr Affirmative Action,
86 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1287-99 (1998) (applying Wilson and Brekke's theory to the hypothetical issue of
evaluating an African American student's poor level of preparation in a class the author was teaching); id.
(describing serious unresolved issues about the course of action she should pursue under the model to
correct likely errors in her unconscious thought process).
144. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 74, at 122. These concerns, however, have not stopped some
commentators from praising simpler methods for uncovering unconscious biases. In one instance, a Web-
based computer program has been theorized to settle the matter with regurd to gender, race, and age bias.
See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Sef-Critical Analysis: Te Case for a Qualified Evidentiay Equal
Employment Opportunity Priiege, 74 WASH. L. REX'. 913,939-64 (1999) (describing seveal aspects of"Implicit
Association Testing"); see also Fight Hate and Promote Tolerance, Test for Hidden Bias, t
http://%/%-'.tolerance.org/hidden-bias/02.htm (providing self-administered computer tests to detect
unconscious "Sexual Orientation Bias," "Racial Bias (Arab/Muslims)," "Racial Bias (Weapons)," "Racial
Bias (Black/White Children)," "Racial Bias (Black/White Adults)," "Racial Bias (Asian Americans)," "Age
Bias," "Gender Bias," and "Body Image Bias"). The drawback of this approach is the level of specificity
of the biases that the tests indicate. They fail to detect biases in particular instances, leaving one to
determine the presence of unconscious bias in only the most general sense. Respecting particular cases,
indications of the absence of a type of bias on the computer program may even be misleading to a judge
who experiences such bias in the courtroom.
145. Phillip M. Massad et al., UtiliZing SocialScience Information in the Poliy Process: Can Pychologists Help?,
in ADVANCES IN APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 213, 225 (Robert F. Kidd & MichaelJ. Saks eds., 1983).
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A more intensive effort to build on these basic principles is not futile,
however. "We may not be able to avoid a stereotypical or prejudiced
thought, but we can stop ourselves from acting on it."'46 As depicted in
Figure 2, below, the proposed method adopts three ofWilson & Brekke's
four steps as guideposts. It dismisses the third step, which requires
motivation to correct the bias, given that judges are required to correct
biases they know may influence theirjudgment and that any method of
self-help is of little use to those who do not desire such help.
FIGURE 2:
THE THREE STAGES OF THEJUDCTAL DEBIASING PROCESS
While Parts IV and V, below, explain the operation of the debiasing
process in great detail, it is wise to highlight the fact that debiasing is a
shared responsibility between judges and their educators. After judges
146. l
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learn the types of strategies to identify and eliminate biases, they must
endeavor to use the process in self-regulation. The judge's job at this
stage is not all that daunting. As one scholar has noted:
Judges can choose to forgo useless or misleading information. They
can adjust their responses-if not internal representations-in light of
information about nonrepresentativeness. They also have a third
option: They can make different use of the nonrepresentative
information. More specifically, they can use such information not as
a basis for judgments, but as a standard of comparison. Judgments
thereby acquire a comparative, relative quality, yielding a contrast
effect. 147
After ajudge becomes alerted to an anomaly in his analysis, correcting
the process may be as simple as relying on a different system of
reasoning.'48 In Professor Pierre Schlag's view, judges inevitably resort
to four of these legal "aesthetics," any of which may be shortsighted due
to lack of conscious awareness.'49 Testing a theory using the DS
Framework, explored in Part IV.B. 1, infia, may demonstrate a more
optimal form of reasoning that favors one aesthetic over the other.
Consequently, the optimal decision may rely on a reinterpretation of
fact or law in an analytical framework that enables more transitional
thought.'3 °
With these basic assumptions stated, the focus of this Article is not
bias in the generic sense, if "generic" means an inclination to decide a
case in a certain way based upon the judge's personal experience. This
is because, as the WBKpostulates, we would expect the judge to adopt
legal justifications that make his ultimate decision valid regardless of his
147. Fitz Strack, The Different Routes to Social Judgments: Evperiential Versus Informational Strategies, in
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 90, at 249, 270.
148. See Schlag, supra note 101, at 1051-52 (describing four types of legal aesthetics used by judges
to achieve judicial decisions, including the "grid aesthetic," the "energy aesthetic," the "prspectivist
aesthetic," and the "disassociative aesthetic"). Because all aesthetics under the model are necessary to the
legal reasoning process, it is presumed that some further indication ofcognitive limitation, besides the act
of privileging one aesthetic over another, is necessary before ajudge must implement a corrective measure.
Greater awareness that an aesthetic may be limiting a judge after review of an opinion is more probable
because "[a] legal aesthetic is something that a legal professional both undergoes and enacts, most often
in an automatic, unconscious manner." Id. at 1102. After recognition that there is a problem, it may be
more evident that "[a] position that may seem inexorable, or compelling [wvill] turn out to be an effect of
operating or thinking within a particular aesthetic ... that is itself neither necessary nor particularly
appealing." Id. at 1112.
149. Id. at 1!14.
150. To this end, different factors may result in biases depending on whether the analysis involves
interpreting the law, facts, or mixed questions of law and fact. See lcubsdorlf, supra note 54, at 262-63
(explaining that fact determinations most often create problem s when they involve reliance on unproven
assumptions, while legal determinations create problems when "judges do not know to what extent their
own values do or should influence the result").
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personal feelings."3' Instead, the dangerous "bias" comes in two distinct
forms. In the first case, the culprit is the traumatic past experience a
judge may have had-one that a present legal dispute invokes and one
that can ultimately determine the extent to which the judge considers
and applies the governing law. The second culprit is the mistaken
assumption resulting from the information ajudge perceives in one way,
but which could have, and should have, been understood in a
completely different context. In both cases the problem is one of process
(i.e., these negative influences exist when judges initially review data and
organize responses to them). 3 2 In other words, ifjudges have certain
inclinations towards seeing things--or not seeing things-in certain
ways, if the causes of these inclinations relate to the judges' past or
another extralegal influence, the WBK approach to decision-making
may not validate the judge's resolution of the legal issue.
Judges' past experiences, especially the more unsettling ones, have
long been a cause for concern in the judicial disqualification literature.13
When researchers have tested judges to determine the type of situations
involving bias that would cause judges to disqualify themselves from
deciding cases, they have found that the majority ofjudges are either
ambivalent to or disposed against disqualification, 54  even when
circumstances may create the appearance of impropriety.
55
Researchers explain that the "variety of factual situations with which
judges are confronted daily" influence judges based on their past
experiences to a much greater extent than the scenarios researchers
have developed in laboratory settings. ' Recognized examples of such
situations may include instances where judges dislike defendants they
151. It is not the aim of this Article to suggest that all of the biases indicated in Figure 1 can be
eliminated or controlled sufficiently with any uniform pvocess, or that a/!instancesofsuch bias a re possible
to control or eliminate.
152. See LANGER, supra note 21, at 75-77 (describing the value of adopting a critical orientation
toward process over outcome in improving one's ability to function optimally).
153. ConsiderJustice Frankfurter's noted comments as he disqualified himself from deciding Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak in 1952: "My feelings are so sirongly engaged as a victim of the practice in
controversy that I had better not participate injudicial judgment upon it." Jeffirey M. Shaman, Forwardto
LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUAIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CODE OFJUDICIAL
CONDUCT, at ix, x (1986) (citingJustice Frankfurter).
154. See SHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 63, at 31 (1995) (finding that fifty-four percent of
judges in their sample were ambivalent and thirty-two percent of the judges were disposed against
disqualification "in cases involving bias").
153. See id. at 37 (addressing the similarity of the current case to thejudge's own recent divorce); id.
at 40 (addressing ajudge who is a member of a group that restricts membership based on race and gender
deciding a similar case).
156. Id. at 51 (commenting that a judge's experiences to open-ended questions expanded the
researchers' understanding of pertinent conflicts based on the researchers' limited estimates).
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knew before hearing cases, 7 where judges are assaulted by defendants
in the past and later decide cases involving the same defendants, 13 8 or
where judges make public statements on topics regarding how certain
cases should be decided in general and then are assigned several of those
particular types of cases.1
39
A survey of 571 trial and intermediate court judges from Arkansas,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Ohio 6 ° provides crucial insight into the
types of issues thatjudges consider are worthy of recusal on the grounds
of bias. More important than those cases in which judges would
promptly disqualify themselves are those cases in which judges would sit
throughout the case. On balance, the judge-respondents were more
likely not to disqualify themselves when, for example, "a divorce case
[was] similar to the judge's own divorce"-even when the divorce
occurred "less tha[n] three years ago,"'' and when the "judge's son
[was] threatened by a party.' ' 162  Judges were ambivalent to
disqualification in situations similar to those where "the judge [was] a
member of a restrictive club and the case involve[d] a claim of
discrimination similar to the [racial and gender] restriction placed by
the club."' 63 These examples provide only a sampling of the majority
of bias-related scenarios to which judges were either ambivalent or
disposed against.'64
One explanation for these prevalent behaviors may be that thejudges
lacked the ability to determine the degree to which their unsettling past
experiences would influence their decision-making processes. For
example, "[t] hejudges that mentioned situations involving relationships
noted that it was difficult to pinpoint just when a personal or
professional relationship becomes too close to allow them to remain
impartial in a proceeding."' 63 Because the disqualification decision
mainly rests with judges themselves, the judges may have been
warranted in deciding to wait and see if any bias would emerge in such
cases. Yet, in the context of those pre- and subconscious factors that
threaten to limit the judges' analyses of theories or interpretations of
phrases or facts during decision-making, there can be no similar hope
157. Id. app. A, Item 32, at 32.
158. Id. app. A, Item 21, at 77.
139. Id. app. A, Item 23, at 77.
160. See id. at 1, 8, 3, 31 (explaining conditions under which judges were tested).
161. Id. at 37.
162. Id. at 54 tbl.3.
163. Id. at 40.
164. For further investigation of particular scenarios that were tested, see id. app. A, in which the
researchers labeled questions 20-25, 27-29, 31-33, and 39-40, as involving bias. Id. at 31,1.12 (labeling).
165. Id. at 61.
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for self-awareness. Although these unconscious impediments on
judgment may not rise to a level requiring recusal, they certainly caution
us to the quality of the judges' product.
The neural networks that make judges more susceptible to bias
involving past experiences can be activated by scenarios less charged
than hearing a case dealing with a defendant who had formerly struck
the same judge. More related to the potential bias involving the judge
who had recently experienced a similar divorce, suppose that a judge
had been assigned a case involving a rape or robbery resembling one
that he had experienced-or, for that matter, a rape or robbery
experienced by a relative or close friend. The judge's gut instinct will
naturally tell him to vindicate the interests of the victim of the familiar
crime. And, while the judge may attempt to control thoughts that
incline him to decide the case in a manner favoring such vindication, the
judge cannot deactivate preconscious networks of thought that may
foreclose the evaluation of theories of law that would otherwise be
available in the more traditional process of legal reasoning. "' It
becomes essential then for the judge to implement a process that
evaluates the consistency and reliability of the analysis that created the
outcome of his decision.'67
The second, more prevalent, example of cold bias considered by this
Article is best related in the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose
that a state supreme court justice attends a distinguished panel at the
local university's law school. While there, the Dean invites the justice
to visit his home: 'Justice, it would be an honor if you came to meet my
son; he's so spontaneous, you'll just love him." The justice cheerfully
agrees and proceeds to his waiting suburban utility vehicle. In the
alternative, suppose the Dean instead had said: "Justice, it would be an
honor if you came to meet my son; he's so impulsive, you'll just love
166. See Wegner & Schneider, supra note 127, at 303 ("FMlotivated thinking may not have the clean-
cut success we sometimes find with motivated physical activities. When we want to brush our teeth or hop
on one foot, we can usually do so; when we want to control our minds, we may find that nothing works as
it should.").
167. Perhaps this example brings Sigmund Freud's work to mind. Freud often emphasized the
concept of "working through" serious emotional issues to gain awareness of their influence in people's lives
even years after the initial incident. Anne C. Dailey, StrizingforRationaliy: Open Mindk Vorkng out he LAogic
of the Soul, 86 VA. L. RE\,. 349, 366 (2000) (book review) (describing concept). The resulting issue for the
purpose of this Article becomes whether it is realistic for us to expect that the judge has the tolerance and
capacity to scrutinize the horrific details of his own misfortunes and then direct his effort toward reducing
their negative effects. One view might hold that judges, as most humans, will find the process too
uncomfortable and would rather leave these types of decisions unexplored as not to bring skeletons out of
the closet. The contrary view would recognize that these types of situations rarely arise. Because the
resulting disruption will be infrequent, judges must still recognize their official duties and address factors
that might potentially influence their impartiality, regardless of the discomfort associated with the task. As
we shall see, this Article identifies tools thatjudges may use to locate, identify, and deal with such conflicts.
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him." With that, the judge instead provides a well thought excuse and
proceeds to mingle with the other guests. In these last two examples, the
difference in the judge's response depended on the connotations he had
preconceived about the meaning of the word "impulsive," as opposed
to the word "spontaneous," even though they both meant the same
thing. 6 ' Professor Langer provides similar examples of this judgmental
phenomenon:
[T]here are as many different views as there are different observers.
... If there is only one perspective, you can't both be right. But with
an awareness of many perspectives, you could accept that you are
both right and concentrate on whether your remarks had the effect
that you actually wanted to produce .... It is easy to see that any
single gesture, remark, or act... can have at least two interpretations:
spontaneous versus impulsive; consistent versus rigid; softhearted
versus weak; intense versus overemotional; and so on.'69
In fact, in an experiment she appropriately titled "Patient by Any Other
Name,"'70 Langer documented the same type of error in judgment
among mental health professionals. Langer was prompted to investigate
the prevalence of premature labeling by the troubling realization that
she considered people who described certain emotional problems in
clinical settings as being "patients"' 7' with troubles, while she viewed
friends describing the same exact emotional difficulties outside of the
clinical setting as being perfectly normal.'72 Consequently, to test how
widespread these types of biases were in the decision-making process,
Langer and her colleague recorded an interview with "a rather
168. See WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1067 (1999) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S Ill
(defining "spontaneous" as "[i]mpulsive; unpremeditated"). On the view that it is questionable to rely on
dictionary definitions and the ambiguity of these words appears dubious, see inra note 218 (describing the
unreliability of dictionary definitions), consider the example of a judge determining the fate of a juvenile
offender. In one instance, the defendant is described by the prosecutor as being a "troubled youth." In the
alternative, the same defendant is described as "a good kid who made a mistake." Although the same
defendant with the same record is being described, simply based on the difference between these two
contrasting designations, the judge could foreseeably reach a different conclusion.
169. LANGER, supra note 21, at 68-69.
170. See generalv Ellen Langer and Robert Ableson, A Patient By Any Other aure .... Clinician Group
hifferences in Labeling Bias, 42J. COUNSEI .NG & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 4 (1974).
171. LANGER, supra note 21, at 155 ("When we discussed certain behaviors or feelings that they saw
as a problem, I also tended to see whatever they reported as abnormal. I saw their behavior as consistent
with the label of patient.").
172. Id. As Langer explains,
Later, outside of the therapy context, when I encountered exactly the same behavior [as
exhibited by the patients] (for example, difficulty in making a decision or in making a
commitment) or feelings (like guilt or the fearoffailure) in people whom I know, it appeared
to be perfectly common or to make sense given the circumstances.
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ordinary-looking man" discussing aspects of his employment. 73 They
previewed the film to a group of psychotherapists and told one half that
he was a "patient," as opposed to the other half, to whom they told he
was a "job applicant." The researchers had further placed professionals
trained in two different types of clinical theory-one that supported
labeling patients and one that rejected the notion of labeling-in both
the control and experimental groups.'74 They subsequently observed
the following:
[W]hen we called the man on the tape a job applicant, he was
perceived by both groups of therapists to be well adjusted. When he
was labeled a patient, therapists trained to avoid the use of labels still
saw him as well adjusted. Many of the other therapists, on the other
hand, saw him as having serious psychological problems.'
7 5
In Langer's study, it was the viewers who had not been immunized-
those who had not eschewed the use of labels-who proceeded in a
mindless way by letting their preconceptions dictate their interpretation
of the evidence. Without a method for determining when judges have
closed their minds to meaningful alternatives, judges often fall into the
same trap when interpreting statutes or cases in which word meanings
or theoretical concepts can potentially lead to contrary conclusions. 176
In other words,judges might prematurely assume that the facts of a case
should lead them to a certain mode of constitutional interpretation, for
example, or a specific method within that mode.' On balance, these
173. Id.
174. Halfofthe subjects were familiar with the "classical doctrine ofmental illness," which is heavily
dependent on labels indicating patients' illnesses, while the other half were behavior therapists whose
training "explicitly encourages" discounting such labels. Langer & Ableson, supra note 170, at 8, 9.
175. LANGER, supra note 21, at 156. See also Langer & Ableson, supra note 170, at 7 ("Do the
traditional clinicians generate a significantly bigger adjustment difference betweenjob applicant and patient
than do behavioral clinicians? The answer is yes (F= 4.75,p < .05).").
176. See also supra note 168 (discussing a judge's possible different reactions to a youth offender
described as a "troubled youth" versus "a good kid who made a mistake.")
177. Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, lultiple E'planation: A Consider-an-Alternathe Strategfor
DebuasingJudgments, 69J. PERSOXAUT' & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1069, 1070 (1995). Psychology offers a number
of possible explanations for this result. The following commentary synopsizes a number of studies.
Consider the "change-of-standard" effect, in which "people make an initialjudgment... in relation to one
standard and then later, when using the judgment in their current responding, reinterpret the meaning of
that judgment in relation to a diffierent standard without taking the change of standard into account
sufficiently." E. Tory Higgins & Akiva Liberman, Alemog Errors From a Change of Standard: Lack ofAwareness
or Understanding?, 27 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 227, 228 (1994). On this view, ajudge might see a similarity
between the way he had interpreted a statute earlier and mindlessly jump into the same type of analysis
without considering the unique new questions posed by the litigants or the facts. Alternatively, consider
the notion of "self-enhancement bias," where people exhibit "the tendency to see [themselves] as better
than [they] really are." Jonathan A. White & S. Pious, Self-Enhancement and Social Responsibiliy: On Caring
More, But Doing Less, Than Others, 25J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1297, 1297 (1995). The danger here is that
such biases "lead to a complacency in which people ignore legitimate risks and fail to take necessary actions
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types of bias show how judges may be stopping short their analyses and
thus their achievement of the better or best resolution to the legal
problem in question at any given time.
The thrust of this Article is that premature information processing
during the judicial decision-making process poses a societal problem
even if the legal analysis that results from the premature commitment is
perfectly rational and legitimate from a legal standpoint. What we see
both in the case of the judges whose past experiences triggered a
subconscious reaction and the judge at the cocktail party is a harmful
type of bias. The negative connotation does not arise because the judges
failed to provide a reliable justification. After all, the cases on which the
first grouping of judges would rely to support their decisions, and the
dictionary meaning of the word "impulsive" on which the second justice
proceeded, would be perfectly legitimate.'78 Instead, these biases are
dangerous if the judges allow their first impressions of a situation to
dominate the structure of their future analyses without recognizing other
equally viable alternatives. Put differently, danger arises if these judges
stop analyzing facts too soon.179
On a grand scale, when such biases go unchecked during the process
of legal interpretation, there exists a risk that the optimum answer will
not be given. It is a danger that judges may not consider all of the
relevant arguments and will thus achieve a result that-albeit certainly
legally legitimate--still falls short of the best answer in the given
situation, or, at the very least, a better answer. One can base this result
on the fact that continuing review and reflection might have resulted in
a more informed decision. And, quite possibly, the more informed
or precautions. For example ... people who believe they will not become sick are less likely than others
to immunize themselves against the flu." Id. at 1298 (citations omitted). In this case, judges might feel
overconfident regarding their abilities to apply constitutional theories to issues based on the fact that they
have implemented such analyses for years, all the while knowing the ironic truth that they may be
determining new areas of law that have not yet been addressed and require the most demanding models
of interpretation. The notion that certain legal issues have never been addressed should caution judges to
be especially aware of unique circumstances, while routine application ofan interpretive theory would call
for the opposite (i.e., finding similarities with predetermined outcomes to guide the present analysis).
178. WEBSTER'S II, supra note 168, at 1067.
179. Normally, it poses no problem when a judge decides to stop reviewing materials in a case.
Professor Simon's theory of"satisficing" sees decisions to stop researching as a natural practice among all
decision-makers. SeeJ. MARCH & H. SImON, ORGANIZATIONS 140 (1959) (describing how individuals settle
for the solutions that are "good enough" to meet the criteria for a decision without continuing the search
until they find the best answer); see also Larry T. Gav'in,AdequateAssuranceofPerfomance: Of Risk Duress, and
Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 71, 141 (1998) (noting how the concept of satisficing embraces, rather than
rejects rationality in its approximation of human nature). The problem I address does not attack judges
for satisficing. Instead, it deals with judges' conclusions that fall short of a "good enough" decision because
the materials on which they rely fail to account for equally compelling or legitimate theories or facts-facts
that may be at their fingertips, though they choose to ignore them due to the influence of biases.
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decision could have altered the outcome of the case and thus could have
transformed the law into a more responsive body of authority capable
of meeting the challenges of an ever-changing society. 8 °
The two instances of bias described above threaten judges because
they petrify the law and limit it to the past, while the social dynamics
and norms of our lives are constantly changing.' Accordingly, limiting
the influence of these biases should be among judges' major priorities.
But this task poses a significant challenge: determining when judges
should seek help and not only where they need to look when they find a
dilemma. I offer the following framework to illustrate how judges can
determine whether they should attempt debiasing in the two situations
described above.
Assume that there are two types ofjudges: those who are willing to
address biases of which they are made aware, and those who are
unwilling to address biases they know exist in a given case (short of
recusal) or in the course of decision-making in general. This Article
concerns itself with the first group ofjudges because they are the ones
who will benefit by learning about new methods of self-analysis.
However, both categories of biased judges will fall into three groups
based on their behaviors. In the first cluster, the biased judge represents
himself to peers, the public, the press, or the parties in a case as if he has
not been influenced in any way. In the second cluster, these audiences
will suspect something unusual about the way the biased judge reached
a decision based on the textual sources he quotes or the analogies he
raises. Finally, the third cluster of biased judges will make statements or
issue opinions that blatantly reveal the presence of the bias.
In responding to biases in these three groups, we can easily address
two of the scenarios: the first and the third. The first group of biased
judges poses the greatest risk because the biased judge's audience may
assume that he achieved a legal decision by exhausting all legitimate
avenues of analysis, when, in fact, the bias caused him to decide the case
prematurely. Thesejudges must become aware of their own inclinations
and should constantly check themselves with the methods described in
Parts IV and V of this Article when making decisions. Similarly, in the
third group, we need not worry excessively about the effects of bias,
180. See Guthrie et al., supra note 10 at 778 ("The quality of the judicial system depends upon the
quality of decisions that judges make.").
181. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 309 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Mai-hall trans., 2d ed. 1989) (1960) (noting that a "text... if it is to be understood pr-operly-i.e., accoiding
to the claim it makes-must be understood at every moment, in evety concrete situation, in a new and
diffe ent way.").
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because the biased judge's audience will know of the bias and will most
likely dismiss the validity of the contaminated analysis.'82
The second group ofjudges, those who act peculiarly, create the most
trouble for the public because they challenge their audiences, and even
themselves, to gauge whether the deviant behavior reveals the presence
of bias or exists for some other purpose. To eliminate these biases, a
number of legal scholars have proposed tentative solutions. Some
suggest further empowerment ofjuries. "3 Others would invest greater
resources in litigants, such as the implementation of a peremptory
challenge system to remove biased appellate court judges.'84 Yet others
would develop multi-judge panels instead of having judges sit alone. 8 5
And still more explain that certain "rules of thumb" can succeed in
limiting unconscious bias.'86
The difficulty of implementing many of these reforms would stem
from the complete overhaul of the justice system that they would
require. As the dialogue expands on developing ways to implement
such reforms, this Article offers temporary measures that might help
182. For example, Professor Wrightsman points to thejudge who decided that a father who had been
convicted of murdering his former wife, had been accused of child molestation, and had been behind in
paying his child support, should have custody of his eleven year-old daughter in a legal battle against her
lesbian mother because of thejudge's position on homosexuality: "I'm opposed to it, and that's my beliefs."
WRIGHTSN AN, supra note 19, at 49 (citing L Pitts, Jr., Judicial Homophobia Led to Biarre Custody Decision
Favoring Killer Dad, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 8, 1996, at C13). In such a case, if the judge had not turned
to any legal basis for proclaiming that the girl's mother was unfit, then his statements should naturally alert
others to be weary of the assessment. Cf Panel to Ev'nineRemarks ofjndge on Homosesuals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 1988, at A16 (citingJudge Jack Hampton's reason for giving a murderer a lenient sentence, "I don't
care much for queers cruising the streets, picking up teen.age boys. I've got a teen-age boy .... [I] put
prostitutes and gays at about the same level .... I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a
prostitute.").
Similar sentiments about obvious biases were expressed during oral arguments in LitekAy:
QUFSTION: Supposing that ajudge-take in this 1983 trial,Judge Elliot had made rulings
that were beyond challenge at all, and-but commented when the defendant finally was led
off to where-["Yiou know, I think you're a worthless, mealy-mouthed little tool, and I
hope I never see you in this court again.["] Now, is that pernsive bias?
MR. HUNGAR: Obviously, Mr. ChiefJustice, it's difficult to draw precise lines in this area.
That might well rise to the level of pervasive bias.
QUESTION: If that doesn't, what would?
(Laughter).
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Uteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (No. 92-
6921), available at 1993 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 129, at *20-21.
183. Set Patricia Cohen, judicial Reasoning Is All Too Human, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2001, at B9
(recounting Professor Shari Seidman Diamond's recommendation to "[riely on juries because they can be
shielded from unlawful evidence").
184. See generally Bassett, supra note 7 1.
185. See Cohen, supra note 183, at B9 (relating the recommendation of Professor Steven Landsman
to "[c]onsider having a panel instead of a single judge rule on [lower court] cases, as is regularly done on
the appellate level").
186. Id. at B9 (noting the comments of PmfessorJeffreyJ. Rachlinski).
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biased judges and their audiences recognize the need for debiasing.
Often the judicial opinion itself can provide the framework for the
detection of bias through the manner in which judges package their
arguments. In Professor Amsterdam and Bruner's work Minding the
Law,"7 the researchers analyzed judicial opinions to determine whether
judges internalized certain societal myths.' Professor Guthrie and his
colleagues also recognized a point helpful to their research: "[m]ost
importantly, published judicial opinions include examples of the
influence of cognitive illusions."' 89
To illustrate this phenomena, I will address judges' reliance on
fictitious texts as authoritative materials in the decision-making
process.19 In particular, I address authoritative uses of works by George
Orwell and William Shakespeare. 9 ' Citations to these works may
187. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw (2000).
188. Id. at ch. Il. For an overview ofseveral limiting archetypes in legal opinion writing, see also
Collin O'Connor Udell, Parading the Saurian Taib Prjection, lung, and the Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 731, 751-74
(2000) (describing the operation of shadow jurisprudence in the courts).
189. Guthrie et al., supra note 10, at 821.
190. A growing body ofliterature suggests thatjudicial opinions do not reflect thejudge's process of
arriving at a ruling contained within it, and are thus useless as indicia of the decision-making process. See
Simon, supra note 23, at 34-35 (explaining that judges themselves "emphasize[] the discrepancy between
the opinion and the decision making process"). For the most part, this sentiment is true, since, forexample,
Supreme CourtJustices involve themselves in multiple discrete levels of analysis before writing opinions.
See generalq JUDGES ONJUDGING: ViEws FROM THE BENCH Part II, Chs. 7-11 (David M. O'Brien ed.,
1997) (discussing these stages). However, in some respects, judges do show us aspects of their own
behavioral influences, which are so powerful in cases that they survive through each decision-making stage
and appear in the opinion. See Theodore Schroeder, The Pychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CAL. L. REV.
89, 90, 94 (1918) (noting that "every [judicial] opinion is unavoidably a fragment of autobiography...
[that] amounts to a confession" not to mention that the "genetic understanding" ofan opinion constitutes
a psychological revelation); William Domnarski, Shakespeare in the Law, 67 CONN. BJ. 317, 323 (1993)
("With the use of figurative language the judge declares his interest in going beyond the issue and facts
before him and connecting them to the larger world of ideas..."). This section explores these particularly
telling examples, which pertain to the entire judging process.
191. Consider that these extralegal sources represent only a small portion of a much more varied
spectrum, ranging from reliance on television series and children's nursery rhymes to paintings, and even
sculptures. For television series, see, for example, DeAngelis . El Paso Alun. Police OfficersAss'n, 51 F.3d 591,
593 (5th Cir. 1995) (comparing the conduct ofan alleged hatasser to that offictional television characters:
"The R.U. Withmi column did not represent a boss's demeaning harangue, or a sexually charged
invitation, or a campaign of vulgarity .... R.U. Withmi intended to be a curmudgeon, the police
department's Archie Bunker or Homer Simpson, who eyed with suspicion all authority figures, academy-trained
officers... whatever had changed from the old days.") (emphasis added). For nursery rhymes, see, for
example, Evpare Kailer, 255 P. 41, 42 (Kan. 1927) (assessing the best interests ofchildren: "Casuists could
make a good argument that in the legendary case of the old woman who lived in a shoe, who had so many
children she did not know what to do, the welfare and best interests ofthose children would be to rescue
them . . ... ")); In re Guardianship of Denlow, 384 N.Y.S. 2d 621, 630 (1976) (addressing child
abandonment: "The predicament of this mother-even as [the party to proceedings] seemed to view
it-was somewhat akin to the 'old woman who lived in a shoe'); see also Lee v. Venice Work Vessels, Inc.,
512 F.2d 85, 87-88 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting problems with "extending survival ofthe cause ofaction beyond
the Administrator to the heirs" in inheritance matters: "[This] reminds us, somehow, of the fabled end of
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provide a way to determine whether biases are at work. Yet, before
beginning, it is noteworthy that some caution is necessary any time
individuals attempt to point out biases in people other than themselves.
As Professor Robert MacCoun observed:
[T] alk is cheap-it is easier to accuse someone of bias then to actually
establish that a judgment is in fact biased. Moreover, it is always
possible that the bias lies in the accuser rather than (or in addition to)
the accused. There are ample psychological grounds for taking such
attributions with a grain of salt.'92
While it is presumed that the review of written judicial opinions can
work optimally as one method to indicate the need for judicial
debiasing, judicial mindfulness moves beyond those judges who write
only opinions.
193
When judges refer to extralegal sources in their opinions, we can
reach a number of conclusions. Usually, these citations are merely
fleeting references, crafted by the judge to demonstrate his learnedness.
One author appropriately defines these references as "ornamental"
quotations, because they are merely decorative in nature. 9 4 However,
'Humpty-Dumpty':
Humpty-Dumpty sat on a wall
Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall
All the King's horses
And all the King's men
Couldn't put Humpty-Dumpty together again.
Id. at 88 & n.4). For paintings, see, for example, In re Subpoenaed Grand j4uo Witness Subpoenaed Witness v. United
States, 171 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cit. 1999) (citing the difficulty ofinterpreting the Mona Lisa's smile as the
basis for applying precedent and the case's outcome: "While a bright line rule would be easy to understand
and enforce, Chemey requires that we read the nuance in Mona Lisa's smile."). For sculptures, see, for
example, Johnson v. State of Florida, 351 So.2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1977) (Adkins,J., dissenting) (alluding to two
sculptures to justify that a graphic magazine was not obscene:
The magazine "Climax" was examined. Just as the sculpture "Bound Slave" by
Michelangelo, and "David with the Head ofGoliath" by Donatello, the magazine contained
pictures of men with their genitals completely exposed. Just as Rembrandt's "Danae," the
magazine contained pictures of a nude female stretched out in a sensuous position....
Granted, the magazine lacked serious literary, artistic, or scientific value, but this alone does
not bring it within the rule prohibiting certain publications.).
192. MacCoun, supra note 102, at 263.
193. While analyzingjudicial opinions to detect bias may be a useful form ofoversight, the process
disregards the many decisions of trial judges that are not supported by written opinions. Judicial
mindfulness reaches trial judges as well.
194. Domnarski, supra note 190, at 318 (defining ornamental quotations as "quotations invoked
because of their subject, theme or key word relationship with the judicial opinion"). See also Margaret
Raymond, Recting Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REv.
1193, 1237 (1998) (noting thatjudges use extralegal allusions "not... to derive constitutional norms but
simply to sell them"). In the present context, various citations to Orwell show no more than an ornamental
use. See USW v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-20 (1979) (citing a passage relating to the fictional government
of Oceania's declaration of war in a way that "[w]ithout words said, [sent] a wave of understanding
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while ornamental quotes predominate the federal reporters, certain
references are instrumental in nature-ones that seemingly convey legal
principles where the law is apparently silent. I am of the view that we
can gain much from distinguishing between ornamental and
instrumental uses of fiction because instrumental uses are more likely to
indicate that some type of force--very likely bias rooted in a past
experience or hasty interpretation of an ambiguous term-has altered
the way ajudge has been trained to resolve a legal dispute. Consider the
following example.
The case of Florida v. Riley'9  is one of the most illustrative examples
of a judge's instrumental use of a fictional work. Riley involved police
deployment of a helicopter to monitor an individual who cultivated
marijuana bushes in his back yard. Here, the Court addressed whether
police surveillance was unreasonable based on the low altitude of the
helicopter (i.e., it determined when surveillance exceeded the bounds of
plain view and became particularized and intrusive to the individual).
On balance, Riley emphasizes that the issue of privacy invasion is among
the hardest constitutional issues to adjudicate, especially since the
Framers of the Constitution could not contemplate many of the
technological advances that currently define our society."9 6 Seemingly
then, it should raise no eyebrows that this privacy case generated
conflicting beliefs and legaljustifications. ' When a plurality of the Riley
court held that helicopters traveling above 400 feet did not violate
tippl[ing] through [a] crowd [ofspectators]" for the proposition that the majority's decision regardingTitle
VII "represent[ed] an equally dramatic and ... unremarked switch in this Court's interpretation" (citing
GEORGE ORWELI, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 181-82 (1949)); United States v. 15324 County Highway
E., 219 F.3d 602, 603 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The year 1984 came and went without the government's
transformation into the ubiquitous and all-seeing Big Brother of George Orwell's book. (This, at least, is
how everyone but dyed-in-the-wool conspiracy devotees would characterize things.)").
195. 488 U.S. 445 (1988).
196. See David Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72 IOWA L. REv. 753, 796 (1987)
(noting "issues that the framers and ratifiers did not consider, or could not have considered").
197. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REv. 43, 51 (1989) (noting difficulties with "open textured" constitutional terms like "speech,"
"search," "cruel and unusual," and "excessive fines"); MichaelJ. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Tetualts: A
Critical Comparison ofjustices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25,63 (1994) ("The textual provisions at issue
in constitutional adjudication are usually susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, at which
point an interpreter must refer to something else to settle the ambiguity of the relevant text."). Accordingly,
judges commonly refer to the Orwellian conception of an imposing government as a "Big Brother" who
sees all. See, e.g., United States v. 13324 County Highway E., 219 F.3d 602,603 (7th Cir. 2000) (referencing
the notion of "Big Brother" in a short line without citing the novel). They similarly cite Orwell for the
notion of "double-thinking." See, e.g., Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 939 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 n.3 (E.D.
Wis. 1997) ("Double-thinking is the deliberate reversal of facts and worxs. So, in Ocenia, the Ministry of
Peace waged wars; the Ministry of Truth spread lies"); Passarell v. Glickman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2719, at *8 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting Orwell's notion of double-speak and adding that "Orwcll did not
anticipate that the current Department ofAgricuhurc of the United States would add to that list .... ").
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individual privacy interests, Justice Brennan responded by citing eight
lines of George Orwell's 1984-a passage involving Big Brother's use of
helicopters:
The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding
corner. There was one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG
BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said.. , . In the far
distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for
an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows.'9
This was a far cry from the run-of-the-mill Orwell reference for two
reasons. The first striking thing about this quote is its length in
comparison to the majority of such citations. But second, and even
more intriguing, is Brennan's statement immediately following the
quote: "Who can read this passage without a shudder, and without the
instinctive reaction that it depicts life in some country other than ours?
I respectfully dissent."' 99 Characteristic of a great many cases, Riley
represents a bold leap by a court official. In it,Justice Brennan directly
defied the notion thatjudges are not supposed to be literary."' In doing
so, he also exposed his inner-self to the public and his fellowJustices.2"'
We gain much from this form of irregular behavior, especially when
contrasted with other judges' uses of the same passage.
Compare Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,2"2 in which
Justice Douglas cited the very same passage from 1984, but for a
contrary purpose. Gibson involved the determination of whether
compelled production of documents relating to membership in an
organization violated the Free Exercise clause and individuals' rights to
associate. In the following excerpt, note the passages redacted byJustice
Brennan in Riley, which I have marked in italics:
Outside, even through the shut windowpane, the world looked cold. Down in the
street little eddies of wind were whirling dust and torn paper into spirals, and
though the sun was shining and the sky a harsh blue, there seemed to be no color in
anything except the posters that were plastered everywhere. The black-
mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding comer. There
was one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS
WATCHING YOU, the caption said, while the dark eyes looked deep into
198. Riley, 488 U.S. at 466 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing ORWVELL, supra note 194, at 4).
199. Id. at 467 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
200. See Domnarski, supra note 190,at 344 (recounting the recommendations ofChiefJustice Charles
Evans Hughes).
201. See Schroeder, supra note 190, at 90 (referencing judicial opinions as windows to the judge's
mind).
202. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
2002] 1065
1066 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW [Vol. 70
Winston's own. Down at street level another poster, torn at one comer, flapped
fitfuly in the wind, alternatey covering and uncovering the single word INGSOC.
In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs,
hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and darted away again with
a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's
windows. The patrols did not matter, however. Only the Thought Police
mattered.
203
Something obviously missing from Brennan's reference was the fact that
"[t]he patrols did not matter," which, in Riley, would have undercut
Brennan's claim that society deems helicopter surveillance an
unreasonable invasion of privacy. °4
While readers might interpret a fictional text in an infinite number of
ways,2°5 Brennan's disingenuous use of 1984 may demonstrate a strong
personal attachment to the work, which most likely interfered with his
interpretation of the passage.2 6 The danger inherent in Brennan's
actions is that he may have imported other past experiences and
emotional inclinations along with the initial interpretation, thus
increasing the likelihood of inaccurate, or what I will soon define as
mindless, decision-making. Given the good faith thesis and other
affirmations ofjudicial honesty,0 7 Brennan most probably interpreted
the passage in the same way it struck him during an initial read, long
203. Id. at 575-76 n. I I (DouglasJ., concurring) (noting additionally "[w]heir government is the Big
Brother, privacy gives way to surveillance" (footnote omitted)). While it is not my role to be a literary critic
here, I still find it interesting that Justice Douglas's use of the passage shifts its focus away fiom the
individual to society, while Brennan's draws our attention to the individual's plight.
204. It may be true that only Orwell can tell us what this phrase means. However, on its face, the
notion that citizens found helicopter surveillance permissible ran contrary to Brennan's argument. The
cannons of legal interpretation would direct Brennan to explain how the sentence supported his view,
Justice Brennan did not explain the meaning of the quote. Instead, he let it stand as if the sentence never
followed.
I should acknowledge the alternative views that Brennan's use of the Orwell passage merely
underscored the invasiveness of Orwell's fictional government, which might require no mention of the
omitted sentence to support its validity. Even on this reading, the sheer length and contents ofthe passage
in both Rily and Gibson alert us to stirred emotions not normally present in judicial opinions.
205. SeeJohn F. Coverdale, Text as Limit; A Plea for Decent Respect fir the Tax Code, 71 TUL. L. REV.
1301, 1511 (1997) (explaining the deconstructionist view that "words are so subjective that texts are open
to numerous oreven infinite interpretations, none ofwhich can be shown to be correct in preference to any
other').
206. While there is always the possibility that one ofJustice Brennan's clerks wrote the portion of the
opinion referencing Orwell, it is still a safe assumption that Brennan reviewed that passage and let it stand.
In any event, the question becomes why he would not address a portion of the cited work that contradicts
his major point. Without a better explanation, it is likely that Brennan felt so strongly about the passage
that he did not care to dilute it. Seemingly these types of abnormal behaviors alert us that judges are
influenced by some other source besides the laws when making their determinations. In these types of
situations, it behooves thejudge to consider self-analysis.
207. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (confirming that judges do not intentionally deceive).
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before he became ajudge. °8 In this respect, one could say he may have
been influenced by his emotions, which were evoked by the memory of
this portion of the text 2
09
In analyzing Riley, we must look to the mechanics ofJustice Brennan's
reasoning process, and not necessarily its product. In other words, we
must resist falling prey to an argument that may seem perfectly
reasonable to the uninformed reader-an argument suggesting that Riley
actually supports philosophers' rejection ofpsychology's relevance in the
decision-making process. After all, none of Brennan's fellow Justices
adopted or even referred to his citation of Orwell. Not to mention,
Brennan's cite appeared in the dissenting section of the opinion,
suggesting that the Riley plurality gave it no weight because of its
irrelevance to the law. But the key assumption underlying this deceiving
rationale is the notion that either the judge is capable of spotting the
extralegal influence or his audience is. This notion ignores the fact that
when judges do not disclose personal influences, it is extremely difficult
for their peers to establish the possibility of bias. Furthermore, when the
208. Researchers confirm the notion that judges return to their initial interpretations of fictional
works by observing how judges cite different volumes and editions of works published in the years when
they attended college, thereby increasing the probability that they used a personal edition for reference.
See Domnarski, supra note 190, at 349 ("The Shakespearejudges have used is notjust the Shakespeare found
in Bartlett's Book of Quotations . . . . [J]udges have cited to more than a score of different editions of
Shakespeare...." With respect to quotations of 1984, olderjudges cite the Hartcourt & Brace version from
1949, while those who have been appointed in more recent years cite the newer versions. See Florida v.
Riley,, 488 U.S. 453, 466 (1988) (citing 1949 edition); USW v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 220 (1979)
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (same); Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539,576 (1963)
(Douglas,J., concurring) (same). Contra Cramer %'. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122, 1136
(2000) (Fisher,J., dissenting) (citing 1992 Signet Classic version); Rushman v'. Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp.
1040, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (citing from an edition reprinted in 1977).
209. At this point, I should distinguish that this Article does not take sides in the popular lebate
regarding whether emotions should have a place in moral decision-making. In this debate, some scholars
argue that judgments made on the basis of the judge's morality are characterized by emotivism, "the
doctrine that all evaluativejudgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions
of preference,.., attitude, or feeling." ALASDAIR MACINrYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 11- 12 (2d ed. 1984). On
this view, "reason is employed only in the selection of means to ends or values already given, but not in the
critical examination or clarification of the ends or values themselves." Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court 1985 Tenm Foreword" Traces of Self-Goveniment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 n.118 (1986). Others refute
"emotivism" with the process of"rellective equilibrium," in which interpreters follow the "subtle process"
of "adjusting the settled law by deleting mistakes." Ken Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories.
Dworkin's Rights The is, Retroactihiy, and the hinear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REv. 369, 378 (1984)
(summarizing Dworkin's version of reflcctive equilibrium from RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 159-68 (1977), which built on Rawls's theory inJOHN RAWL, A THEORY OFJ'STICE 20-21,
48-50 (1971) andJohn Rawls, Outline ofa Decision ProcedureJir Ethics, 60 PHIL. RE'. 177, 184-90 (1951)); see
atso Lirry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal PcInciples, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 279, 306 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995) ("In the moral realm, reflective equilibrium is championed as the correct
epistemological method for discovering (constructing?) correct moral principles."). This Article does not
reach the debate noted above because it addresses practical psychological tools to deal with judicial
biases-a far step from the broader philosophical debate regarding the role of morals in the law.
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judge doesn't know about his own influences, he can't alert others to
them, and lack of self-searching makes it more likely that he will not
discover them." 0 This result is more than likely guaranteed by the lack
of self-inquiry that characterizes the bench, introducing the greater
danger-a hidden danger--that the judge may be unaware of his
combining of factual analyses with emotional ones in the creation of
hierarchies of legal reasoning.21' We can see these threats more clearly
when we consider legal decision-making as a process of elimination.
According to Professor Robert Cover, law is a process of elimination
where a judge eliminates theories until he arrives at the appropriate
solution.1 12 On this model, as Professor Burton's comments suggest,
when law is indeterminate, elimination isjustification." 3 Consequently,
ifjudges eliminate theories on the basis of emotional attachments, they
decrease the legitimacy of their legal analyses. Accordingly, if other
judges have no way to know that the biased judge's reasoning is
illegitimate, and adopt the same reasoning, the eventualjudicial decision
will be less accurate. Riley therefore shows us an exceptional
circumstance: unless the biased judge is bold enough to provide the real
reasons for his decision, or is bold enough to address these reasons with
the appropriate psychological tools before sharing his view, all of the
judges may fail to achieve the most accurate legal determination
possible, which would be a different outcome under the same
circumstances if no bias were present. The key becomes recognizing
one's own biases and restraining them or alerting other judges that such
influences are present.
Riley hardly stands alone. In fact, it provides a fresh perspective on
countless judicial opinions, and, in each situation, compels us to shed a
new light on the citing judges' conceptions of legal reasoning. When in
Levy v. Louisiana,2"' for example, a majority of the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of discrimination against children born out of
wedlock and inaccurately cited lines from a despicable character in
Shakespeare's King Lear, the quote suggests thatJustices were in search
210. See Simon, supra note 23, at 36-37 (explaining how judges are "[n]aturally" helpless to act on
forces "of which they arc not consciously aware").
21!. Scholars have long recognized the danger of the judicial hunch-that a judge will jump to
conclusions and find legal reasons to support them. See Hutcheson, supra note 4, at 277 (noting the
practically uncontrollable intensity of judicial hunches as the "restless, eager ranging of the mind to
overcome the confusion and the perplexities of the evidence, or of constricting and outworn concepts");
Lasswell,supra note 20, at 359-61 (noting unexplained feelingsjudges have toward attorneys based on their
past experiences).
212. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme CoWr, 1982 Tm - Foreword Abmos and.Aative, 97 HARV. L.
RE'. 4, 33 (1983) (describing the elimination process).
213. See BURTON, supra note 37, at 48 (discussing the danger of ambiguous law).
214. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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of a message with social or moral value, even though it was codified in
an extralegal source.2 5
While fiction may be the most telling of behavioral influences, a
number of scholars evidence the biased use of history in Originalist
interpretations. In one study, a comparison of Justice Brennan and
Rehnquist's opinions revealed that "bothJustices... use [d] the intent
of the framers to support an outcome consistent with their [ideological
rather than legal] predispositions. '2 16 With Originalism, as in their use
of fictionjudges often act contrary to their professed rationales.217 The
same can be said ofjudges' authoritative use of dictionaries." 8 Quite
215. Id. at 72 n.6 (Douglas, J.) (citing WILJAAM SHAKESPEARE, KIN(; LEAR ACT 1, SC. 2, 1.6)
(supporting rights for children born out of wedlock with the following citation:
Why bastard, wherefore base?
When my dimensions are as well compact,
My mind as generous, and my shape as true,
As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us
With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?)
Contra Glona v. Am. Guarantee &Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 77 n.3 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (noting how
Edmund, the character cited by the Lezy majority, was an awful and untrustworthy individual, thereby
conveying a difflrent contextual message in the cited text). Note the commonality ofinaccurate statements
regarding such sources. See Domnarski, supra note 190, at 333 ("To a surprising and embarrassing degree
judges have misused these quotations on law by not knowing the quotation's original context."). While it
would not be difficult for ajudge to read an entire work, and in the case of Biennan's dissent in Riley only
one line further, emotional and behavioral inclinations evidence the operative factors dictating such
mischaracteizations.
216. John B. Gates & Glenn A. Phelps, Intentionalism in Constitutional Opinions, 49 POL RE.. Q. 245,
256 (1995) (noting how, in some cases, bothJustces used vague language with no historical examples to
support the Framers, while, in othercases, they provided detailed historical analyses). Compare Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. American's United, 454 U.S. 464,494 (1982) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (commenting how
the Framers "surely intended" a result, without explaining how); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. PSC
ofN. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 398 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (describing commercial speech as "the kind
ofspecch that those who drafted the First Amendment had in mind" but refiraining from further historical
analysis), it'h National League of Cities '. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting)
(citing extensively THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 and 46 to support the adequacy of state protections against
governmentencroachment); Ry. Libor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457,466 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J.) (interpreting extensively THE FEDERALIST No. 42 to determine the constitutionality of a uniform
bankruptcy law).
217. See Gates & Phelps, supra note 216, at 257 (1996) (noting inconsistency in rationales); see also
Raymond, supra note 63, at 1242 (noting the way references to totalitarian governments like those depicted
by Orwell are used inconsistently and unpredictably byjudges in the same circumstances (observ'ingJustice
Frankfurter's "understate[ment]" of circumstances where individuals would expect him to dlaw such an
analogy in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952))).
218. While dictionary quoting has become a "fanatical movement," judges use them haphazardly
and unpredictably. Nicholas Zeppos, Judicial Review of Agengy Action: The Problems of Commitment,
Noncontractabiliy and the Proper Incentives, 44 DUKE LJ. 1133, 1143 (1995); see also Note, Looking It Up:
Dictionaries and Statutogy Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1446-47 (1994) ("[Tlhere has been no
apparent pattern to (or discussion ol) theJustices' choices of volume or vintage" ofdictionary. "Individual
judges must make subjective decisions about which dictionary .. , to use." (emphasis added)).
Critics point to cases like Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), in whichJustice Scalia turned
to a dictionary published in 1950 to define the word "representatives" for the purpose of interpreting a
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possibly, each of these dilemmas are related to unrecognized biases, the
type of which I described above.
For those who argue that emotional factors are not at work in the way
judges justify their decisions, the initial burden of proof is on them to
prove otherwise.219 On this note, we should consider the comments of
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, which I will define as the Chemerinsky
challenge. After recognizing that the only thing that accurately
characterizes the Rehnquist Court is the quest for impartiality in
decision-making,22 Chemerinsky observed the following: Either the
Court should reject the quest for neutrality all together as "a rhetorical
gloss to explain... rulings... that the Court favors," or we should
accept that "the Court truly seeks neutrality, but lacks a consistent
theory and is thus left with an inconsistent method of decision-
making."22' In the next part of this Article, I propose that psychology
can meet the demands of the Chemerinsky challenge by demonstrating
the possibility of an adequate and consistent method for achieving
neutrality.
statute passed in 1982, ignoring more recent definitions of the word. See id. at 410 (Scalia,J., dissenting)
("There is little doubt that the ordinary meaning of'representatives' does not includejudges, see Webster's
Second New International Dictionary 2114 (1950)."). These types of misuse suggest thatJustices would
rather use dictionaries as "'a second robust coordinating dcvice' that permits [them] to decide and dispose
easily of technical cases that they ... find uninteresting as well as to 'reach some methodological consensus,
in the face of substantive disagreements."' Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the WFrord: Dictionay Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 275, 278-79 (1998) (citing Frederick Shaver, Statutogy Construction and the
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REV., at 232, 253). While dictionary definitions
accordingly provide an "optical illusion" of "certainty-or 'plainness,"' when all that exists mav be the
"appearance" of these notions, the Court refiains fiom addressing the threat of inaccuracy. A. Raymond
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain leaning, and Contkvt in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv.J.L. & PUB. PO.. 71, 72
(1994) (citation omitted). See also Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. %. Scheidler, 310 U.S. 249 (1994) (refusing
to create a method for determining which of two conflicting definitions of the same word in the same
dictionary prevailed as the correct meaning).
219. See Chemerinsky, supra note 197, at 31 (noting the worthlessness ofJustices' dedication to neutral
principles when they fail to define "what constitutes such principles or how they are to be determined").
For generations, scholars have commented against "sententious admonitions to 'know thyself" and mere
assertions that judges have the ability to reach unbiased decisions. See Lasswell, supra note 20, at 362;
FRANK, supra note 4, at 260 (noting "Peter Pan legends ofjuristic happy hunting ground in a land of legal
absolutes"); see alsojerome Frank, Arej tdges Human? Part One, The Effect on Legal Thking of the Assumption that
Judges Behave Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 42 (193 1) (explaining the "fiction" in jurisprudence
that "so-called rules were the controlling influences affecting decisions, although we know perfecty well that
what we are sqying is not true"). With assertions of this nature, it seems likely that judges, like all decision-
makers, cannot combat the negative effects ofbehavioral influences until they can observe these influences
in action.
220. See Chemerinsky, supra note 197, at 91 (noting that the Court "sweepingly reject[s] all judicial
value imposition," finds "certain types of value judgements are impermissible," and yet "never explain[sj
the line between the allowable and the unacceptable"); see also id. at 48 (noting that commentatos are
"hard pressed to find a coherent approach to constitutional decisionmaking" on the Rehnquist court, even
in light of their goal of neutrality).
221. Seeid. at59.
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IV. JUDICIAL MINDFULNESS
This section aims to develop the general framework for judicial
debiasing by exploring aspects of Professor Ellen Langer's theory of
mindfulness. The theory is extremely helpful in clarifying the goals of
debiasing and in identifying what debiasing seeks to avoid with respect
to two types of cold biases outlined above in Part III.C. Professor
Langer's theory developed out of her investigations of the way people
limit themselves during the decision-making process.222 Her research
explored the conditions required for overcoming such limitations,
distinguishing mindful thinking from mindless thinking by highlighting
the importance of "cognitive flexibility," '223 a condition in which people
view "[a] situation or environment from several perspectives," instead
of "rushing headlong from questions to answers. '224 Put simply, mindful
thinking involves "drawing novel distinctions, examining information
from new perspectives, and being sensitive to context,"223 whereas
mindless thinking is characterized by "treat[ing] information as though
it were context-free--true regardless of circumstances. '226  This theory
echoed the concerns of sociologicaljurisprudes and others, who warned
against judges with slot machine minds. 27
At first glance, it may seem reasonable to assume that judges are
engaging in a mindful approach when they analyze facts and apply
222. See generaly LANGER, supra note 21 (exploring the human process ofdecision-making).
223. Justin Brown & Ellen Lngeriindfuiness and Intelligence.: A Comparison, 25 EDc. PSYCHOLOGIST
305,314(1990).
224. EllenJ. La nger, A Mindful Education, 28 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 43, 44 (1993).
225. Id.
226. LANGER, supra note 21, at 3. Mindlessness occurs in three distinct ways. The first form,
"entrapment by category," applies when wve limit ourselves to interpreting the facts in life in the way we
originally encountered them, which is harmful because we do not update our original assumptions. Id. at
10. The second form, "automatic behavior," occurs when "we take in and use limited signals from the
world around us... without letting other signals.. penetrate as well." Id. at 12. Finally, in the third
form, "acting from a single perspective," we simply see rules as "inflexible." Id. at 6. In each ofthese cases,
the danger is "moving directly from problem to solution" without exploring other viable altcrnatives.
Brown & Langer, supra note 223, at 314.
To Linger, the more we force ourselves to follow regimented rules, the greater the chances are
that we will miss our marks. In essence, the less certain we are about an issue, the more we will have an
opportunity to recognize viable alternatives. So, it is ultimately the illusion ofcontol and order that can
hurt, rather than help, our interpretations. Linger explored mindlessness in a number of studies, during
which she found that mindless thought can reduce an individual's performance by more than half of his
potential. See generally Benzion Chanowitz & Ellen J. Inger, Premature Cognitive Commitment, 41 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1051 (1981) (measuring the performance trends in research subjects who
believed they had a debilitating disease, as opposed to others who were provided with information leading
them to doubt the accuracy of the estimate).
227. Hutcheson, supra note 4, at 275.
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calculated tests to weigh them. After all, judges apparently have a
variety of resources with which to distinguish and interpret facts, each
of which seemingly counts as one of Langer's requisite diverse
perspectives. 228 But we must take Langer's theory a step further. That
is, we must look not only at the way judges distinguish and interpret
facts, but also at the wayjudges select analytical systems that necessarily
limit the use of particular analyses (e.g., how judges decide which
constitutional theories to apply in specific cases). This last distinction
raises an entirely different issue.
While it is no news that lacking theoretical options poses the greatest
danger to anyone applying a theory, as the WBK rationale
emphasizes, 229 Langer offers a practical solution to the problem based
on her research of people's discriminatory beliefs. Langer's work
suggests that people's levels of prejudice drop when they "increase
rather than decrease the number of distinctions" they establish about
"the relative importance of any particular difference.""23 This finding
highlights the benefits of creating new categories of understanding. It
also expands on the notion of healthy indeterminacy, under which
"[f]lexibility is needed to permit experimentation with and investigation
of alternative normative structures, to assure fairness, and to promote
other substantive values in situations not anticipated or fully appreciated
in advance."23 '
Langer's findings stress that informed decision-making is not
automatic. Since one must challenge a theory or mental process that
formerly defined the limits of a given realization, there is some illusion
of risk.232  Nevertheless, the reward for taking the first bold step is
228. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBEMS OFJURISPR UDENCE 73-75 (1990) (desetibinga virtual
"grab bag" of resourcesjudges use to attribute meaning, including: "introspection, "common sense," and
"memory"); butcf Lawson, supra note 39, at 412 (questioning whether theories like Originalism can solve
these problems since they still do not codify "what materials count towards establishing a provision's original
meaning," "how much the various materials ought to counti,]" or clarify matters of "application" (i.e., how
much the actual materials reflect history).
229. Seesupra notes 39 and 42 and accompanying text (describing the danger ofinflexibility injudicial
interpretation).
230. Ellen Langer et al., Decreasing bejudice by Increasing Discrimination, 49J. PERSONALrTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 113, 113 (1985) (reporting the results ofvarious tests involving studies ofdisabled individuals and
questions intended to provoke various levels of mindful thought). Here, whereas research subjects first
categorized handicapped persons as genetally disabled, after learning to make calculated distinctions, the
same subjects were more likely to label the same person as a "person who cannot do X." Id. at 114.
231. Kr ess, supra note 29, at 294.
232. See MICHAEl. BASSECHES, DIALECTICAL THINKING AND ADULT DEVELOPMENT 29 (1984)
(discussing the dangers of self-questioning but noting the benefits of a more accurate thought process).
Basseches particularly notes that "[i] n questioning these boundaries, we may be questioning precisely those
points of reference which provide us with a sense of intellectual stability and coherence about our world."
Id. But cf id. at 30 ("Tihe dialectical analysis is more likely to allow one to experience Isuch] pain as loss and
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greater consistency and reliability in the final product of the analysis. In
other words, the more a person admits areas of uncertainty, the more he
will "create [] the freedom to discover meaning where experts choose to
"5233see only random noise.
Langer used the common experience of starting a car each morning
to illustrate these benefits. While there is "very little choice involved"
with turning the key in an ignition each morning, "the degree of choice
increases" whenever your car will not start.234 In essence, by finding
yourself in a situation that calls into doubt your initial assumption, you
as the driver, must become more aware of factors that you would not
have originally considered. 35 You might even decide to look under the
hood, only to find that other dangerous conditions exist besides the fact
that your battery is low. Seemingly, the same is true of the judicial
decision-making process.With Langer's theory in mind, ifjudges were truly confident that they
could select the right method of constitutional interpretation, it follows
that they would explain the merit of selecting a particular constitutional
theory in the same painstaking detail with which they describe factual
evaluations under those very theoretical systems. Yet judges rarely, if
ever, write opinions in this way. Instead of defining each of the factors
needed for an appropriate analysis (including defining the
appropriateness of the theory and its limitations in the case-specific
context),236 most judges apply an interpretive theory as if the theory
speaks for itself137 Subsequently, ifjudges are simply searching for ways
to mourn the loss. At the same time, the pain ofloss may be counterbalanced by an emotionally positive
intellectual awareness of(a) order in the developmental process, (b) new discovery, and (c) the opening of
new possibilities.").
233. Brown & Langer, supra note 223, at 324.
234. Id.
235. Lnger supports this proposition by citing the discovery of alternative uses for the drug
Monoxidil, which began as a product to lower blood pressure, and an agricultural machine that initially
destroyed crops with its icy foam byproduct. In both cases, the alternative uses (i.e., using the crop machine
as a snowmaker and Monoxidil as a hair growth stimulant) "occurred because the discoverers recognized
that their unsuccessful attempts to resolve problems could be viewed from other perspectives." Brown &
Langer, supra note 223, at 314.
236. See Lawson, supra note 39, at 412 (describing necessary factors for justifying use of a
constitutional theory like Originalism).
237. Justice Walter Schaefer stressed that judges should articulate the bases for their decisions to
increase the legitimacy. See generally Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Polity, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3 (1966)
(suggesting thatjudges explicitly state reasoning for decisions individually rather than in a unified manner).
And, while it seems that Justices like Antonin Scalia provide detailed analyses of their methodological
processes, his actualjudicial opinions reveal blatant contradictions. SeeAntonin Scalia, Common Law Courts
in a Civil-Law System" The Role of the United States Federal Courtt in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF IN-TERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (noting
specific types of documents he believes to "display how the text of the Constitution was originally
understood"); but cf. supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussingJustice Scalia's inaccurate reliance
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to achieve predetermined outcomes and conceal their motives for
arriving at a particular solution, their decision-making processes are
more likely to be susceptible to bias.2"' Langer implies that judges
should articulate to themselves -the reasons for selecting a particular
theory and then employ an objective procedure to address mindless
impulses. The following section provides a method for achieving
mindfulness and address the conditions that are necessary to achieve
mindful adjudication.
The Elements ofJudicial Mindfulness
Because the goal of mindfulness does not explain how to achieve its
objectives, we must distinguish the conditions required by Langer's
theory. Langer's theory presupposes thatjudges not only have a method
to determine how their own beliefs influence analyses of facts in a
particular case, but also whether these beliefs influence selection of a
particular theory of interpretation.2' 9  The concept of judicial
mindfulness, as opposed to mindfulness in general, involves applying
two steps.2 4' First, judges need to determine the magnitude and
direction of their own bias: this essentially requires identification of the
ways that they are influenced by factors related to the cases they hear.
In the case of interpreting the Constitution,judges must thus know what
the Constitution means to them, as viewed through the lens of their past
experiences.241 They can accomplish this goal by applying the
on a weak dictionary as a source of meaning). Seemingly, in permitting interpreters to consultJustices'
external materials regarding the decision-making process, supporters of this approach would need an
additional method ofinterpretation for interpreting eachJustice's interpretative theory of each method of
constitutional interpretation.
238. Determining which theories to use in their analyses, judges are more vigilant rather than
mindful. To Lnger, vigilance represents a condition in which "one has to have a particular stimulus in
mind, an expectation of what the stimulus is rather than what it could be." Langer, supra note 224, at 44.
Consequently, the riskjudges run is "paying] attention to something[,] [while] at the same time, something
else may go unnoticed." Id.
239. Linger's theory is thus the psychological tanslation of Professor Chemerinsky's objective in
challenging the Court. Let us recall his challenge, which demands a consistent theory demonstrating self-
awareness. The general notion of mindfulness achieves this objective by increasing the distinctions that
individuals make about their experiences. Therefore, by showing how to achieve mindfulness in thejudicial
realm, we simultaneously show that it is possible to achieve awareness of biases in reaching judicial
opinions, thus increasing our likelihood of selecting a correct model of constitutional interpretation.
240. That is, assuming that judges have alerted themselves to the manifestations of mindlessness
(entrapment by category or automatic behavior), as evident in analyses of their opinions (perhaps after
locating ornamental quotations rising above the level of decoration).
241. While the trend amongjudges may be to ignore instances in which personal issues arise in the
decision-making process, at least some have been willing to explore the effects of their personality types on
their interpersonal relations and general attitudes. A growing number ofjudges have experimented with
the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a foreed-choice test designed to evaluate a subject's preferences
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psychological theory called negative practice, a method for discovering
subconscious influences by consciously engaging in an activity that is the
opposite of one's initial inclinations (e.g., reading the Constitution in a
totally subjective manner). Second, with knowledge of their personality
preferences and subconscious constitutional influences, judges should
engage in what psychologists call transitional thinking to adjust for
unwanted responses in decision-making; that is, they must begin to ask
themselves directed questions that move beyond the limitations of their
own belief systems. Each of these steps is described below in detail.
A. Gauging Subconscious Constitutional Influences Using Negative Practice
A necessary condition for self-modification is awareness about
unconscious behavioral influences, an object many constitutional
scholars fearjudges will never attain.242 In America's psychology wards,
however, clinicians turn to a number of methods to achieve this goal.
The theory of negative practice emerged from the overarching theory
of satiation, which dictates, inter alia, that patients can extinguish
unwanted habits by overindulging in them.243 While monitoring the
process, psychoanalysts observed how "troublesome symptoms-
including obsessive-compulsive ones-often disappear when the client
intentionally engages in them rather than fights ineffectually against
toward certain behaviors. For a general overview of the MBTI, see generally MOST EXCELLENT
DIFFERENCES: ESSAYS ON USING TYPE THEORY IN THE COMPOSITION CLASSROOM (Thomas C.
Thompson ed., 1996) (explaining the origin and operation of the MBTI).
For an overview of the MBTI's effectiveness in helping judges, see John W. Kennedy, Jr.,
Personality Type and Judicial Decision Making, 37JUDGES'J. 4, 9 (1998) ("Ifjudges are tuned into their own
personality type ... they can minimize the extent to which their own biases affect their evaluation of...
[a] case."). Judge Homer Thompson also experienced similar success in his training of fellowjudges. See
Larry Richard, Law Practice; How FourPersonaily Affects Four Practice, 79 A.B.A.J. 74,July 1993, at 76 (noting
Judge Homer Thompson's comment: "I observed that they [several hundred judges to whom he
administered the MBTI] found it tremendously valuable in better understanding themselves, their associates
and the public they serve"). Judge Kennedy even warns that judges are "unable to guard against the type
of biases that influence their decisions" if they are "unaware of typological differences." Kennedy, supra,
at 9. While these words of praise suggest that the MBTI might solve all ofajudge's problems, the test has
a number of limitations, the foremost of which is the fact that it cannot predict how a judge would
approach a given case. For general criticisms of the MBTI, see generally M.H. SamJacobson, Themes in
Academic Support for Law Schools: Using the A lgers-Bnggs Type Indicator to Assess Learning Style: Type or Stereotype,
33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 261 (1997) (doubting the MBTI and supporting this sentiment with various
studies).
242. See Idleman, supra note 12, at 1321 (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the
Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S LJ. 965, 989-90 (1993) (arguing the impossibility of developing an adequate
psychological model because "neither full self.awareness nor full disclosure is possible").
243. See generally ARNOLD A. LAZARUS, BEHAVIOR THERAPY AND BEYOND (1971) (introducing the
concept of paradoxical intention to counter patients' obsessive fears by intentionally inflating them).
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them." '244 Negative practice, as a subset of satiation, helps patients
explore the sources of their compulsions by "deliberately... performing
[any unwanted] behavior while consciously attending to it."243 For the
purposes of this Article, negative practice is more promising than
general satiation theory because it places the subject in control of
realizing solutions to her own problem, which is exactly what judges
need to do. A pioneer in the field explained why negative practice can
benefit judges:
The value of... negative practice is that of increased insight. The
student is assigned deliberately to create situations in which the
former insecurities and inadequate behavior would tend to be present.
The old inadequate reactions, however, are not to be used, but,
instead, the appropriate behavior is to be carried out . ..
[D]eliberate entrance into insecure situations not only teaches new
reactions, but also gets rid of a great deal of the fear associated with
them.246
While the theory might be applied by judges in a number of ways, the
proposed modification specifically addresses implementation of the
theory in the area of constitutional interpretation.
In the proposed modification of negative practice, a judge should
begin the awareness process with two essentials: a copy of the
Constitution and some scratch paper. He should then analyze the
textual provisions of the Amendments that have created the most
difficulty for judges, writing exactly how each phrase applies to his own
collective life experiences, in the absence of case-specific factual
244. JOHN L. SHEITON & MARK ACKERMAN, HOMEWORK IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY:
EXAMPLES OFSYSTEMATIC ASS1GNMENTS FOR THERAPELTIC USE BY MENTALHEALTH PROFESSIONALS
149 (1974). In practice, therapists "often assign intentional obsession or compulsion times" forcompulsive
worriers to "obsess thoroughly.... [and] [w] rite a one page description of each worry-time" for discussion
during treatment. Id. at 149-50. The researchers note that "[c]lients often do the homework once or twice,
then begin to forget to do so-at the same time recording fewer (and sometimes no) obsessions or
compulsions per day on their data sheet." Id. at 150.
245. DAVID L. WATSON & RONALD G. THARP, SELF-DIRECTED BEHA\IOR: SELF-MODIFICATION
FOR PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT 89 (6th ed. 1993). In one clinical case: "Garrett, who habitually cracked
his knuckles, spent five minutes each morning and five minutes each evening [engaging in the behavior]
while paying close attention to every aspect ofthe behavior. This helped him learn to pay attention to the
target behavior." Id. at 90. Negative practice is useful tojudges in the same way it was useful for Garrett:
It can make them aware of their behavior when interpreting the Constitution in a biased way. See also
FREDRIC M. LEVINE & EVELYN SANDEEN, CONCEPrUALIZATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE MODELS
APPROACH 80-81 (1985) (describingsuccessful applications of the theory in up to ninety percent of the cases
%%,here it was implemented and exploring the diverse settings where the theory was used, including inhibiting
nervous tics and stuttering); cf G.K. YACORZYNSKI, MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY 113 (1951) (explaining the
value of the process in a strictly physiological sense).
246. C. VAN RIPER, SPEECH CORRECTION: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 85 (1939).
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circumstances.1 4 7 With little more, this process should help begin to
reveal to judges what their own inclinations are regarding the
Constitution. While this process may seem almost trivial, we must ask
ourselves whether judges actually do engage in this kind of inquiry or
whether any judge would otherwise have reason to engage in it. 48
Ultimately then, regardless of its simplicity, the proposed method allows
judges to develop a baseline for analyzing the intensity of their
constitutional inclinations. The process might resemble a method
proposed by one judge in an effort to address levels of confidence in
one's decision, "Use a mental meter that establishes a blue zone between
30% to 5 0 % confidence, a green zone from 5 0 % to 90%, and a red
zone from 9 0 % to 100/o. "249 Judges could rate the intensity of their
dispositions toward or against certain provisions of the Constitution in
a similar way. This model, however still does not explain what judges
can do to discount these influences while making decisions. Part IV.B,
below, explores this notion.
B. Transcending Sel-Imposed Belief Systems Through Transitional Thinking
1. The Dialectical Schemata
Assuming that the process of interpreting the Constitution in a
personal way (negative practice) helps somejudges become aware of(a)
their reliance upon past experiences to evaluate new facts and/or (b)
their inclinations to view a certain constitutional phrase in a narrow-
minded manner, these judges must still determine whether they
bypassed viable alternatives for resolving issues in the case. In essence,
this next logical step in the evaluation process requires ajudge to move
beyond the limits of the legal decision-making process230 to transitional
thought (i.e., "distinguishing between the actual ideas or answers [you]
247. In fact, she should go through great lengths to support her conclusions as clearly as possible,
perhaps to the point where she uses specific emotional experiences tojustify her conclusion, as if applying
a legal precedent.
248. If anything, the multiple incentives compelling judges to deny behavioral influences have
probably prevented the application of negative practice-that is, until now.
249. STEPHEN D. HIu., DECISIONS: THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO MAKING COMPLFX
DECISIONS FOR BUS' TRIALJUDGES 24 (1999).
250. See Emily Souvaine et al., Life Afer Fonnal Operations: Implications for a Psychology of the Self, in
HIGHER STATES OF HU.AN DEVELOPMENT 229,229 (Charles N. Alexander & EllenJ. Langer eds., 1990)
(noting that "[t]he \ery nature of being subject to a system prevents the individual fiom reflecting upon the
limits ofthat system"). Also note Linger's observation that "the fieedom to define [a] process-outside of
which the outcome has no inherent meaning or value-may be more significant than achieving that
outcome." Brown & Linger, supra note 223, at 327.
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produce [] and the reasoning or process by which [you] arrive [] at these
ideas or products").231  This thinking involves, inter alia, the ability (1) "to
reflect on one's basic premises and pursue evidence of their limitations,"
(2) "to be somehow qualitatively less defensive in relation to others," and
(3) "to recognize and [temporarily] tolerate paradox and
contradiction. "252
This kind of transitional thought calls for a dialectical evaluation
process similar to the one envisioned by Professor Michael Basseches.
For the purpose of this Article, dialectics characterizes thought that
occurs in a fluid and moving way.23' Because the object of dialectical
thinking is "actively oriented toward shifting categories of analysis and
creating more inclusive categories,, 254 transitional thinking encompasses
it, and judges can use the criteria that characterize a dialectical system
to determine if they have achieved a transitional state. The concept of
the dialectic relates back to mindfulness because Langer actually
envisions two simultaneous systems in her theory. First, a person can
"simply resolv[e] [a] crisis in a mindful manner. 253  Second, and of
greater significance, he can use the process of being mindful as "an
opportunity for [further] innovation. ''236 Langer terms this innovation
"second-order mindfulness, 2 57 which ultimately involves fixing the
cognitive system that created the problem, rather than only the problem
itself, the objective of both transitional and dialectical thinking.
In 1984, Professor Michael Basseches introduced the Dialectical
Schemata (DS) Framework, an analytical tool that identifies nine
discrete attributes of cognitive functioning that help a person achieve
systems-transcending thought.2 58 Each of these nine schemata addresses
251. Souvaine et al., supra note 250, at 245.
232. Id. at 237.
253. See BASSECHES, supra note 232, at 33 ("Dialectical thinking is thinking which looks for and
recognizes instances ofdialectic--developmental transformation occurring via constitutive and interactive
relationships."); id. at 24 ("Orienting toward dialectic leads the thinker to describe changes as dialectical
movement (i.e., as movement that is developmental movement through forms occurringvia constitutive and
interactive relationships) and to describe relationships as dialectical relationships (i.e., as relationships that
are constitutive, interactive, and that lead to or involve developmental transformation)"). Importantly,
however, the dialectical process does not "preclude a formal analyses," thus condemningjudges to replace
traditional methods of decision-making. Id. at 27.
254. Id. at 29 (noting additionally that "formal analyses which establish categories of analysis from
the thinker's own perspectives tend to remain relatively impermeable" in contrast).
253. LANGER, supra note 21, at 198.
256. Id.
237. Id. at 199.
258. While, in total, Professor Basseches identified twenty-four methods ofthinking Dialectically, he
highlighted nine particular Meta-formal approaches within the largergroup. This section focuses on Meta-
formal principles for the following reason: Not only do they "most clearly reflect[] the meta-systematic
level of... dialectical thinking," they "enable the thinker to describe (a) limits of stability of forms; (b)
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the multiple ways we can limit ourselves by failing to recognize
transitions, and especially inconsistencies and incompatibilities, between
different types of thought structures. For example, one of Basseches's
research subjects observed the way people often point out contradictions
in theories to show why the theories inevitably fail. The subject noted
how this type of criticism is less optimal than using a different method
to critique the theory because relying on a flawed theory leaves the
potential for further contradiction. Accordingly, to achieve more
consistent results in one's criticisms of a contradictory theory, the critic,
after recognizing the flaw, should instead synthesize the two opposing
views and find a more "inclusive" way to represent the contradiction. 0
Basseches denotes this activity as "Understanding the Resolution of
Disequilibrium or Contradiction in Terms of a Notion of
Transformation in Developmental Direction ' 260  (hereinafter
Disequilibrium Schema).
The rest of this subsection examines portions of Professor Basseches's
interviews with research subjects. To test what he calls the
Disequilbrium Schema, Basseches asked a research subject to share his
views about philosophical paradoxes, like the one that the Greek
mathematician Zeno had identified, circa 400 B.C. Zeno's paradoxical
theory against movement can best be described by the Race Course:
Starting at point S a runner cannot reach the goal, G, except by
traversing successive "halves" of the distance, that is, subintervals of
SG, each of them SG/2n (where n = 1, 2, 3, ... ). Thus, ifM is the
midpoint of SG, he must first traverse SM; ifNis the midpoint ofMG,
he must next traverse AV; and so forth. Let us speak of SM, MY,
NO,... as the Z-intervals and of traversing any of them as making a Z-
run. The argument then comes to this:
[F1] To reach G the runner must traverse all Z- intervals
(make all the Z-runs).
[b2] It is impossible to traverse infinitely many intervals
(make infinitely many Z-runs).
[3] Therefore, the runner cannot reach G.
But why would Zeno assert [b2]? Probably because he made the
following further assumption:
[F4] The completion of an infinite sequence of acts in a
finite time interval is logically impossible.
relationships among forms; (c) movements from one form to another (transformation); and (d) relationships
of forms to the process of form.-construction or organization." BASSECHES, supra note 232, at 76. While
this Article highlights three of these schemata, each of the nine offers a significant tool with which judges
can enhance their decision-making. See id. at 74 tbl. 1. (labeling schemata).
239. Id. at 126.
260. Id.
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This assumption has enormous plausibility.261
After discussing philosophical theories, the research subject in this
particular inquiry made the following comments about Zeno's Paradox,
which satisfied the criteria of the Disequilibrium Schema described
above:
[SUBJECT]: [T] ake a classic paradox like [Z] eno's paradox, you know,
where you have the paradoxical conclusion that there is no motion.
... [lhe classic skeptic's response is to walk across the room. Now,
in one sense, yeah, that person is right, that does refute the paradox,
I mean, shows you that the conclusion is false. On the other hand,
the paradox seemed to arise by rather straightforward reasoning,
involving our usual conceptions of space and time and motion; and
so, to me, the deep response to this paradox, you know, is then to articulate the
concepts of space, time and motion and to define the logic in such a way that the
paradoxes can no longer be drawn-that is, the contradiction can no longer be
drawn-from them262 .... So, in other words, there was a tension
between the facts of the real world namely, that there is motion-and
the way the Greek philosophers were describing that motion. The
two won't go together because when you put them together you did
get a contradiction, right? So then the theoretical problem, you know,
which forced Aristotle ultimately to formulate a highly sophisticated
physical theory, was to find a way of getting around this.
[BASSECHES]: SO WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE GUY WHO WALKED
AROUND THE ROOM-THAT THAT SOLUTION WAS INADEQUATE?
[SUBJECT]: Yeah, that's sort of failing to, or refusing to accept... to
face a certain reality because that same skeptic... I mean, he is right,
there is motion, but he is going to go on using language which generates the
paradox, rather than trying to do better and get deeper into the world and our way
of expressing the world, in order to avoid that contradiction.263
Basseches emphasized certain sentences with italics because they
represent the Disequilibrium Schema in two ways. First, they recognize
a contradiction between the "skeptic's response" and the "deep
response." 264 Second, they "describ [e] the deep response as a movement
to a more inclusive (more developed) form which integrates a language
for describing the physical world, a logic, and the observed facts of motion:
[as evident in the subject's prescription] to articulate the concepts of
space, time, and motion and to define the logic in such a way that the
261. Gi egory Vlastos, Zeno ofEka, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIAOFPHILOSOPHY 369,372 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967).
262. Basseches uses italics in a passage to indicate instances of dialectical thinking.
263. BASSECHFS, supra note 232, at 127.
264. Id.
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paradoxes can no longer be drawn.'26 3 As demonstrated below, these
observations also apply to the legal analyses employed by judges. 266
To Professor Basseches, two additional schemata, besides the
Disequilibrium Schema, relate particularly to the task of judicial
decision-making.267 Judges' foremost concern should be to display the
analytical characteristics of the schema titled "Criticism of Formalism
Based on the Interdependence of Form and Content" (hereinafter
Criticism of Formalism Schema),"' which also relates to the schema
known as "Multiplication of Perspectives as a Concreteness-Preserving
Approach to Inclusiveness" (hereinafter Multiplication Schema).269 The
examples cited below illuminate these two Meta-Formal tools.
In the first case, the Criticism of Formalism Schema deals with the
"effort to describe relationships and movements of particulars as
governed by rules or laws which can be stated at a general or universal
level, with no reference to the content of the particulars."7 In the legal
realm, we encounter this phenomenon whenever a judge identifies
formal rights, such as statutory rights, requiring the application of
standardized analytical procedures.' An example of this might include
applying a subsection of the Uniform Commercial Code and working
through each provision, only to arrive at some preordained point. This
type of formality, however, is susceptible to criticism when the legal
questions deal not with a clearly defined statute, but rather with a
265. Id. at 128.
266. See infta Part IV.B.3.A (describingJustice Scalia's analysis of the passage of time in Puintz).
267. See Interview with Michael Basseches (Apr. 3, 2001).
268. BASSECHES, supra note 232, at 142.
269. Id. at 146.
270. Id. at 142. Basseches further notes how: "In the sphere of logic, one finds statements such as
'If p is true, then not-p is false.' This statement is meant to apply to any proposition which may be
substituted forp, regardless of its content." Id. But cf EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 3 (1949) (recognizing that legal reasoning is the kind "in which the classification changes as
the classification is made [and] t1he rules change as the rules are applied."). Professor Levi's description
of the "moving classification system" suggests that the legal reasoning process can develop valid
classifications even where specifics appear to be absent. Id. at 4. What seems indisputable is the increased
level of attention that the interpreter must devote to situations where classifications move easily-a
requirement upon which Basseches seems to focus his attention with the Criticism of Formalism Schema.
271. According to Basseches, these are "statements of formal rights which cannot be violated and
formal procedures which must be followed no matter what one's particular purpose might be." Id. at 142.
See also id. at 142-43 (noting how these outcomes are supported by the following inferences:
[G]eneral laws and rules (form) govem relationships and movements of particulars (content)
which exist separately from the general, statements themselves. These pre-existing
particulars are considered to confirm (in the case of theories and facts) or conform to (in the
case of rules and behaviors) the laws by acting in accordance with them, or to disconfirm
or violate them by acting in discordance with them. Formalism appeals to impartiality as
justification, claiming either that impartial rules should be obeyed because they are fair, or
that theoretical generalizations are justified by the conformity to them of impartially
collected facts.).
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"theoretical law." '272 For example, in the case of a constitutional
principle, such as the prohibition against Congress compelling states to
enact a federal scheme, 273 while
a formalist may claim that [the law's] validity is demonstrated by facts
which conform to it [,]... if sets of stimulus conditions, response
classes, or positive reinforcements are not particulars which exist prior
to the law, but are rather defined by the experimenter . . ., there is
every reason to believe that another law could be formalized which
would apply equally well to the same events but which would
conceptualize those events using different categories.! 74
To guard against this threat, the transitional thinker must instead adopt
an outlook that reflects the Criticism of Formalism-a perspective that
envisions form and content as being "interdependent." The legal
theorist must recognize her own role in developing the very categories
that ultimately comprise the "universal statement" to which she is
appealing. In the following excerpt, the subject mindfully comments on
an instance in which a music aficionado interpreted a meaning in a
composer's work of which the composer was not yet aware:
[SUBJECT]: I'm saying that if you start off with the notion that there
is a conceptual framework involved and that a perception of that
framework is either closer to or further from being accurate,
depending on whether it agrees with the conceptual model, you've got
problems. There has to be the interaction between what?-the
conceptual, and what?-the perceptual source. 7
Here, the subject identified a problem that relates to "a single abstract
'conceptual' form to which different listeners' perceptions of the
composition (substantive content) conform more or less accurately. 2 76
The subject stressed the need for interdependence by "saying that the
way the composer or an analyst conceptualizes the piece should depend
on what listeners hear and that unanticipated perceptions should be
viewed as sources of conceptual enrichment, rather than as inaccuracies.
(What listeners hear clearly depends on how the piece was
272. BASSLCHES, supra note 232, at 143.
273. The Court developed this rule in the recent case ofAiw Fwor. UnitedStaltes, 505 U.S. 144 (1992),
where it deemed unconstitutional any attempt by Congress to "commandeeri] the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Id. at 176
(citing Hodel . Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
274. BASSEcHF.S, supra note 232, at 1 43. With this observation, Basseches validates the notion that
such mindless thinkingcan potentially keep a person from achieving the better or best answer by confining
them to a state of theoretical indeterminacy.
275. Id. at 144-45.
276. Id. at 145.
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conceptualized.)." '277 In a legal sense, judges should make similar
distinctions in their analyses by synthesizing alternative theories and
expanding them, rather than limiting themselves by endorsing only one
of multiple approaches.
In the final instance, the Multiplication Schema complements the
Criticism of Formalism in that it "treat[s] a large problem as a whole by
viewing the whole from several vantage points (either from within or
without the whole) at one time." '278 Basseches provides the example of
evaluating hospitals in America, an objective that can include each of
the following considerations: (1) the quality of"healthcare delivery," (2)
the "organizational structure" of the hospital, (3) the historical economic
developments of the hospital in relation to America's changing
corporate structure, and (4) the experiences of staff members in the
hospital." 9 Evidently, by comparing and contrasting these several
perspectives, an evaluator will enjoy a more informed decision-making
process. Albeit this schema is hardly complex, the challenge becomes
acknowledging the one-sidedness of any perspective 280 and balancing it
with others to generate more accessible outcomes. The subject who
epitomized this schema responded to a question requiring him to
distinguish "the nature of education in general,"2 '' as opposed to the
nature of education at his small private college:
[BASSECHES]: WELL, I GUESS THE FIRST QUESTION HAS TO DO IN A
BROADER SENSE WITH WHAT EDUCATION IS ABOUT, AND THEN THE
SECOND...
[SUBJECT]: For the broader sense, I throw up my hands in despair.
The only way I could deal with that question would be to disaggregate
it. .. .I would start to ty to pick out centers. It seems to meyou have to cut that
cake up so many different ways andyou start talking about the different sections,
primaoy, seconda'y; the considerations such as ethniciy, social class, parental
background; whether it is education geared specifically towards occupational
preparation or whether it is more general. This is all off the top of my head.
I think before you can view the question of education in America you
have to start making these kinds of discriminations ....
[BASSECHES]: SO YOU DON'T THINK YOU COULD SAY SOMETHING
ABOUT WHAT EDUCATION IS ABOUT ... ?
277. Id.
278. BASSECHES, supra note 232, at 147.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 149. This result implicates a three step process: acknowledging (1) "the limits of
abstraction," (2) the necessary one-sidedness of perspectives, and (3) " the essential importance of the
concrete." Id.
281. Id. at 149.
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[SUBJECT]: Not meaningfully. I could certainly say something. I'm pretty
glib. But I don't think I could say anything that either you or I would
be very impressed with.2" '
In the excerpt above, the subject's reference to picking out centers
indicated analysis of multiple perspectives, while his unwillingness to
speculate regarding the unknown indicated a preference for
concreteness (evident in the assumption that "the subject is suggesting
that what he would say at a general level would not be meaningful
because it would be so abstract").28 The subsections below will apply
these three most prevalent schemata, as described above, to the
reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States.
284
2. Printz's Appeal to the Dialectical Schemata
Because the systems of analysis discussed above work best when
judges apply them willingly,285 it would be deceptive to pretend that any
particular judicial opinion demonstrates influenced decision-making or
that any particular method of psychological analysis would have caused
a different result.2"' However,judicial opinions criticized by scholars for
being inconsistent may be valuable as analytical tools to hypothesize
how a particular method of self-analysis might have assisted the judges
who wrote those opinions.
Printz is useful for demonstrating the hypothetical benefits of the
analytical approaches presented because scholars with divergent
viewpoints have criticized the numerous inconsistencies present in the
opinion. 2 7  Foremost among these inconsistencies is the seemingly
biased interpretation of historical materials considered by theJustices in
rendering their decision.288 Some of these commentaries essentially
282. BASSECHES, supra note 232, at 149-50.
283. Id. at 150.
284. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
285. See infra Part V (explaining that judges need to apply theories on their own initiative).
286. See supra text accompanying note 191 (expressing doubt into the ability to show w%-hatJustices are
thinking based solely on analysis of their witten opinions).
287. See Neil Colman McCabe, "Our Federalism, "2\iit Theirs: judicial Comparative Federalism in the U.S.,
40 S. TEX. L. REv. 541,553 (1999) (referring to Printz's reasoning as "an aberration"); Evan H. Caminker,
Printz, State Soereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SuP. CT. L. REV. 199, 202, 210 (1997) (noting the
"ad hoc" nature of the decision for which Justice Scalia is accused of having "sidestepped th[e] obvious
issue"); Martin S. Flaherty, Part I. Are I Ve to be a.¥ation? Federal Power vs. "States'Rights" in Forei-n Affirs, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1284, 1289 (1999) (calling Printz "[tihe Court's most far reaching exercise in
soewreignty federalism" and "disjointed"); Gene R. Nichol, justice Scalia and the Printz Case: 77Te Trials ofan
Occasional Onginalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, at 962, 967 (1999) (describing the Pintz opinion as a
"mischaracterization of history and intention" and "thin").
288. Much of this commentary focused on Justice Scalia's use of THE FEDERAUST, which I will
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suggest that the Justices exhibited mindlessness. 289  Professor Evan
Caminker's observation that Justice Scalia succumbed to a process-
based bias apparently reflects the second type of dangerous bias where
interpreters automatically default to a rigid analytical system without
comparison.
[Printz] is particularly striking because of the analytical route the
Court took to its doctrinal destination; all but the most unreflective
formalists should find its reasoning process troubling.... My concern
here is not with arbitrating this dispute at a high level of abstraction
.... My concern is rather with maintaining the integrity of each
[interpretive] approach, which requires that each is . . .skillfully
applied and invoked only when appropriate. Where foundational
sources of text, structure, and history provide scant guidance,
interpretive formalism can easily become an exercise in undirected
choice from among competing conceptions and formulations-choice
that seems arbitrary because it appears neither dictated by the
underlying sources, nor counseled by articulated purposes, values, or
consequences. 2:
The question involved is one of "process." As another author
recognizes: "Printz could not have been more straightforward about the
constitutional sources it relied on for the result it reached."29' Instead
of the sources used, the trouble apparently rests in the mechanics of the
Justices' analyses.
Certain of thejustices' commentaries in Printz seem ripe for analysis
under the Disequilibrium, Criticism of Formalism, and Multiplication
Schemata identified by the DS Framework,29 2 even though numerous
explore in depth below. See inqfra Part IV.B.3 (describing the Court's use of THE FEDERALIST). However,
the criticisms of Pnintz to which I am referring not only addressed the dangers scholars normally note are
inherent in relying on THE FEDERALIST, they went beyond these common complaints. SeegeneralyJACK
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrI'UT1ON 201
(1996) ("Within the language of the Constitution, as it turned out, there was indeterminacy enough to
confirm that both Federalists and Antifederalists were right in predicting how tempered or potent a
government the Convention had proposed."). Instead, the critics attacked the justices' specific analytical
decisions-attacks which defied the notion that the Federalist Papers are historically indeterminate and
noting that the case should have been clear cut. See Nichol, supra note 287, at 963 ("At bottom,justice
Scalia's federalism analysis constitutes little more than a bow to his constituents, a wave to the crowd. We
know we are supposed to support states' rights. Yet we are not told what that means."). McCabe, .wpra
note 287, at 554 ("The Pnntz majority's invocation of federalism without a coherent and convincing
explanation of the theory raises the question of whether federalism is nothing but a convenient 'device for
permitting activist (conservative)judges to impose their policy preferences from the bench.").
289. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing Langer's theory of mindfulness).
290. Caminker, supra note 287, at 200-02.
291. Flaherty, supra note 287, at 1285.
292. The applicability of the DS Framework is suggested by three factors in the case. First, membe-s
of the Court found two extremely different meanings in the same historical materials. See infia notes 331
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analytical shortcomings in this Supreme Court decision have been
raised.293 While these connections between the analyses adopted by the
Justices and the DS Framework may be somewhat tangential, the
existence of any linkage to the psychological theory offers essential
insight into the value and practical utility of such methods in aiding
judges. Rather than criticizing the opinion with sweeping absolutes,
such as "right" or "wrong" or "good" or "bad," the use of the examples
below questions what the Framework might have suggested to the
Justices if they had had the opportunity to consult it.
The Printz case involved a determination of whether Congress could
require a local law enforcement official to enact an interim federal plan
for conducting background checks on purchasers ofhandguns.294 Citing
the recent case of New rork v. United States,29 which outlawed "direct[ ]
comp[ulsion of states] to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program," 2 6 law enforcement officers from two states attacked the
provision on constitutional grounds because of the federal law's
and 334-341 and accompanying text (describing the Court's battle over Alexander Hamilton's writings in
No. 27 of THE FEDERAUST). While this is surely not the first time the Court has viewed the same facts in
mysteriously different ways, we shall see that Aintz displays mindlessness and eligibility for the resolution
of bias with the DS framework. See WRIGHTSNIAN, supra note 19, at 52-53 (describing the startling
differences between Justice Marshall and Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the very same facts in Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), and using these diverging interpretations to suggest thatjudges' "values serve
as filters for the way that 'facts' are perceived"). Second, members ofthe Court applied different analytical
frameworks. See infra text accompanying notes 331 and 334-341 (comparing analyses); see Ernest A. Young,
Alden %. Maine and theJtrisprudence oJ'Stncture, 41 W.M. &MARY L. REX'. 1061,1645 (2000) ("The dueling
opinions in PNntz dramatize the extent to which political theory has replaced text and original
understanding by parsing the abstract discussions in 7he Federalist as carefully as a tax opinion might parse
the Internal Revenue Code."). ThirdJustice Scalia wrote for the majority in a way some might argue
defied the very principles for which he is supposed to stand when applying his unique brand of Originalist
interpretation. Compare Antonin Salia, Originalism, The Lesser Ezil, 57 U. CiN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989)
(finding repugnantjudicial opinions "rendered not on the basis ofwhat the Constitution originally meant,
but on the basis of what thejudges currently thought it desirable for it to mean"), and Zolnick, supra note
16, at 1378 (noting howJustice Scalia sees the Constitution as "dead" to eliminate the potential thatjudges
will use it to advance their own values), with Nichol, supra note 287, at 968 (1999) (noting that Scalia made
"no effort.., to tie the judge-made principle to" either "text" or "particular tradition" and that "[t] he fur
would have flown" had Scalia been "asked to write a dissent to his own opinion"); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Tetualism, the Unknown Ideal, 96 MIcH. L RE%,. 1509, 1521-22 (1998) (using Scalia's own reference to
Hai-old Leventhal, who sid "the trick [in using legislative history] is to look over the heads of the crowd
and pick out )yout friends," to cast doubt on his "creat[ion] [oq a constitutional limit on the national
government where none appears on the face of the Constitution") (altetation in original).
293. See supra notes 287, 288, and 292 (identifying criticisms).
294. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,902 (1997) (desribing aspects of the Brady Handgun
Violence Protection Act that "required the Attorney General to establish a national instant background-
check system" by 1998 in an effort to keep guns away from convicted criminals).
295. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
296. Id. at 176.
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expansion of their existing local duties.297 A number of states and
political organizations filed supplemental amicus briefs.29
The officers argued that the powers Congress had exercised were
reserved to the states and that various constitutional provisions
prohibited the federal legislature's interference with those powers.299
The government responded that the burdens imposed by Congress were
minimal and represented a tradition of "cooperative federalism" that the
founders of the nation sought to promote.00 These views raised a
serious historical question that involved the practices adopted by the first
Congress to enact a huge body of federal laws.30'
Given this apparent respect for cooperation between states and the
federal government, two possible historical models potentially resolved
this dilemma. On the one hand, the alternative championed by Justice
Scalia and the majority held that it was implicit in every historical
instance that states still had a choice regarding whether or not to comply
with congressional "requests."302 On the other hand, Justice Stevens
297. The officers also add ressed a number ofnegative reperc ussions stemming from the requirement
to conduct these investigations. Sheriffjay Printz, for example, complained that the Act required him to
"pull[] deputies offpatrol and investigation duties" for time intervals ranging from an hour to several days.
Brief for the Petitioner at *3, Printz %. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (No. 95-1478), available at LEXIS
1995 U.S. Briefs 1478. Further administrative burdens included the fact that the officers "ha[d] no
mechanism for carrying out the duties assigned by § 922(s) and no budget provision authorizing the
expenditures." Id. Sheriff Mack identified a closely related dilemma: "To the extent [that Mack]
attempted to perform the Federal duties, he incurred civil liability. Under Arizona law, a county official
who expends funds in excess of statutory authority is personally liable for their refund." Brief for the
Petitioner at *4, Printz %'. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (No. 95-1503), available at LEXIS 1995 U.S.
Briefs 1503.
298. See PAintz, 521 U.S. at 901-2 (noting the participation ofseveral states and organizations).
299. Specifically, they argued that (1) Congress had no power to compel state compliance under
Article I § 8 of the Constitution, Petitioner's Briefat 9, Pnintz (No. 95-1478), available at LEXIS 1995 U.S.
Briefs 1478; (2) that the commands violated the Tenth Amendment, Petitioner's Briefat *7, PNntz (No. 95-
1503), available at LEXIS 1995 U.S. Briel 1503; (3) that Article II ofthe Constitution requires the President
to appoint federal officers to faithfully execute federal laws, Petitioner's Briefat * 15, PNntz (No. 95-1478),
awailable at LEXIS 1995 U.S. Briefs 1478; and (4) that Congress's requirements were not permissible as an
extension of its enumerated powers, such as regulation of commerce. Id. at *4.
300. Respondent's Initial Briefat *2, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (No. 95-1478 and
95-1503), available at LEXIS, 1995 U.S. Briefs 1478. The government added that the obligations of local
officers did not constitute the compulsion outlawed by .1hw rork v. United States, id. at *7, and that the
requirements imposed by Congress were less burdensome than more demanding requirements that the
Court had upheld in the past. Id. at *3 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 465 U.S. 742 (1982), as upholding a
more burdensome demand on states than the interim Brady Act provisions).
301. Notably, the newly formed Congress called on state officials to execute necessary adjudicative
tasks, including the transportation of fugitives to their respective overseers, see Act ofFeb. 12, 1793, Ch. 7
§ 1, 1 Stat. 302, the determination of the condition ofseafaring vessels, see Act ofJuly 20, 1790, ch. 29 § 3,
1 Stat. 132, and the enforcement of federal laws dealing with immigration. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch.
3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (addressing the maintenance of citizenship applications by states).
302. See, e.g., Ptsntl, 521 U.S. at 917 (noting how "President Wilson did not commandeer the services
of state officers, but instead requested" their assistance).
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supported the government's assertion that the historical materials
represented instances of a long tradition of "cooperative federalism," 303
in which states would clearly benefit from the opportunity to execute the
federal laws in a manner sensitive to local concerns,0 4 which negated
the burdens of complying with the government's orders.
Justice Scalia gained the support ofJustices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
Thomas, who resolved the historical question by refuting Justice
Stevens's position. 3 05 Justice O'Connor, who concurred with the Printz
majority, strayed further from it by advocating that the Tenth
Amendment spoke directly to the issue at hand.0 6 In the final analysis,
the decision expanded New York's holding by outlawing not only
compulsion of states to enact a federal regulatory program, but also
"conscription" to enforce one temporarily.0 7
3. Printz's Mindless Analyses
That the Prntz majority and dissent offered contrasting approaches
to interpreting historical documents does not, in itself, indicate the
existence of mindlessness, even though some scholars have insinuated as
much.30" Nor does this mean that Printz was wrongly decided, no matter
how mindless theJustices may have appeared in their analyses. Instead,
this section highlights howjudges in similar positions might use the DS
Framework to alert themselves to moments in the decision-making
process where they have not fully explored an issue.
The four instances of mindlessness suggested by Printz occur in (1) the
way Justice Scalia conceived differences in conceptions of legal
obligations based on modern meanings, (2)Justice Scalia's and Justice
Stevens's reliance on modern secondary sources to explain the meaning
303. Id. at 960 (Stevens,J., dissenting); Respondent's Initial Briefat *2, Printz (No. 95-1478), available
t LEXIS, 1993 U.S. Briefs 1478 ("The challenged provisions of the Brady Act continue the extremely
valuable and constitutionally sound tradition of 'cooperative federalism' in the law enforcement
arena .... ).
304. See generally Respondent's Initial Brief, Printz (No. 93-1478), available at LEXIS, 1995 U.S. Briefs
1478 (describing the benefits of "cooperative federalism").
305. Pnintz, 321 U.S. at 917.
306. See Pn'ntz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O'Connor, J, concurring) ("The Brady Act violates the Tenth
Amendment to the extent that it forces States and local law enforcement officers to perform background
checks on prospective handgun owners and to accept Brady Forms firom firearms dealers.").
307. See Caminker, supira note 287, at 205 (noting "compulsion"/"conscription" distinction).
308. To one commentator, lintz resembled the noted film NIGHTOFTHE LIVING DEAD (Columbia
TniStar Entertainment 1990), in which constitutional meanings arose from their textual coffins and
compelledJustice Scalia to adopt a diflrent analysis. See Eskridge, supra note 292, at 1516 (observing how
"[tihe dead Constitution that Scalia describes in the Tanner Lectures came alive in PAintZ because Scalia
cobbled together a constitutional limit from several sources .... ").
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of original historical materials, (3)Justice Scalia's andJustice Souter's
deference to the notoriety and popularity of certain Framers as
determinants of the Framers' meanings in specific writings, and (4)
Justice Scalia's and Justice Stevens's treatment of constitutional
questions on which the writings of the Framers' remained silent. It
appears that examples one and two defy the Disequilibrium Schema,
example three negates the Criticism of Formalism Schema, and example
four implicates the Multiplication Schema.
a. Time Distinctions and the Lack Thereof
At one point in Printz, Justice Scalia adamantly distinguished the
present legal system from the one the Framers knew. The issue arose
becauseJustice Stevens's opinion referenced a 1790 statute that required
state courts to "appoint an investigative committee of three persons
'most skillful in maritime affairs' to determine whether a ship was
worthy of travel.30 9 Justice Stevens analogized this process to "an expert
inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise more
characteristic of executive activity."310 Justice Scalia consequently
responded to Stevens in a lengthy footnote, pointing out the fact that
Stevens impermissibly tried to use modem concepts associated with
"contemporary regulatory agencies"3"' to make his point-concepts that
clearly did not apply to the time period in question:
The dissent's assertion that the Act ofJuly 20, 1790 ... caused state
courts to act "like contemporary regulatory agencies" . . . is cleverly
true-because contemporary regulatory agencies have been allowed
to perform adjudicative ("quasi-judicial") functions .... It is foolish,
however, to mistake the copy for the original, and to believe that 18th-
century courts were imitating agencies, rather than 20th-century
agencies imitating courts. The Act's requirement that the court
appoint "three persons in the neighbourhood . . . most skillful in
maritime affairs" to examine the ship and report on its condition
certainly does not change the proceeding into one "supervised by a
judge but otherwise more characteristic of executive activity"...; that
requirement is not significantly differentftom the contemporagyjudicialpractice of
appointing expert witnesses, see, e.g., Fed. Rule. Evid. 706. '12
309. Printz, 521 U.S. at 951 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Act ofJuly 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 3, 1 Stat.
132-33).
310. Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (rejecting Scalia's observation that these requirements wee merely
"adjudicative in nature").
311. Id. at 950-51 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
312. Id. at 908 n.2 (emphasis added).
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In response to the passage above, the Disequilibrium criteria would
caution against observations similar to justice Scalia's. After recognizing
a contradiction, namely thatJustice Stevens misapplied a theory (i.e.,
that executive duties required ofjudges in the 1700s were the same as
those required in the 1990s), Scalia then attempted to apply his correct
interpretation ofjudges' roles in the 1700s by referencing Rule 706 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The trouble with his application of the
Federal Rules is the fact that they did not come into existence until
1974.313 Furthermore, until that time, each state had developed its own
rules regarding selection of expert witnesses or blue ribbon panels of
jurors, which would negate the notion that pre-1974 expert witness
provisions have any bearing on the maritime proceedings of 1790.314
Scalia, much like the traditional skeptic who walked across the room to
disprove Zeno's paradox, used the very misgiving he had identified in
Stevens's approach (improper time comparisons) to point out the correct
mode of interpretation. 315
The Disequilibrium Schema would counsel one in Justice Scalia's
position not to terminate his analysis early on, even if his initial
understanding of the premises supporting the Federal Rules analogy
were legitimate from an argumentative standpoint. With the aid of this
Schema, a decision-maker injustice Scalia's position should probably
complete the analysis only after finding examples that applied at the
time period in question so as not to negate his own point.
b. Reliance on Secondary Sources
The historical questions posed in Printz required thejustices to consult
a great many sources of law developed by the first Congress. But, in a
number of instances, Justices quoted modern secondary sources
simultaneous with the originals, as if they had the same persuasive
weight. In one example, Justice Scalia authoritatively cited a book
written in 1948 in a paragraph featuring nothing but statutes from the
313. Seegeneraly H.R. REP. No. 650 (1974) (exploring the historical developmentofthe Federal Rules
of Evidence).
314. See Mark Lewis & Mark Kitrick, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael: Blowout From the O'erinflation
ofDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 79, 80 (1999) (observing that "[c]ourts
[in the mid-I 800s] did not employ a generally agreed upon test for admissibility, causing inconsistency and
unpredictability in the admission of expert witness testimony").
315. See supra text accompanying notes 263-265 (describing flaws in the skeptic's approach to
disproving Zeno's paradox). Even if this statement seems logical for the purpose of demonstrating how
Stevens's example is similar to the modern practice of appointing expert witnesses, the form of the
argument apparently resembles the same problem observed in Basseches's interview with the subject who
referred to Zeno.
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1700s.316 In yet another instance,Justice Stevens introduced a historical
theory proposed in a 1993 law review article to explain the meaning of
references in the Federalist Papers regarding states' administrative
capabilities. 317 These quotations raise a number of concerns about the
legitimacy of Prntz's outcome. At one point, Justice Stevens attacked
Justice Scalia for thinly supporting certain propositions with no more
than the "speculation" of a footnote in a law review article.3
8
The trouble with authoritative citations to secondary sources derives
partly from considerations about the role of the historian and his
potential biases." 9 It is sometimes unavoidable that certain judges will
316. See rintz, 521 U.S. at 909-10 (citingJustice White for the proposition that "Georgia refused to
comply with [a] request").
317. See id. at 945-46, 946 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Beer).
318. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia doubted the dissenters' theory that requiring certain
"discrete ministerial tasks specified by Congress" was permissible and did not amount to compulsion
because the requirement would not "diminish the accountability" of state officials. Id. at 929-30. Scalia
heightened his criticism by claiming that, were this practice to grow, Congress would be able to take credit
for all of the states' toil. In this respect "even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of
implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its
burdensomeness and for its defects." Id. at 930. To support this claim, Scalia cited a footnote in the
Vanderbilt Law Review. Although he did not quote or paraphrase the citation, the footnote, after citing the
District Court's opinion in Printz for the proposition that the Brady Act "both absorbs government
resources that the states might direct elsewhere and confuses the lines of political accountability," read in
its entirety:
The Brady Act raises at least three accountability issues: (1) the lack of federal funds to
support the Act's mandates may force local law enforcement agendes to cut other essential
services, leading voters to blame local officials for those cuts; (2) voters opposed to gun
control may identify the Act with the local officials charged with administering it, and blame
those officials for the statute's enactment; and (3) citizens may blame law enforcement
officers for erroneous applications of the Act. Although the Act specifically exempts local
officers from civil liability for erroneous determinations, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7), it does not
shield them from popular criticism or electoral retaliation for those decisions.
DeborahJones Merritt, Three Faces ofFederalisr: Finding a Formuaiforthe Future, 47 VAND. L. RE\. 1563, 1580
n.65 (1994) (citing Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1514-15 (1994)). Justice Stevens attacked
the quote as unfounded: "The Court cites no empirical authority to support the proposition, relying
entirely on the speculations of a law review article. This concern is vastly overstated." fNntz, 521 U.S. at
957 n.18 (Stevens,J, dissenting). Seemingly, Scalia would have been better off citing the actual district
court opinion, which he might very well have done had he been sensitive to the concerns about secondary
sources mentioned in this section.
In another instance, Justice Scalia neglected to provide a pinpoint citation for one of the works he
referenced, as if hoping to appease critics wishing to call his bluff with a catchall citation. See Printz, 521
U.S. at 923 (referencing generally a 1994 article). Yet, the Justices were not the only ones to fall prey to
this practice. See, e.g., Petitioner's Reply Brief at *10, Printz (No. 95-1478), available at 1996 WL 650918
(citing a 1983 article from the iVashington Uniersi y Law Qartero to drive home the point that "The Framers
intended that voluntary cooperation between the States and the federal government would be integral to
federalism").
319. Often, scholars note the predominance ofconfusing language used even after the writing of the
Constitution, the clarity of which represented only a temporary respite. See PETER M. TIERsMA, LEGAL
LANGUAGE 45-46 (1999) (noting how "American legal language came to resemble the statutes of King
George III" even though individuals like Thomas Jefferson "seriously considered abolishing the entire
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encounter difficulties when interpreting the writings of historians who
have interpreted the Framer's meanings from their original writings.
This dilemma arises because the historian adds his own interpretation
to the finished product. 21 In Printz, two specific references highlight the
danger of over-reliance on these more modem sources, even more than
the examples illustrated above.
First, as Justice Stevens debated with Justice Scalia the issue of
whether an early act addressing Selective Service registration equated
to a request or compulsion of state officers, he attempted to impeach the
portion of the secondary work Scalia cited. Stevens did this by citing
seemingly contrary information written by that same author in the same
321piece. Of key importance, the note to which Stevens referred only
spanned a few short pages. Because it is difficult to imagine thatJustice
Scalia overlooked or intentionally avoided information contrary to his
main proposition, some other explanation is necessary to explain why
his opinion failed to take this information into account.3 22
existing system of laws" for the purpose of clarity). The law became so confusing that states like
"Massachusetts forbad lawyers fiom serving in [their] legislature and required that parties in court represent
themselves rather than engage an attorney." Id. at 43. Given the confusion that existed then, the likelihood
that judges now will face a great deal of indeterminacy is no understatement.
Other scholars turn not only to the laws and statutes of earlier years but to the changing role ofjudges to
confirm such doubts. See Susanna Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mlind, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 131, 139
(1998) (noting how judges' roles transfbrmed from "romantic" figures "whose judgements were, at once,
emanations of [their] own mind[s] [as well as] expressions of the 'rule of law"' and the way the objective
of self-analysis gave way to notions of legal realism); See DENNIS E. MITHAUG, SELF-REGULATION
THEORY: How OPTIMAL ADJUSTMENT MAN.IMIZE.S GAIN 32 (1993) (explaining how the 1900s
transformed the process ofjustification: "The relationship between factfinding and theory building reversed
positions. Top-down Aristotelian deduction of the past gave way to bottom-up inductive inquily of the
present."). Although the newer inductive system demanded "the development of systematic searches,
selections, uses, and reuses of solutions to achieve prescribed goals" it suggests that the prior body of
decision-making still rests on the more abstract principles. Id. at 40 (emphasis omitted).
Without recommending any specific process, Professor Louis E. Wolcher stated the need for
methodological self-consciousness to resolve historical dilemmas. Under his model, the goal would be
"neither a privileging of structure over subject, nor subject over structure, but rather a privileging of the
historian's own part in the process of reconstructing the past." Louis E. Wolcher, The Mlany Meanings of "lVherefore"
in L-galHistoy, 68 WASH. L. REV. 559,372 (1993) (emphasis added). For Wolcher, this would be the only
way to overcome the challenge of determining whether writers' accounts related to the "extralegal life
changes," autonomous of legal ones or not. Id.
320. Depending upon how many historians the most current author references, this process of
removal from the initial interpretation of meaning could continue infinitely. See William N. Eskridge,Jr.,
T'tualism and Original Understanding. Shoud the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but.'bt Statutol egslative Histoy?
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1310 (1998) (observing how "sources still being published" about the
Framers increase the indeterminacy of their understandings).
321. See PsintZ, 321 U.S. at 933 n. 13 (1997) (Stevens,J, dissenting) ("Indeed, the \ery commentator
upon whom the majority relies noted that the 'President might, under the act, have issued orders directly
to every state officer, and this would have been, for war purposes, a justifiable Congressional grant of all
state powers into the President's hands."' (citation omitted).
322. Here, such conduct raises issues similar tojustice Brennan's use ofGeorge Orwell'swork in Riey.
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In a similar vein, Justice Souter attacked Justice Scalia's use of
Clinton Rossiter's commentaries about particular Framers. Here, when
Scalia commented that Madison's view prevailed over Hamilton's,
giving him reason to discount Hamilton's statements, Souter replied
citing Rossiter for the proposition that there was no prevailing view
among the Framers since the writers of the Federalist Papers had a
unified voice:
This, indeed, should not surprise us, for one of the Court's own
authorities rejects the "split personality" notion of Hamilton and
Madison as being at odds in The Federalist, in favor of a view of all
three Federalist writers as constituting a single personality notable for
its integration:
"In recent years it has been popular to describe Publius [the nominal
author of The Federalist] as a 'split personality' who spoke through
Madison .... 2
The most striking thing about the paragraph above is not merely the
contrast between theJustices' interpretations of the Framers' meanings.
More importantly, the highlighted portion of the excerpt above indicates
that Justice Souter shifted his analysis to discussions of modem
conceptions of the meanings of original documents. In effect, in both
examples, the Court began to battle over the historians' views of the
original matter, rather than the original matter, which substantially
detracted from the Court's interpretive capacity.
It is the Criticism of Formalism Schema that can potentially assist
judges facing these kinds of dilemmas. This Schema enables judges to
distinguish the ways in which authors' interpretations evidence historical
meanings and the author's own meanings simultaneously. Criticism of
Formalism provides this capability because it focuses on "assertion[s] of
interdependence. '24 By employing this schema, judges could avoid
having to rely solely on a scholar's account merely because the author
utilized reliable sources in developing the scholarship. Instead, the
judge would question how those sources helped to create the depiction
that she found compelling when evaluating the facts of the case. This
Schema would prompt the judge to consult those very materials to gain
a better understanding by implementing the author's rationale, but not
the author's verbatim result.
See supra note 204 (suggesting that Brennan omitted the portion of the text he quoted that would have
evisce,,ted the persuasiveness of his claim).
323. PNntz, 321 U.S. at 973 n.2 (SouterJ., dissenting) (citing CLI.N'TON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER
HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 58 (1964) (emphasis added)).
324. See supra note 263 (describing flaws in the critic's approach).
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c. Deference to the Personal Reputations of the Federalists
At two separate points of the Printz decision, Justices resorted to a
method of interpretation that I call "popularity weighting." This
method consists of weighting a Framer's popularity in the same way that
one might weight a particular historian's conception of meaning. My
concern is that this process detracts from the Justices' mindful analyses.
In the first instance,Justice Scalia refutedjustice Souter's assertion that
No. 27 of The Federalist should be read to uphold the requirement that
states comply with the orders of Congress, stating that
[e] ven if we agreed withJUSTICE SOUTER'S reading of The Federalist
No. 27, it would still seem to us most peculiar to give the view
expressed in that one piece, not clearly confirmed by any other writer,
the determinative weight he does. That would be crediting the most
expansive view of federal authority ever expressed.... Hamilton was
"from first to last the most nationalistic of all nationalists in his
interpretation of the clauses of our federal Constitution. 325
The preceding analysis invokes a number of questions, the most
pressing of which is, what does Hamilton's reputation for being a
nationalist have to do with the issue at bar?326 The answer seems to be
nothing, as is evident from Souter's response to this criticism. But the net
effect of the squabble resulted in diverting the attention of the Justices
from the legal questions involved in the dispute.32
7
Before departing from this example, we should note that two
phenomena are occurring here. At the most basic level,Justice Scalia
relied upon the assumption that Hamilton was a nationalist, although
he elected not to define that term in the context of his opinion.32 8 On
another level, Scalia's comment that a valid Framer's opinion must
reflect a collective view rather than an individual one seriously
undermines his own view. This mandate sets the interpretive bar so
325. frintz, 521 U.S. at 915-16 n.9 (citing two more recent historical pieces by Rossiter and Farrand
to confirm Hamilton's reputation).
326. As one of nntz's critics put it:
Justice Scalia's reliance on Clinton Rossiter [1964] and Farrand's Records of the Federal
Comention [1911] at best supports the commonly known proposition that Hamilton was
comparatively far more nationalistic than most of the other Founders, not that his views on
the commandeering of state executive officials failed to "prevail."
Flaherty, supra note 287, at 1292 n.91 (1999) (citation omitted).
327. For commentary regarding Justice Souter's off-topic response, see infra note 331 and
accompanying text.
328. See Nichol, supra note 287, at 967 (finding preposterous the assumption that simply because
Hamilton was "Nationalistic" one is naturally to "suppose[] his views should be dismissed out of hand").
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high that it, taken to its natural limit, would deny reliance on any of'the
materials written by the Federalists and would potentially undercut the
Originalism thatJustice Scalia holds so near and dear to his heart. 29 In
other words, by requiring that multiple voices confirm the content of
any opinion in The Federalist Papers, Scalia would be condemning that
interpretive practice to reliance on multiple voices, each of which
represent different political and value-based influences-a pitfall of
Originalism that the theory's critics castigate the most emphatically. 3 °
We must ask ourselves then, if such a precarious interpretation on
Scalia's part can reasonably be understood to indicate anything other
than a mindless state. Perhaps it does not.
An even more compelling example of the dangers of mindless
constitutional interpretation is present injustice Souter's response to
Scalia, which heightened the existing state of mindlessness to an
unprecedented level. In a passage clearly intended to rebut Scalia's
attacks, Souter focused attention on the words Hamilton used in The
Federalist No. 27. Souter specifically remarked:
The Court reads Hamilton's description of state officers' role in
carrying out federal law as nothing more than a way of describing the
duty of state officials "not to obstruct the operation of federal law,"
with the consequence that any obstruction is invalid. But I doubt that
Hamilton's English was quite as bad as all that. Someone whose
virtue consists of not obstructing administration of the law is not
described as "incorporated into the operations" of a government or
as an "auxiliary" to its law enforcement. One simply cannot escape
from Hamilton by reducing his prose to inapposite figures of
speech. 3
Justice Souter's use of the vague term "bad" in combatting the
majority's interpretation of Hamilton's grammar, without further
explanation of what was actually "bad" about Scalia's interpretation,
had little judicial value. Even more troubling was his failure to ground
his reasoning in the meanings of the words as Hamilton would have
understood them.
The Criticism of Formalism Schema would have addressed both
instances of mindlessness. With respect to Scalia's reference to
329. See McCabe, supra note 287, at 544 (noting how, in Pintk, "Scalia's use ofThe Federalist Papers
as proofsupports a conclusion opposite to his").
330. See Flaherty, supra note 287, at 1309 (discussing problems associated with understanding
collective intent based on the writings of one Framer).
331. Pnt, 521 U.S. 898, 972-73 n.l (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing
Hamilton's writings and trying to prove invalid Justice Scalia's comparison between "auxiliaries" and
"nonobstructors"). Id. at 973 n.2.
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Alexander Hamilton, the Schema would compel several questions: (1)
who measured Hamilton's level of popularity; (2) how did that person
conduct such an evaluation; and (3) what types of secondary sources
were used to arrive at that conclusion? Justice Scalia's analysis makes
no mention of these underlying questions; nevertheless, as a result of his
remark, there is real danger that future legal practitioners will cite these
references for their authoritative weight whenever Hamilton's
nationalistic reputation furthers their cause. Because of the precedential
force of Scalia's opinion, future judges will have little incentive to
engage in the analysis that Scalia neglected. Likewise, with respect to
Souter's pithy remark regarding Hamilton's use of grammar, the
Criticism of Formalism Schema would urge him to explore the possible
meanings of words and standards of grammar that characterized
Hamilton's era before interpreting Hamilton's intentions.
d. Ultra-Narrow Interpretations of Silence
This final subsection will focus onjustice Scalia and Souter's dispute
over the meaning of a passage written by Alexander Hamilton in No. 2 7
of The Federalist Papers. Scalia's response, in particular, shows us how he
considered only one potential interpretation among a number of
competing possibilities. 32 Unlike the Criticism of Formalism Schema,
332. This is not to say that the case only featured one such instance. In fact,Justice Scalia blithely
asserted his interpretation on multiple occasions. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 287, at 967-68 ("Even if the
dissenters are wrong that the Framers clearly indicated a belief in the acceptability ofthe federal use ofstate
actors, that, ofcourse, does not mean, without more, that they clearly rejected the practice."); id. at 966-67
(pointing out the following drawbacks regarding Scalia's historical analyses:
Justice Scalia's response to [a] litany of counter-examples is somewhat out of character for
such a forceful advocate. The listed examples, he writes, "do not necessarily" conflict with
his proffered constitutional rule; they do not "necessarily imply" or provide "clear support"
or "clearly confirm" or "conclusively" determine the "precise issue" before the Court. It
is possible, he seems to say, to find at least some ambiguity in the cascade of historical
practices offered to contradict his new constitutional rule. (Admittedly, the "possible
ambiguity" claim grows tiresome after seven or eight uses.) The reader of the opinion is
almost left with the impression thatJustice Scalia is playing a game ofcat and mouse, ending
by saying "you can't force me to admit that history is on your side-sure, it's true, but I'll
never admit it.).
See also McCabe, supra note 287, at 551 ("In the end, Scalia more or less admitted his approach in P'nt wsas
somewhat 'formalistic,' although he effectively said 'same to you,' when the dissenters accused him of
'empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order."') (citation omitted).
Additionally, in one example,Justice Scalia noted that although the power to commandeer was "highly
attractive" to Congress, Congress did not use the power as much as it could have. Prints, 521 U.S. at 905.
Scalia thus concluded: "[I]f... earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would
have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist." Id. One commentator appropriately notes
the following: "By the end of this discussion, what began as a potential 'reason to believe' tansmogrified
into a dispositive rationale .... Flaherty, supra note 287, at 1290. In contrast to these simpler examples,
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which would have encouraged Scalia to explore the many sources that
compromised his initial interpretations of a formalistic theory, the
Multiplication Schema is appropriate to critique this instance of
interpretation because it would require any judge in the same position
to dig deeper than the single perspective embraced by Justice Scalia.
The following passage by Hamilton led Scalia and Souter to two
completely opposed conclusions:
It merits particular attention... that the laws of the Confederacy, as
to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will become
the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers,
legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the
sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of
the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of
the national government asfar as itsjust and constitutional authority extends,
and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. 3
To the Printz Court, the meaning of the word "magistracy" was the
key issue.334 If the word pertained to all civil servants, including the
functionaries of a state's executive branch, then the provision seemingly
permitted the action sought by the gun control legislation. If, however,
the word applied only to judges, the provision would not necessarily
permit the desired compulsion. For Justice Souter, the first view
constituted the only viable alternative, as he confirmed: "[Mlt is The
Federalist that finally determines my position. '" Grasping tightly onto
the sentence referencing "[1]egislatures, [c]ourts, and [m]agistrates,"
Souter proclaimed it evident that magistrates included more thanjudges
in Hamilton's interpretation.336
Justice Scalia adhered to the contrary view that magistrates meant
judges only.337 Furthermore, he attacked Souter's analysis, noting how
Hamilton and Justice Souter simply presumed that it "flowe[d]
automatically" from the reference to complying with the laws of the
Confederacy that state officers are "incorporated" into federal service
the excerpt featured above provides the clearest indication of the type of pervasive mindlessness that can
be avoided with the DS Framework.
333. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 162 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
334. See David M. Sprick, EvAbundanti Cautela (Out o'An Abundance of Caution): A HistonicalAnalysis of
the Tenth Amendment ani the ConstitutionalDilemma O'er "Federal" Power, 27 CAP. U. L. RE\,. 529, 568-69 (1999)
(observing the determinative \alue of this question to the outcome of the case).
335. intz, 521 U.S. at 971 (Souterj., dissenting).
336. Id. Some say that Souter's distinction here had the effect of"renderingJusticc Scalia's opinion
indefensible." Sprick, supra note 334, at 569.
337. Pnntz, 521 U.S. at 907 (proclaiming that historical sources "establish, at most, that the
Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judgev to enforce
federal prescriptions").
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and made "auxiliary" to the government."' In a detailed footnote,
Scalia presented an alternative theory showing why the argument based
on "automatic" flow was mistaken:
Both the dissent andJUSTICE SOUTER dispute that the consequences
are said to flow automatically. They are wrong. The passage says
that (1) federal laws will be supreme, and (2) all state officers will be
oathbound to observe those laws, and thus (3) state officers will be
"incorporated" and "rendered auxiliary." The reason the progression
is automatic is that there is not included between (2) and (3): "(2a)
those laws will include laws compelling action by state officers." It is
the mere existence of all federal laws that is said to make state officers
"incorporated" and "auxiliary."3 '9
Justice Souter loudly voiced his discontent with Scalia's
characterization of his analysis, attacking, inter alia, Scalia's view that
state duties "not to obstruct the federal law" were their only obligations
in carrying out the laws.34 He further assaulted the inferences under-
lying Scalia's model, accusing Scalia of creating the straw man notion
of "automatic" flow and then assigning this fabricated conception to
Souter and Alexander Hamilton without providing a scintilla of
support. 4'
Critics have labeled Scalia's behavior in a number of contrasting
ways. To some, Scalia's analysis embodies many positive attributes
associated with judicial restraint.342 To others, Scalia's interpretation
evidenced unfounded "conclusive reliance on negative inference.
3 41
Still more argue that Scalia relied on Hamilton "affirmatively" '344 to
establish and support the majority's position, while others suggest that
Scalia merely grafted Pintz's considerations onto arguments that he had
338. Id. at 912 n.4.
339. Id (emphasis omitted).
340. Id. at 972-73 n.2. It is said that Souter was not the onlyJustice to criticize Scalia in this way.
SeeJeffr-ey Rosen, Dual Sowe'dgns, NEW REPuBIsC, July 28, 1997, at 17 (observing Justice Stevens who
"remarked spontaneously thatJustice Scalia's opinion reminded him ofJustice Douglas's opinion in the
Griswold Contraceptives case of 1965, which extrapolated a right to privacy from the Constitution's
'penumbras' and 'emanations').
341. See Pnntt, 521 U.S. at 972 n.1 ("[N[either Hamilton nor I use the word 'automatically';
consequently, there is no reason on Hamilton's view to infer a state officer's affirmative obligation without
a textual indication to that effect.").
342. SeeJohn F. Manning, Tetualism and Original Understanding: Textualism and the Role ofThe Federalist
in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. RE\. 1337, 1363 (1998) (noting that Scalia's actions were
calculated and suggesting that his opinion "consciously seeks to assign The Federalist only such weight as its
analysis merits"). On this view, Scalia is merely responding to the government and Justice Souter
"defensive[ly]." Id.
343. Flaherty, supra note 287, at 1290.
344. See Eskridge, supra note 292, at 1520 (noting how "Scalia's opinion .. . affiatively relied on
The Federalist to establish" the majority's position).
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formerly asserted less successfully in other cases.343  These varied
conclusions suggest an almost infinite number of possibilities for using
the lessons from Printz to improve judicial decision-making.
Amid the din of confusion, the Multiplication Schema rises to the
occasion as a reasoned and instructive evaluative criterion. While
Scalia's analysis may have been based on a legitimate study of history
and the texts composed by the Framers, critics rightly challenge his one-
sidedness in interpreting the requirement that all magistrates be judges
and then failing to consider other alternatives. Scalia's decision to
embrace a singular theoretical resolution highlights the need for the
Multiplication of Perspectives as a Concreteness-Preserving Approach
to Inclusiveness.
The greatest benefit of this cognitive approach in the context of the
Printz decision would have been that reliance on this schema might have
rebutted the notion that silence in The Federalist No. 27 could only mean
one thing: that the idea of state compulsion had to be directly indicated
with the word "compulsion." The problems inherent in this analysis will
surely resurface whenever the Court adjudicates an issue related to
compulsion. The meaning of the original text has demonstrably
changed; no longer will The Federalist No. 27 stand for the more
inclusive concepts that it had prior to Pntz. Whereas, before the case,
Hamilton's commentary might have provided guidance to states about
resolving dilemmas in complying with federal mandates, The Federalist
No. 27 is reduced to a justification why Congress cannot compel state
governments to act-a meaning that will be forever intertwined with
Printz's precedential value.
Even in light of apparent instances of mindlessness, however, it is
hardly fair to claim that Printz was wrongly decided."4 The better
observation is that Printz left several questions unanswered while it
wasted time on mindless banter. While one author concludes that "we
are left in the dark as to the broader meaning of Printz,"34 7 others point
to more specific examples of remaining uncertainty about Printz's
holding.3 48
343. See Ralph A. Rossum, The Inmy of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Cour and the
Seventeenth Amendment., 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 737 (1999) (noting that Scalia "sugarcoat[ed]" the
sepanation-of-powers argument "directly from his dissent in Afonison v. Olson" in Pint).
346. Given a virtual cornucopia of explanations for the majority opinion, how would one prove
conclusively the correctness of the ruling?
347. Caminker, supra note 287 at 202.
348. See Nichol, supra note 287, at 961-62 (describing a virtual laundry list of cases in which the
federal government may still compel states to serve certain federal functions even in light of Printz);
McCabe, supra note 287, at 350 (noting Scalia's "assumption" that law enforcement agents were "state
executive branch officials"and recognizing contrary statutes in Texas, for example, that consider sheriffs
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V. JUDICIAL MINDFULNESS IN PRACTICE
Part IV, above, introduced the workings of ajudicial self-help process.
The tough question now is how much help does the model actually
provide? The proposed model ofjudicial mindfulness does not enable
a judge to emerge with an understanding of every single behavioral
influence that affects him. Nor does the model enable him to travel
back in time and know the true meanings of the Framers. Yet, we
should still recognize the benefits of the model. If the two methods I
propose above-using negative practice and transitional
thinking-comply with Langer's general theory, then judges can
potentially decrease the bias underlying their decisions by fifty percent,
if they are currently operating mindlessly. 49 Even if the model only
improved decisional accuracy five percent, the model would still be
extremely beneficial forjudges since indeterminate law more than likely
weights potential theoretical solutions equally.3
30
We can critique the proposed model further by analyzing it with a
criterion that characterizes effective self-help methods in general: the
ease with which judges can implement the process. If judicial
mindfulness withstands this test, the theory will stand as a practical
approach to increasing the accuracy ofjudicial decision-making.
For any self-help model to work, the people who use it must
understand it. More importantly, they must also be committed to the
process.33 At one level, it makes sense for judges to know that certain
debiasing processes exist. Awareness is naturally the first step.352 But
to be members of thejudicia)'); Caminker, supra note 287, at 202 C"[T]he Court left open the possibility
that particular constitutional provisions outside of Article I, Section 8 might still authorize congressional
commandeering, but the Court provided little guidance for determining when this would be so.").
349. See Chanowitz & Langer, supra note 226, at 1051 (describing results ofAlindfulness training).
350. Seesupra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (defining and explaining legal indeterminacy). Also
note that judges will be more informed regarding which influences they need to subtract from an analysis,
fulfilling Professor Schroeder's call, more than eight decades ago, for a process wherejudges are "knowing
[of] the present action, and the immediate stimulus firom without, [so that] as if by a process of subtraction,
[they] may uncover the contributing motive fr-om within, which is the product of past experience."
Schroeder, supra note 190, at 90.
351. See CARLE. THORF.SEN & MICHAELJ. MAHONEY, BEHAVIORALSELF-CON-FROL 9 (1974) ("To
exercise self-control the individual must understand what factors influence his actions and how he can alter
those factors.... [t]his understanding requires that the individual in effect become a sort of personal
scientist."); Schroeder, supra note 190, at 96 (requiring that judges "habitually check[]" themselves for
biases).
332. HIL, supra note 249, at 21 ("One method to improve decisions, is simply to make decision
makers aware ofthe nattre oflimitations of biases ofwhich they may not be aware. By simply becoming
informed ofinnate biases and perecption distortions, the decision maker can take the steps to correct them
... But awareness alone does not create a system.") (emphasis added); Cohen, supra note 183, at B9 ("The first
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without actually attempting the practices regularly, the "knowing-doing"
gap will remain an impediment to the attainment of judicial
mindfulness.313  Because judges are overloaded, if not overwhelmed,
with a growing docket of cases, they need a simple program that allows
for quick implementation, a requirement I call the judicial economy of
self-help. 4 Judicial mindfulness passes this test because it comports
with the general requirements of effective self-help models. 55 Judges
only have to use negative practice once to create a baseline for
evaluating their behavioral inclinations regarding the Constitution, for
example. Given the simplicity of this first step, the only real challenge
becomes achieving transitional thought in relation to problem cases as
they arise. To meet this challenge, judges might simply create a self-
monitoring chart implementing Professor Basseches's examples from the
Dialectical Schemata with the results gained from the exercise
interpreting the Constitution in a personal way. Because these
requirements are minimal in comparison to clinical self-help programs,
which require frequent consultation with mental health professionals,
judges should be able to use these tools in their chambers as they review
cases.
hurdle is to get judges to admit they are subject to the same psychological hiccups as everyone else."); c
Jonathan Baron & Rex Brown, Toward Improved Instruction in Decision laking to Adolescents: A Conceptual
Framawork and Pilot Program, in TEACHING DECISION MAKING TO ADOL-SCEN'TS 95, 107 Jonathan Baron
& Rex Brown eds., 1991) (recognizing that "simply warning.., of the existence of a bias does not usually
help" those affected by it).
353. In explaining this dilemma, Professors Lowenstein and Thompson point out studies indicating
that a large proportion of people have faulty conceptions of the way that thermostats operate. They
compare the causes of the problem to classes they have taught in which students of negotiation were still
unable to implement the theories they learned immediately following instruction. Jefflrey Lowenstein &
Leigh Thompson, The Challenge of Learninf, NEGOTIATIONJ., Oct. 2000, at 400, 401, 404. While the
advanced students in such negotiation classes surely benefited from the luxury ofhaving directed instruction
and feedback from the instructors, the success of the self-awareness methods described in this Article is
totally contingent upon the judge himself. See id. at 403-405 (describing a number of benefits when the
learning process is facilitated in classroom settings and explaining the unpredictable value of these methods
even as applied in supervised conditions).
354. See MITHAUG, supra note 319, at 32 (observing that "problem solvens use the least expensive
method to gain the minimal amount ofinformation necessary to decide").
355. See MICHAELJ. TANSEY & WAUFER F. BURKE, UNDERSTANDING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE
FROM PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION TO EMPATHY 87 (1989) (noting that productive self-checking
processes create frameworks for answering the following questions: "What am I experiencing?", "Why am
I feeling this way?", "How did this come about?" or "What purposes might this serve for the [litigants or
their counsel] to arouse this experience within me?"); Donald C. Nugent, J7udicial Bias, 42 CIE'. ST. L.
REV. i, 58 (1994) (noting that, "[alt a minimum, judges should mentally list potential biases that may
permeate their decision-making process [and] review and add to the list daily.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that two types of cold bias-one involving the
judge's past traumatic experiences and the other relating to his
interpretation of ambiguous terms or words-can negatively influence
judges by causing them to interpret the law in a hasty manner without
fully exploring alternative channels ofinterpretation. Either type of bias
can limit the utility of the judge's legal determination to the needs of an
ever-changing society. While the bias does not corrupt the legitimacy
of the materials upon which the judge relies to achieve his final
judgment, the bias impedes the process that the judge implements to
interpret such materials. In response to these harmful biases, this Article
identified certain methods of self-awareness that psychologists have used
to solve similar dilemmas in decision-making in a non-legal context.
Although these methods have apparently been neglected by the legal
community based on doubts about the utility of psychological
approaches in aiding legal analyses, they offer a number of important
analytical tools to the American judiciary.
While this Article may be the first to adopt Ellen Langer's concept of
mindfulness as a judicial objective, judges should have little difficulty
embracing the idea. It promotes many of the standards to which judges
are held accountable within their own profession. The greater difficulty
comes, however, with adopting psychological methods like Michael
Basseches's Dialectical Schemata as a legal approach. The problem
arises because, regardless of effectiveness of the DS Framework in
pointing out specific analytical problems, the Framework was never
intended to critique legal decision-making, specifically-a way of
thinking that is distinguishable from all others.
This Article urges the legal academy to experiment more with the
notion of transitional thinking as a method for judges to check and
address their own biases. With enough experimentation in this field,
judges should ultimately use psychologically tested models as checks
against their natural thought processes when reaching decisions. The
general debiasing framework proposed by Wilson and Brekke provide
a foundation upon which new advances in transitional thinking can be
built.
While this proposal has certain costs in that it requires legal ethicists
to promote the system and adapt it to administrative constraints on the
courts, these demands are realistic when compared to expensive
anonymous training sessions and the risks related to confused legal
outcomes.
The recommendation to experiment further with transitional thinking
comes not only because the system helps us identify better approaches
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to dealing with hard cases like Printz v. United States 3"-; approaches that
scholars, not to mention the PintzJustices themselves, were unable to
resolve with traditional analytical methods-but also because judges can
implement analyses under the framework without devoting incredible
amounts of time and energy to learning and implementing the system.
While judicial mindfulness may not be the panacea to improve all legal
analyses, it offers practical tools that will potentially improve legal
decision-making in a number of sensitive analytical areas that limit the
judicial role or permit unchecked legal outcomes, such as where the law
is indeterminate.
In sum, judicial mindfulness recognizes those judges who have
realized the need for greater self-awareness in their decision-making. As
one such jurist put it: "'Why do I make the decisions I do?' I make
them because I have to. But I can do better.
3 7
356. See Eskridge, sula note 320, at 1309 n.33 (calling /intZ a "hard constitutional casel I");
Matthew D. Adler, State &ereignty ard the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 374 ANNAl.S 138 (2001) (same).
337. HuL, supra note 249, at 28.
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